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ABSTRACT 
“GOSH I MISS THE COLD WAR”: POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY 
MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 1989-1995 
by Samantha Alisha Taylor 
August 2017 
The end of the Cold War created a dilemma for American foreign policymakers 
as the strategy to contain the spread of communism became obsolete. The presidencies of 
George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Jefferson Clinton were forced to create grand 
strategies for American national security and foreign policy to replace the forty-plus year 
strategy of containment that continued to rely on traditional themes and principles of US 
foreign policy. Both men had to overcome lingering Cold War attitudes about the United 
States role in the world and its national security interests. As they struggled to do this, 
they faced an American public that was supportive of and reluctant of American 
participation in conflict resolution around the world.  
This dissertation argues that even hat even as the international context changed 
following the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents 
George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy 
and national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-
containment grand strategy. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign 
policies returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and 
regional institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened 
to world security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold 
War technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and 
 iii 
electronic email increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence 
foreign policy decisions. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state 
conflicts the United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995. 
Using Bush and Clinton’s national security strategies, presidential documents, 
documents from the National Security Council, US State Department, and Central 
Intelligence Agency this dissertation examines the development and execution of Bush 
and Clinton’s grand strategies. The dissertation also uses public opinion polls, newspaper 
editorials, and archived television news reports understand public opinion and its 
responses to mass media and presidential framing and agenda setting.  
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The unanticipated end of the Cold War concluded the forty-year ideological 
conflict between communism and democratic capitalism and the rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. It also ended the raison d’etre for US involvement in 
international crises around the world. For forty years, the United States had intervened 
around the world to prevent the expansion of communism and Soviet power. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union ended this overarching justification for American international 
activism. Without this overarching justification, US policymakers struggled to create a 
unifying post-Cold War strategy that could duplicate the strategy of containment. This 
made it difficult for policymakers to present a coherent strategy of American 
interventions to the American public to get public support for those operations. As post-
Cold War conflicts increasing occurred within states, policymakers faced a difficult time 
explaining to the American public what threats those intranational conflicts posed threats 
to the United States and its interests. Another issue was the increased publicity of policy 
debates in the media where the public could view them, which informed public opinion to 
support or oppose policy decisions. This forced American policymakers and the president 
to sell their strategies and decisions to the American public. The increased publicity of 
foreign policy debates also put American policymakers in a competition with the mass 
media to frame international events and set the public agenda for America’s response.  
This dissertation argues that even as the international context changed following 
the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents George H. 
W. Bush and William “Bill” Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and 
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national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment 
grand strategy. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign policies 
returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional 
institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world 
security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War 
technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and 
electronic email increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence 
foreign policy decisions. The technological advances of the late 1980s and 1990s enabled 
the popularity of cable television and the rise of twenty-four-hour news channels like 
CNN and email. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state conflicts the 
United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995. It also explores the evolution of 
American national security and foreign policies during this period in response to the rise 
of intranational crises and decline of international ones. This dissertation will show that 
international changes occurring after the Cold War challenged American policymakers 
understanding of American interventions and how policymakers explained those 
decisions to gain public support. It will also show that changes in public opinion and 
mass media influences, starting as early as 1960s, changed the relationship between the 
president, the media, and the public about the way foreign policies were created.  
Opinion polls during the 1990s, revealed a growing divide between the American 
public and policymakers about the direction of America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. 
While most policymakers including Presidents Bush and Clinton wanted to maintain 
America’s leadership role around the world, the public was divided on whether the 
United States needed to fulfill such a role. Also, most Americans preferred the United 
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States engage in multinational or multilateral interventions, and maintaining America’s 
military presence around the world.1 This divergence occurred at a time when the mass 
media’s and the American public’s influence was growing, and media reports presented 
perspectives that differed from the president’s desired narrative. It also occurred as the 
occurrences of international conflicts, like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, decreased and 
intranational or intrastate conflicts, like the coup in Haiti, emerged as the dominate threat 
to global stability.  
These intranational conflicts created crises that did not directly threaten the 
United States, but because American policymakers believed in US global leadership they 
attempted to justify American participation in the interventions to resolve the crises. The 
policy decisions made regarding these intra-state imbroglios revealed two trends 
regarding US policy. For example, during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Bush successfully 
justified US participation to defend the Persian Gulf from Iraqi aggression, convinced the 
American public to support his policy decisions, and established a frame that the mass 
media mirrored. On the other hand, during the Bosnian War Bush and Clinton struggled 
to justify their policy to the American public, failed to establish a convincing frame for 
the conflict. Additionally, the media presented its own frame that focused on the 
humanitarian aspect of the crisis and countered the president’s frame. Bush and Clinton’s 
failure to convincingly justify their policy to the American public created divisions within 
public opinion and increased public opposition to the presidents’ decisions. It was during 
                                                 
1 Richard J. Cattani, “America In the World,” Public Perspectives, 3, no. 3 (March/April 1992): 3-
5. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33003.pdf  
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the Bosnian War that pressure from American public and media encouraged Clinton to 
make policy changes that led to the Dayton Accords in December 1995.  
This dissertation consists of several cases studies: the reunification of Germany, 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the coup in 
Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. These examples illustrate the interdependency of public 
opinion, mass media, and presidential policymaking in the post-Cold War foreign policy 
process. Since the 1970s, the president’s ability to determine foreign policy debates 
without significant opposition and to rely on bipartisan consensus had declined 
considerably. These post-Cold War conflicts occurred at a time when advances in 
telecommunications technology enabled real-time communications, expanded the 
popularity of cable television, and made the rise of twenty-four-hour cable news 
networks like CNN possible. These advances democratized television for the American 
public, which had previously been limited to the three broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, 
and NBC. These changes created an environment where Bush and Clinton had to publicly 
debate foreign policy while considering their position, the position of other Washington 
elites, the American public, and the mass media. Thus, in the early post-Cold War period, 
understanding public opinion became an important factor to successfully implement US 
foreign policy. It also required Bush and Clinton to work harder to make their 
interpretation and conception of these intranational crises the accepted frame, otherwise 
the mass media’s frame would become the publicly accepted understanding of events.  
This dissertation gets its title from a statement Bill Clinton made on 15 October 
1993 during an interview with the Washington Post. Following the withdrawal of US 
forces from Somalia, Clinton said, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually 
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coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”2 Clinton’s statement 
was partly in response to the failed military operation to capture Somali warlord 
Mohamed Farah Aideed and the publicized images of the Somalis mistreating the bodies 
of fallen US soldiers. It was also partially a reply to questions the failure raised about 
Clinton’s foreign policy agenda among the international community, the US Congress, 
and the American public. It was partly a reaction to the increased influence of the 
American public on foreign policy debates and decisions, and the publics ability to force 
the government to change policy in response to a negative result of a policy decision, and 
mass media’s growing influence in foreign policy debates due to technological advances. 
Lastly, it was also a response to Clinton’s struggle to establish a widely supported grand 
strategy to replace the simple, general, and long-enduring strategy of containment during 
a period where a concise message to explain and justify US responses to intranational 
conflicts remained elusive.  
George H. W. Bush 
Before he was elected president in 1988, Bush had served as Vice-President to 
Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1988. He had also served as US ambassador to the UN, the 
head of the CIA, and as a Naval flyer during World War II. Bush’s professional 
experiences differed greatly from his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, who had gained fame 
as a Hollywood actor and later entered politics as governor of California in 1966 before 
becoming president in 1980. During his presidency, Reagan produced a foreign policy 
                                                 
2 Ann Devroy and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,” 
Washington Post, October 17, 1993, 
https://secure.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/307677847.html?FMT=FT. 
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agenda with a nationalist outlook that exuded confidence in the rightness of US 
objectives and America’s ability to achieve those objectives. Also, Reagan did not 
believe that the Soviet system could change. He viewed the Soviet Union as eternally and 
implacably hostile to the West. Reagan’s hostile view of the Soviet Union and the world 
that led to a diplomatic style that had a propensity for simplicity.3  
On the other hand, Bush was less ideologically oriented than Reagan, and his 
rhetoric was often less antagonistic towards the Soviet Union and leftist regimes. Bush 
was also less likely to make hyperbolic declarations or rely on clichés in speeches and 
interviews. He focused on pragmatic diplomatic negotiations and sought cooperation with 
friends and opponents. While Reagan was “the Cold Warrior,”4 Bush, on the other hand, 
had diplomatic experience from his assignments as US Ambassador to the UN and as 
vice president, and he could negotiate with the Soviet Union and take advantages of the 
changes in the East-West relationship.5 Bush’s temperament fit the period of improved 
relations between the United States and Soviet Union. This was especially needed as 
Mikhail Gorbachev carried out his reform policies that emboldened democratic 
movements in the Warsaw Pact nations and weakened Soviet influence in Eastern 
Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1990 allowed Bush to create a 
foreign policy that did not focus on containing or rolling back Soviet expansionism as 
Reagan’s policy had. It also allowed Bush to undertake plans to reduce the size of the US 
                                                 
3 Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 1 (1988/1989): 1-27, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043881. 
4 Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press) xi. 
5 Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 1-5. 
 7 
military because he believed that the end of the Cold War eliminated the need for a large 
US military force. 
During Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign, the Republican party’s foreign policy 
agenda focused on ensuring the continuation of US leadership in the world and 
encouraging free nations to promote global peace. The Republican party’s main objective 
remained defending the United States, its interests, and its citizens while preserving 
peace, stability, and security around the world by fostering democratic self-determination 
and economic prosperity. The Republican party also intended to have the United States 
engage enemies and friends from a position of strength.6  
During his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination Bush 
incorporated the republican foreign policy platform into his campaign pledge. He 
promised to pursue peace through strength, to continue working to reduce the US and 
Soviet conventional and strategic weapons. He also pledged to support America’s 
modernization and technological edge, and to speak and stand for freedom in the East and 
West.7 He continued this in his inauguration speech when he stated that the United States 
would stay strong to protect peace. He also promised to work to continue America’s new 
relationship with the Soviet Union as consistent with US security.8 During his presidency, 
                                                 
6 Republican Party Platform, "Republican Party Platform of 1988," August 16, 1988, Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846.  
7 George Bush, “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National 
Convention in New Orleans,” August 18, 1988, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955.  
8 George Bush, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1989,” Public Papers of the President of the 
United States: George Bush, 1989 Book 1—January 20 to June 30, 1989, 3 (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1990). 
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Bush attempted to implement the Republican Party’s foreign policy platform by 
continuing the SALT talks with the Soviet Union, and adjusting US relations with 
NATO. However, not all of Bush’s policy decisions after the Cold War adhered to the 
Republican platform. Bush’s decision to support conflict resolution efforts by regional 
organizations during the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Haiti did not reflect 
American leadership. Bush’s actions during these conflicts created an image of American 
withdrawal from the world. This contradicted his New World Order that had called for 
US leadership in international collaborative efforts to resolve and end conflicts around 
the world. Nonetheless, Bush’s presidency provided the initial steps away from Cold War 
attitudes and the strategy of containment. He helped the nation learn to respond to post-
Cold War conflicts, and understand the costs of continuing to hold onto Cold War beliefs 
and strategies. As Clinton succeeded Bush as president, Clinton’s ability to learn from 
Bush’s successes and failures in the post-Cold War period foreign policy making would 
determine Clinton’s ability to establish a successful post-Cold War grand strategy. 
However, Clinton would face more conflicts like Bosnia and Haiti and few like Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. The spread of intranational conflicts would emerge as the largest 
challenge to Clinton’s ability to establish and implement his post-Cold War strategies and 
policies. 
William “Bill” Clinton 
Upon taking office in 1993, Clinton became the first post-Cold War American 
president. The Soviet Union was no longer an ideological or military threat to the United 
States, and the Cold War rules of containment were no longer applicable. In the wake of 
democracy’s “victory” over communism, the United States stood as the world’s sole 
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superpower. Thus, Clinton tried to develop a grand strategy to guide US foreign policies 
that would promoted US engagement with the world and promoted global prosperity. He 
also wanted the United States to defend and enlarge the number of democratic 
governments around the world. While Bush had faced a blend of international and 
intranational conflicts like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
Clinton faced intranational crises during the first two years of his presidency. The 
growing occurrence of intranational conflicts like illegal government changes, political 
opposition, ethnic violence, and genocide forced the United States to reevaluate its 
willingness to intervene in internal state conflicts that threatened regional stability and 
security even if it meant violating another countries sovereignty. 
As Clinton created his national security strategy and foreign policies he contended 
with mixed public opinions about US post-Cold War foreign policies that Bush had. 
Public opinion polls taken just before Clinton started his presidency revealed that that 75 
percent of Americans wanted to focus on domestic issues over foreign affairs. At the 
same time the public was split over letting the world get along as best it could without US 
interventions.9 Thus, Clinton faced complex public attitudes that increased the difficulties 
he faced gaining public support for his foreign policy decisions. The American public’s 
disenchantment with American activism abroad was shared by the mass media and added 
to Clinton’s struggle to keep the United States engaged in the post-Cold War world. 
Unlike his predecessor, Clinton lacked military and diplomatic experience. While Bush 
had been a young Navy pilot during WWII, Clinton had moved to Canada to avoid the 
                                                 
9 Richard Cattani “America In The World,” Public Perspectives 3 no. 3 (March-April, 1992): 6-9, 
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33006.pdf.  
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Vietnam draft. Whereas Bush had this experience from serving as the US Ambassador to 
the UN and as head of the CIA, Clinton had worked as a lawyer and local politician most 
of his career before running for president. Clinton’s lack of diplomatic experience 
became apparent when he attempted to explain his foreign policy to the public even 
though Clinton was a charismatic speaker. Clinton’s lack of foreign policy experience 
dampened his public confidence and his charisma making it difficult for Clinton to 
convincingly establish foreign policy frames and agendas during his first two years.  
During the 1992 presidential campaign, while Bush trumpeted his foreign policy 
successes, Clinton focused on domestic issues which resonated with the American 
public’s demand for greater attention at home than abroad. The Democratic party 
criticized Bush’s foreign policy for not acting assertively or tough enough to global 
crises, “What the United States needs is not the Bush Administration’s Cold War thinking 
on a smaller scale.”10 The Democratic Party argued US foreign policy needed to restore 
America’s global leadership position by helping the world prevent crises, deter dictators, 
respond assertively to aggression, punishing human rights abusers, protecting the 
environment, and honing America’s competitive edge in the global economy to the 
national security strategy and foreign policies. The Democratic Party noted, “The 
collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger to our interests.” 11 Democrats 
contended that US post-Cold War foreign policy and national security required 
restructuring the US military while maintaining its strength and America’s ability to 
                                                 
10 Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.  
11 Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.  
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defend itself. This included maintaining a nuclear presence capable of deterring any 
nuclear threat, shifting conventional military power to where national interests were 
threatened, reducing military size while maintaining international obligations and 
improving the ability to rapidly deploy, maintaining American superior personnel and 
technology, and improve intelligence capabilities to provide more timely and accurate 
analyses of situation that can cause conflicts.12  
Methodology 
This dissertation relies on an interdisciplinary approach that combines traditional 
diplomatic history with mass communications studies to understand the development of 
post-Cold War foreign policies as policymakers navigated a new international 
environment and greater public influence in the policymaking process because of the 
advances in telecommunications technology that introduced twenty-four-hour news 
channels, the internet, and email. This dissertation uses the mass communications 
theories of framing, agenda setting, cascading activation, and the “CNN factor” on policy 
making.  
 The mass communications theory of framing refers to the way an issue is 
characterized I news reports can influence how the audience understands the issue. 
Agenda setting is that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis mass media puts 
on issues and events through newspaper placement or the amount of coverage they give 
to those issues and events, and how important the public assumes those issues and events 
are. Framing and agenda setting focus on the ways the media reports on the issues and the 
                                                 
12 Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.  
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influence reporting styles and methods have on American understanding of events, and 
thereby what the public feels would be the proper response to those events.13  
Robert M. Entman’s cascading activation theory describes the interweaving 
influence on official views of events from the President to policy elites to the media then 
to the public, and back up, and how that effects policy decisions. Entman’s cascading 
activation reveals the contest between the president, his supporters, and critics for 
political leverage theory, and shows that implementing foreign policy requires the 
president to reckon with the media when proposing to use of military forces and the 
American public as well as Washington elites. Lastly the CNN effect argues that 
following the Cold War, Western media has been a driving force pushing Western 
governments, including the United States, to undertake untenable humanitarian 
interventions. The CNN effect focuses on how much power the media possesses to 
convince governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises through their use of 
images and rhetoric that sways the audience’s opinion of the crises, and pressure the 
government to act.14  
Scholars have shown that the president and mass media have influence on the 
public opinion, and that public attitudes can influence the direction of mass media and the 
policymakers. This interdependence is an important factor for my analysis of early post-
Cold War foreign policy, because after the Cold War this relationship had a growing 
                                                 
13 Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The 
Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” Journal of Communication 57 no. 1, (Mar 2007): 11. 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cms&AN=24074
978&site=ehost-live  
14 Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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influence on the ways that policymakers explained international situations and justified 
policy decisions to the American public.15 The presidential rhetoric and the president as 
media explores presidential agenda setting through public statements on policy agendas 
that and the president’s ability to make the public more aware of those policy areas, and 
support his decisions. Jeffery E. Cohen’s study on presidential State of the Union 
addresses shows that increased presidential attention to economic, foreign, and civil 
rights policies led to increased public concern towards those policies. Cohen continues 
that even sparse statements of policy areas could elicit a public response especially on 
foreign policy.16 Since televised presidential speeches are the president’s main means to 
express their positions to the public, I examine how presidential rhetoric and the president 
as media through broadcast and cable television influenced public opinion, and the 
president’s ability to sway public support for policy decisions through public statements 
about each crisis.  
Along with presidential rhetoric and the president as media, this dissertation 
explores public opinion and its influence on foreign policy decisions during German 
reunification, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnian War, 1991 
coup in Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. This research included public opinion polls, 
editorials, letters to the editor, and letters to the president of the United States.  
                                                 
15 Gary Young and William B. Perkins, “Presidential Rhetoric, The Public Agenda, and the End of 
Presidential Television’s ‘Golden Age’,” The Journal of Politics, 67 no. 4 (November 2005):1190-1205, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00356.x Jeffrey S. Peake, “Presidential Agenda 
Setting in Foreign Policy,” Political Research Quarterly 54 no. 1, (March 2001): 69-86, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/449208. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell, “Has Cable Ended the Golden 
Age of Presidential Television?” The American Political Science Review 93 no. 1 (March 1999): 99-114, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585763.  
16 Jeffrey E. Cohen, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” American Journal of Political 
Science 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 87-107, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111759.  
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Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms intranational and intra-state 
interchangeably to reference the multiple types of internal conflicts that states faced 
including humanitarian disasters, civil wars, ethnic fighting, genocide or ethnic cleansing, 
and illegitimate regime changes. Since intra-state imbroglios became the dominant form 
of conflict in the early post-Cold War period prevention and intervention methods 
became significant parts of Bush and Clinton’s security and foreign policy strategies.17  
Justifications 
This dissertation consists of six foreign policy case studies and a chapter on post-
Cold War mass media, public opinion, and presidential rhetoric. In this dissertation, I will 
analyze the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the 1991 military coup of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I chose the timeframe so that it included 
Bush’s transition from the Cold War and the adjustments he had to make to US foreign 
policy for post-Cold War international situation. Following Bush’s transition into 
Clinton’s first two years as a post-Cold War. This period provided a balanced period to 
                                                 
17 Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy no. 100 (Autumn 1995): 69-87. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149304. Mark E. Pietrzyk, “Explaining the Post-Cold War Order: An 
International Society Approach,” International Journal on World Peace 18 no. 3 (September 2001): 31-54, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753316. Adam Roberts, “International Relations after the Cold War,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institution of International Affairs 1944-) 84 no. 2, (March 2008): 34-350 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25144768. Alan James, “Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era,” International 
Journal 50 no. 2 (Spring 1995): 241-265, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25734052. Gareth Evans, 
“Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy no. 96 (Autumn 1994): 3-20, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149213. Linda B. Miller, “American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 66 no. 2 (April 1990) 313-324, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621336. Muzaffer Erean Yilmaz, “UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” International Journal of World Peace 22 no. 2 (June 2005): 13-28, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753484. Walter Russell Mead, “Lucid Stars: The American Foreign Policy 
Tradition,” World Peace Journal, 11 no. 4 (Winter 1994): 1-17, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209380.   
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explore Bush and Clinton’s policies toward the post-Cold War period. The years after 
1995 represent a subsequent break as the later post-Cold War period was increasingly 
marked by international terrorism which required a different national security strategy 
and foreign policies. Although it falls into my chronology I did not include the crisis in 
Somalia because of classification restrictions on Clinton’s National Security Council 
documents. I am hoping that in time more of these documents will become available so 
that I will be able to carry out a comparison of Bush’s and Clinton’s policies in the future.  
I chose to begin the dissertation with a chapter on the reunification of Germany 
because Bush’s diplomatic efforts contained elements of the strategy of containment, and 
American diplomatic and security strategies from WWII. This included cautious 
cooperation with Soviet leaders while standing ready to prevent any Soviet attempts to 
expand communism or initiate repressive policies in Eastern Germany or Eastern Europe. 
This was a significant turn at the end of the Cold War and indicated that improved 
international cooperation was possible in the future. The reunification of Germany was 
the last crisis the United States responded to while abiding by the strategy of 
containment. It also occurred as the right dominated American politics while the left 
dominated American culture, which created a conflict between political conservatism and 
secular multicultural worldviews. As democratic revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe 
started to undermine Soviet influence Bush contended the same changes occurring in the 
United States internationally.   
My second chapter explores the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that 
began on August 1, 1990. I will refer to this crisis as the Persian Gulf Crisis as it was 
referred to in the media. My use of the Persian Gulf Crisis only refers to the Iraq invasion 
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of Kuwait between August 1990 and January 1991. It does not include the Gulf War from 
January 1991 to April 1991. I made this decision to focus on Bush’s efforts to create and 
lead the international response and coalition against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and 
because it was the last international crisis that involved the Soviet Union as a world 
superpower. As Bush and his administration began to recognize that the Cold War was 
ending while the Soviet Union collapsed between 1990 and 1991, it was during the 
Persian Gulf Crisis that Bush began developing and espousing his post-Cold War 
strategy. I also chose the Persian Gulf Crisis to study Bush’s efforts to gain public 
opinion and control the frame for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Lastly, the Persian Gulf Crisis 
was the last international imbroglio the United States participated in as it transitioned to 
the post-Cold War period. After the Cold War, the United States participated in more 
intranational peace efforts, thus including this chapter allows me to compare Bush’s 
policies towards intranational conflicts as compared to international ones. 
I examine the dissolution of Yugoslavia for several reasons. First, because the 
collapse of Yugoslavia was the first crisis the United States dealt with after the Cold War 
ended, whereas the Persian Gulf Crisis and the reunification of Germany occurred during 
the end of the Cold War. Second, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was a direct result of the 
end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, international economic aid 
evaporated, and political and ethnic disagreements pushed the country toward collapse. 
The way Bush and the media framed Yugoslavia’s collapse influenced public opinion and 
by extension, Bush’s policy decisions. In particular, the media’s focus on “ancient ethnic 
hatreds” made justifying an intervention for any side difficult. Yugoslavia’s dissolution 
tested Bush’s New World Order vision and his ability to apply cooperative security 
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arrangements as a response to intra-state conflicts. As the Bosnian War resulted from the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, I examine it in the chapter following the Yugoslavia. This 
chapter is the first to analyze and compare Bush’s and Clinton’s strategies and policy 
decisions in the post-Cold War period, as well as their views on US leadership and 
intervention in intranational conflicts. 
In the next chapter I analyze the 1991 coup of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, which reveals both presidents post-Cold War commitment to defend and support 
democratic governments threatened by illegal government change and political 
opposition from enemies other than communists. Haiti also reveals the influence of race 
politics on US post-Cold War foreign policy, especially as the 1990s were a period where 
debates about racial equality and racial discord were important factors. Throughout US 
diplomatic historians African Americans had attempted to influence US foreign policy 
and US policymakers had used African Americans to further national security and foreign 
policy goals. In the post-Cold War period, the Congressional Black Caucus emerged as 
strong lobbying force in the government and foreign policy. Their efforts to change US 
policies towards Haiti under Bush and Clinton demonstrate the Congressional Black 
Caucus’s growing influence in Washington, and the changing nature or race in US 
foreign policy after the Cold War.  
I examine the genocide in Rwanda as another ethnic conflict and intranational 
conflict to show changes that began to occur in Clinton’s foreign policy regarding UN 
peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. The genocide occurred as the 
American public and politicians became increasingly wary of US participation in 
peacekeeping efforts that dragged the United States into quagmires that had little 
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connection to US interests and offered little reward. The Rwandan genocide tested 
Clinton’s re-evaluation of US participation in peacekeeping missions, and his ability to 
establish foreign policy frames and agendas without relying on those first established by 
George Bush.  
Explanation of Sources 
This dissertation relies on research that includes National Security Council and 
administration records from the Bush and Clinton Presidential libraries, U.S. State 
Department and CIA Freedom of Information Act websites, the United Nations Archive, 
and UN online records to analyze foreign policy and national security strategy. I use 
archived news broadcasts from ABC, CBS, NBC, C-Span, and CNN from the Vanderbilt 
University Television News Archive; newspaper articles and editorials from the New 
York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal; and public statements by George 
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to understand the contest between the president and media 
over the frames and agendas for each crisis. I also use newspaper editorials and public 
opinion polls by Gallup and the Pew Research Archives to get to public opinion about the 
conflicts and related policy decisions. Lastly, I use the White House Office of Records 
Management from the Bush and Clinton presidencies to access public correspondence to 
the presidents related to each conflict. Due to the size of the WHORM collections, this 
dissertation uses a sample of the letters available from the Bush and Clinton libraries. For 
example, the letters I gathered from the Clinton Archive on the Yugoslav conflict are 
mostly from 1995, with only few letters from the public before 1995. Part of this is due to 
public reaction or lack or response to the Bosnian crisis before 1995. The letters used on 
the Persian Gulf Crisis are a sampling of the 198,600 pages of correspondence Bush 
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received during Persian Gulf Crisis. The sample comes from letters that arrived around 
the time of major events during the Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991. Much of the 
letters in the sample are from the period between August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait 
and January 1991 when Bush, with UN support, made the decision to go to war.  
The mass media portions of this dissertation come from research in the New York 
Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal archives. By conducting keyword 
searches in the Vanderbilt Universities Television News Archive datable of broadcast 
news reports from August 1968 by ABC, CBS, and NBC I gained statistical information 
about news broadcasts on each crisis. These searches provided key terms that were used 
to describe each debate as well as the length of each broadcast. Analysis of archived 
videos come from Alexander Street and C-Span archives available. I have gained public 
opinion poll data from The Gallup Poll Monthly and the Pew Research Center website.  
Literature Review 
The post-Cold War environment was set up as early as the mid1960s when the 
United States faced social and political changes that included the civil rights movements, 
the 1964 Goldwater campaign, and the rise of the religious right in the 1970s. These 
changes configured the United States for the Ronald Reagan presidency which Sean 
Wilentz argues was a defining period for the conservative movement in the United States 
against liberal domestic policies. Though Reagan was mostly unsuccessful rolling back 
the New Deal and civil rights movements he opened avenues to undermine them.18 The 
domestic and foreign polices Reagan carried out occurred at a time the United States and 
                                                 
18 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008, (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 
2008). 
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much of the West was culturally moving to the left while politics moved to the right.19 In 
this Reagan’s foreign policy also pointed to a retrenchment of US Cold War attitudes 
including the belief that the United States and Russia were eternal enemies.20 Reagan’s 
domestic and foreign policies and the cultural changes occurring the in United States 
during the 1980s were both critical and complex. When Bush succeeded Reagan, he 
faced a diverging political and cultural situation at the same time the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev’s leadership was re-focusing its influence and power in Europe. The rise of 
personal computers, a more globalized economy, and the rise of MTV further pulled 
American society away from Cold War attitudes even as foreign policy remained 
dedicated to containment.  
As the Cold War ended the United States faced many conflicts that occurred 
because the Cold War rivalry led the United States to implement regime change to 
contain communism. David Schmitz exploration of America’s late-Cold War support for 
right wing dictatorships shows that United States instilled anti-American attitudes in 
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere to contain Soviet expansion.21 
While Schmitz touches on the consequences of America’s late-Cold War actions, 
Chalmers Johnson shows that these policies overextended US resources and planted the 
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seeds for post-Cold War conflicts.22 In the post-Cold War period, the Iraq invasion of 
Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, and other conflicts were connected with the changes 
created by the end of the Cold War and the changes in US foreign policy and national 
security strategy. This left the US policymakers with few options to resolve those 
conflicts.  
One change that did not occur in the post-Cold War period was of America’s 
military presence around the world. Lloyd Gardner argues that during and after the Cold 
War American policymakers believed the United States could encourage progress and 
introduce democratic governments while eliminating anti-American attitude by using 
American military power.23 These attitudes supported the continued deployment of 
American forces around the world. However, America cannot maintain its global military 
presence without consequences. In American Empire, Andrew Bacevich argues the 
continued global deployment of America's military power in the post-Cold War period 
threatens America’s position in the long term. He contends that US policymakers’ 
inability to create a post-Cold War grand strategy for the world’s only superpower forced 
the United States to maintain its global military presence.24 Bush and Clinton’s continued 
reliance on America’s military power around the world in the post-Cold War period did 
ensure post-Cold War stability and security. Repeatedly during the Cold War, Bush and 
                                                 
22 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, (New York, 
NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2000). 
23 Lloyd Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy From the 1970s 
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Clinton demonstrated reluctance to deploy US military forces to respond to a conflict 
than to use it to end a conflict. 
Part of this reluctance was due to strategy debates in both administrations about 
the framework for post-Cold War international relations: was the period unipolar or 
multipolar, and should the United States response unilaterally or multilaterally. In Nigel 
Thalakada and Christopher Layne show that while the post-Cold War period emerged as 
a unipolar situation, it quickly became multipolar. Thalakada argues that the post-Cold 
War period reversed the power dynamic of America’s Cold War alliances giving 
America’s allies opportunities to manage and influence American power. He also shows 
this led American policymakers to move away from unipolarity and embrace 
multipolarity by encouraging America’s allies to share the burdens of maintaining 
international stability.25 This move towards cooperative security revealed a short unipolar 
moment and the return to a multipolar system that had existed before the Cold War. As 
Layne argues this shift occurred as other states began to counterbalance America’s power 
through soft balancing – the use of diplomacy and international institutions, and hard 
balancing – the buildup of military power to directly challenge the United States.26 
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the consequences of America’s global military 
presence was balanced against the rise of regional powers which pushed the United States 
towards multilaterally and cooperative security arrangements. However, this did not 
                                                 
25 Nigel Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances, (New York, 
NY: Palgrave MacMillian, 2012). 
26 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States 
Unipolar Moment,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41. 
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cause the United States to lose it superpower status. While the United States remains the 
world’s only super power, Joseph Nye argues the United States can only maintain that 
status through multilateral diplomacy.27 He shows that without the Cold War threat of 
communism the United States lacks the ability to act unilaterally around the world. 
Richard N. Hass also shows that the United States can best defend its interests by relying 
on international organizations and multilateral undertakings.28 As America’s ability to 
deploy its military power around the world changed, so too did the influences that drove 
foreign policy decisions.  
US post-Cold War foreign policy relies on more than debates over unipolarity and 
multipolarity and the consequences of America’s global military presences. It also 
includes debates about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy making. James 
M. Scott and a group of international relations scholars and diplomatic historians show 
that after the Cold War the American President, Congress, and public each influence the 
development of post-Cold War foreign policies. The authors show that each group had 
different levels of influence, and that policymakers after the Cold War must take greater 
care to study the preferences of each group has for a policy can determine the level of 
support or opposition.29 As Bush and Clinton attempted to create post-Cold War grand 
strategies and foreign policies to respond to the rise of intranational conflicts. Hal Brand 
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contends that Bush’s New World Order and Clinton’s democratic enlargement struggled 
to calculate US goals and priorities in a changing international system.30 While Bush’s 
and Clinton’s non-containment policies were unable to completely respond to the rise of 
intra-state conflicts, their efforts attempted to adjust to the growing multipolar 
international system after forty years of a bipolar one.  
Other studies of American foreign policy have focused on how the post-Cold War 
presidents themselves have attempted to define U.S. foreign policy. Christopher 
Maynard’s Out of the Shadow and James D. Boys' Clinton’s Grand Strategy are two 
works that look at Bush and Clinton’s roles shaping of America’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy grand strategy. Maynard’s work explores Bush’s presidency as he transitioned to 
United States to the post-Cold War period. Throughout the book, Maynard reveals Bush’s 
and his administration’s thought processes as they responded to global changes between 
1989 and 1993. Maynard reveals that Bush was a foreign policy realist, not an idealist. 
He contends that Bush’s foreign policies were not a continuation of Ronald Reagan’s 
policies and Bush’s policies rested on his aggressive personal diplomatic style.31 In A 
World Transformed Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, detailed 
their memories and thoughts about the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the Gulf War. The diary reveals the 
inner thought process for Bush and his top advisor as he responded to global crises as 
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after the Cold War.32 Bush’s foreign policy attitudes and his responses to the challenges 
established the post-Cold War system that Clinton inherited and would continue to adapt 
US foreign policy to. Boys argues the core components of Clinton’s foreign policy were 
national security, prosperity promotion, and the promotion of democracy. He contends 
that Clinton’s responses to the Somalia and Balkan crises, economic challenges in 
Mexico and Europe, and the emergence of the European Union, North American Free 
Trade Agreement, and World Trade Organization were crucial to the development of 
world politics at the start of the twenty-first century.33 They also reveal the dual nature of 
Clinton’s foreign policy of promoting democracy and global economic prosperity as 
means to promote and defend US interests after the Cold War. Bush and Clinton’s 
responses to the post-Cold War period were based on assumptions made about global 
security and stability without the US-Soviet rivalry.  
In an edited collection by Ellen Schrecker, scholars explore how the United States 
“defeat” of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a distorted discourse on the Cold War’s end, 
prevented a postwar reassessment of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, and a final accounting of 
the Cold War’s impact on American society. The authors reveal that post-Cold War 
triumphalism misrepresented the emerging period and hindered efforts to respond to the 
period.34 Derek Chollet shows that liberals and conservatives attempted to reconcile 
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themselves to the post-Cold War period.35 While Philip Wegner shows that the 1990s was 
a period of full of debates about globalization, neoliberalism and the end of history, the 
rapid growth of the internet, and the rise of anti-globalization. He shows that these 
debates increasingly dominated the political and social climate as the post-Cold War 
period continued.36 The political and social debates of the 1990s increasingly made their 
influence on foreign policy decisions after the Cold War. The ways the media reported on 
and discussed domestic and foreign affairs further influence public opinions about 
America’s place in the world and its responsibilities.  
As the United States debated its policy choices the contest between the president, 
policy elites, the media, and the public affected the direction that foreign policy took. The 
media’s role in the post-Cold War reporting on crises and explaining them to the public 
influenced public opinion and public support or opposition to presidential foreign policy 
decisions. In Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts, Philip Hammond examines how the 
British media interpreted post-Cold War conflicts. He argues that the British media’s 
framing of the Balkan conflict as an ancient ethnic conflict influenced Western 
government’s determination to resolve the crisis.37 As the Bosnian War occurred 
telecommunications technology had improved allowing for instantaneous news on wars 
and catastrophes. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin’s War and Media argue that the 
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media’s role depicting wars and other crises with new telecommunications technology 
created a global awareness for the audience. They show that these changes affected the 
audience's understanding of war, and desensitized the audience to the images of war. 
They argue that the mediatization38 of war diffuses the relationship between the causes 
and effects of war, and increases uncertainty for policymakers.39 In a period, where 
intranational conflicts became increasingly common the media’s ability to provide 
constant updates about conflicts and to desensitize the audience to those conflicts, 
changed the way public opinion responded to televised conflicts.  
The media is not the sole source of information to drive public opinion. In 
“Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” Jeffery E. Cohen argues that the more 
attention the president gives to policy areas in their State of the Union Addresses 
increases public concern about those areas even if temporarily.40 However, the rise of 
cable television altered the way president’s increased public concern about foreign 
affairs. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell argue that the increased popularity and 
availability of cable television allowed the American public to choose whether to watch 
presidential addresses. They continue that this ability to choose to watch led to decreased 
the ratings for presidential addresses, which led networks to decrease their coverage of 
presidential addresses, and this encouraged presidents to reduce the number of addresses 
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they gave to consolidate their rhetorical influence.41 Continuing along this line Gary 
Young and William B. Perkins argue that the rise of cable networks did not negatively 
affect presidential rhetoric on foreign policy. They also note that the rise of cable 
television did not significantly diminish the president’s ability to influence public 
concern about foreign policy.42 As the Bush and Clinton competed with the media over 
public opinion to support foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War period, they also 
attempted to develop foreign policies that could respond to the international changes by 
relying on older foreign policy and national security frameworks. Their efforts led to a 
return to cooperative security arrangements and multipolar world to ensure stability and 
security after the Cold War.  
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CHAPTER II – BUSH AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY 
Introduction 
Of the dramatic changes that occurred in Eastern Europe because of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's leadership and reforms, the most striking was the opening of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the 
Communist Party and the Soviet Union. From that point, he implemented perestroika—a 
series of political reforms—within the Communist Party that opened it to liberalism, 
democracy, and helped bring about the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1985 and the 
opening of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev’s perestroika produced radical political reforms in 
the Soviet Union that severely diminished the authoritarian power of the Communist 
Party. Gorbachev’s policies started political competition between liberal-democrats, 
traditional communists, and reform-minded communists for control over Soviet policies. 
Additionally, Gorbachev's foreign policies led to a lessening of tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and his refusal to abide by the Brezhnev doctrine43 
led to successful democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, ending 
long-held beliefs the Cold War would continue indefinitely.44  
From the Berlin Airlift to John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech to 
Reagan’s call for Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall,” the United States 
repeatedly attempted to remove the barrier between communism and democracy. On 9 
November, a miscommunication from a Soviet official announced that the border was 
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open, and from that moment East and West Germans began reuniting.45 With the opening 
of the wall came joy and hope that Cold War divisions were finally coming to an end, and 
a period of coexistence was beginning. The opening also started discussions on reuniting 
East and West Germany and integrating Eastern and Western Europe.46  
The reunification of Germany revealed that while Cold War tensions, attitudes, 
and practices warmed, they would not end overnight. It also revealed that Bush had led 
the United States and the international community through these changes. This chapter 
argues that Bush’s strategy for the reunification of Germany was the initial step to create 
a post-Cold War grand strategy and foreign policies for the United States. By using 
earlier foreign policy methods, Bush reintroduced cooperative security strategies to 
American foreign policies. America presidents had used these policies throughout the 
Cold War as part of the strategy of containment, they had not use these policies to 
prevent or end international crises. The United States last used a cooperative security 
strategy during WWII, when Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman 
attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union and Western Europe. However, the depths 
of mistrust revealed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences led to the division of Europe 
and the world between democratic capitalism and communism. Over forty years this 
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distrust entrenched, so that in 1989 entrenched Cold War beliefs limited Bush’s ability to 
adjust US policies to the changing situation in Eastern Europe. These limitations 
prevented Bush from expanding his policies beyond countering Soviet suggestions, even 
as he cooperated with the Soviet Union and Western European leaders to reunite 
Germany.  
Political Changes and Border Openings 
Since no one was expecting the developments that occurred in the late-1980s, 
efforts to reunify Germany were caught in an environment of changing international 
political and security arrangements. These changes included the weakening of the Cold 
War dichotomy, and improved US-Soviet relations. The spread of successful democratic 
revolutions in Eastern Europe created instability that many, including the United States, 
feared would derail the reintegration of Eastern and Western Europe, and force the Soviet 
Union to use repressive tactics. The reunification of Germany was a microcosm of this 
environment. As the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France worked with the 
two Germanys the conflicts between Soviet desires and internal problems repeatedly 
required Bush to negotiate solutions that did not worsen Soviet instabilities.  
Following the opening of the Berlin Wall, the political situation in East Germany 
became unstable: increasing numbers of East Germans relocated to West Germany, GDR 
citizens forced their ways into previously secured government buildings, the public 
stormed secret police offices searching for files, and the government lost its monopoly 
over the news leading to reports on environmental damage and economic issues in the 
GDR. These events caused the GDR communist party to lose power, and forced the GDR 
to establish an interim all-party government in the communist party’s place. This new 
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government set a 6 May 1990 date for free elections to occur in East Germany to create a 
new government.47 The events occurring in GDR were similar to those occurring in 
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The combination of these revolutions led the 
United States and the Western European governments to fear the instability would lead to 
Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. These fears ensured that Bush and his administration 
remained wary of Soviet actions and statements throughout the reunification process. It 
also led to constant analysis reports before and during the reunification procedures about 
possible ways the Soviet Union might undermine or prevent Germany’s reunification. 
In February 1990, with the momentum for reunification increasing, Helmut Kohl, 
Chancellor of FRG, announced plans to begin talks with GDR leaders to bring the GDR 
economy under the control of the FRG central bank. On 10 February, Chancellor Kohl 
and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met with Gorbachev in Moscow. 
During the meeting, Gorbachev informed the men that the Soviet Union supported 
German unity under the condition that the combined borders of the GDR, FRG, and 
Berlin became the permanent borders for a reunified Germany. Gorbachev’s decision to 
support German reunification provided Bush with the space necessary to establish the 
method that Germany would reunify.  
This process involved convincing the British, French, and Soviet Union to accept 
a conference that only involved the Four Powers48 and the two Germanys. Bush would 
defend this plan because only the Four Powers had the authority to prevent Germany’s 
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reunification. However, Bush was only focused on uniting Germany, he did not intend to 
discuss German economic and security arrangements with the rest of Europe.49 This 
allowed Bush to focus on maintaining cooperation between the six parties which was a 
more manageable task that gaining consensus with all of Europe. It also allowed Bush to 
focus priorities on monitoring the Soviet Union and its responses to developments in 
Germany and Eastern Europe. 
US Planning for German Reunification 
As developments in the two Germanys revealed that German reunification would 
not be slowed, the Bush administration focused on understanding the attitudes and 
positions of Europe on German reunification. Through intelligence reports, the 
administration learned that many countries in Europe were uncomfortable with a quick 
path to German reunification, and many believed that a reunited and militarized Germany 
posed a threat to their national security. Bush and his staff recognized that opposition to a 
reunified Germany in Europe would increase tensions, and focused their efforts on 
establishing a consensus among the Four Powers, rather than all of Europe.50  
After the opening of the Berlin Wall, East and West German relations steadily 
improved, increasing German desires for reunification. As these attitudes increased Bush 
and the United States emerged as the main proponents of German reunification. Bush 
developed a three-pronged strategy capable of responding to Western Europe and the 
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Soviet Union concerns, and maintaining a cooperative environment between all six 
parties. The first part of Bush’s strategy required him to convince Britain and France to 
support reunification and overcome security concerns. Secondly, Bush and his 
administration had to determine what the Soviet Union would gain and lose with 
Germany’s reunification, and how those gains and losses would affect Soviet responses 
and policies. The second step required Bush and his administration to focus on cautious 
cooperation, while limiting any Soviet gains that threatened US interests in Europe. The 
third part of Bush’s strategy focused on maintaining cohesion between the United States, 
Britain, and France both as a bulwark against Soviet desires, and to limit internal 
conflicts among the three Western Allies.51  
Bush’s policies towards German reunification did not follow the stark divisions of 
the Cold War. Instead Bush’s actions resembled Roosevelt’s negotiations with the British 
and Soviet Union during WWII. Bush began by creating a consensus with his the British 
and the French, as this was the easier to accomplish even though the three governments 
did not completely agree German reunification. However, they shared similar views of 
the Soviet Union and what the reunification of Germany meant for reducing tensions in 
Europe and reducing the Soviet sphere of influence. Bush also cautiously negotiated with 
the Soviet Union while keeping containment in reserve should Soviet actions threaten the 
process to reunification or if Soviet desires challenged US interests to greatly. Like 
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Roosevelt, Bush’s prioritized compromise with the Western European powers over 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
Bush’s strategy for the reunification of Germany closely the diplomatic efforts 
during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on post-war Europe. During these conferences, 
the United States attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the make-up of 
postwar Europe. The United States cautiously cooperated with the Soviet Union while 
attempting to limit Soviet expansion in Europe while aligning close with the Western 
allies. In 1945, this strategy led to the division of Europe. However, between 1989 and 
1990, it provided the opportunity to reunify Germany and start reintegrating Eastern and 
Western Europe. 
As Bush and his administration began strategizing on how to reunify Germany, 
their first step was to determine what was legally required to reunite Germany. Since the 
end of WWII, the Four Powers had divided Germany between the Soviets and the 
Western Allies. Thus, the administration determined that German reunification required 
Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union to renounce their occupational 
authority over Germany. It also required settling German WWI and WWII debts, 
establishing permanent German borders, and determining Germany’s status in the EC, 
NATO, and other international institutions.52 By knowing the issues ahead of time, Bush 
begin developing methods to get the Four Powers to compromise on their conflicting 
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interests without undermining Germany’s reunification. He could also prepare responses 
for the most difficult issues.  
Of these issues, the most pressing were establishing Germany's border, and East 
Germany’s ties to the Soviet Union. The issue with Germany’s border was caused by 
German territorial claims in Poland. Bush learned that most European states would 
require this issue resolved before Germany reunified. The second concern was a reunited 
Germany’s position in Europe’s security infrastructure. Since FRG was a NATO member 
and GDR was in the Warsaw Pact, the United States had to convince the Soviet Union to 
accept Germany’s membership in NATO even if it did not join the Warsaw Pact. Bush’s 
ability to get the Soviet Union to accept a reunified Germany in NATO presented the 
largest obstacle to German reunification. This was especially true if Bush could not 
provide sufficient remuneration for Soviet military and economic loses after the GDR 
dissolved. This encouraged Bush to implement a strategy of cautious cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, and to observe the changing situation in Eastern Europe and the 
influences it had on Soviet policy decisions.53  
With this knowledge, the Bush administration undertook studies understand the 
role of warming US-Soviet relations in the reunification process. This was necessary as 
the democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were pushing the 
Soviets to relinquish control and influence, and Bush did not want to jeopardize their 
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revolutions as Germany reunified.54 Bush’s administration recognized that the United 
States could not afford a misstep in the reunification process or it risked threatening, if 
not undoing, the democratic revolution in those other states. In this situation, maintaining 
a cautious cooperation with the Soviet Union was key to prevent any act of Soviet 
repression in Eastern Europe. Bush also determined that German unification was not 
worth endangering the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, especially if reuniting 
Germany would provoke the Soviet Union to initiate repressive measures to regain 
control and influence. Bush’s ability to determine which interests in Europe were most 
important to American security would determine the how far he was willing to cooperate 
with the other parties involved in Germany’s reunification. It would also help him decide 
what interests he was willing to compromise on, and how far that compromise would 
reach.55  
The first hurdle Bush faced reunifying Germany was figuring out the best way to 
end Allied occupation powers over the two Germanys. The Bush administration 
determined that there were three ways to accomplish this. First, the Four Powers could 
stand aside and allow the Germanys to reunify since there was no legal precedent that 
required Allied approval for German reunification. While Bush could possibly persuade 
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Britain and French to accept this method, the Soviet Union would require Allied approval 
for German reunification.56  
The second option was for the Four Powers to individually renounce their powers. 
However, doing so came with one major disadvantage. While the United States could 
convince the British, and French to renounce their occupational powers, the Soviet Union 
would only renounce their powers after making a separate settlement with the Germanys 
on security and economic issues. The administration determined that any separate Soviet-
German settlement could undermine Western interests in Germany and NATO.57  
The third option was to hold a conference to resolve any issues surrounding 
Germany’s reunification. However, the administration did not prefer this method because 
it gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to make demands that could stall or prevent the 
Germanys from reuniting. Yet, developments revealed that the third option was preferred 
by the Soviets, Britain, France, and most of Europe. Therefore, Bush prepared to 
participate in a conference knowing that he would have to negotiate competing 
interests.58 
Therefore, it was paramount that Bush maintain cooperation between the 
countries to prevent Cold War antagonisms from derailing the reunification of Germany. 
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Bush’s ability to manage and reach compromises among the conflicting desires would 
determine the success of Germany’s reunification. With the fluid situation in Eastern 
Europe, Bush’s successes and failures maintaining international cooperation during 
German reunification would set a standard for future cooperative security engagements 
after Germany’s reunification.59  
To decrease the chances of disagreements undermining the conference, Bush and 
his administration decided to limit the talk’s agenda. The Bush administration decided 
that the agenda would focus on getting the Four Powers to agree to a method to end 
occupation powers over Germany. Then they would discuss Allied troop deployments in 
the Germany and Berlin. They would also establish Germany’s permanent borders and 
resolve German territorial claims in Poland. The administration’s decision to limit the 
conference to these points was to limit the obstacles the conference would encounter that 
could stop the reunification process.60  
The administration also explored the main sources of tension that would emerge 
during the talks. Bush’s staff contended that American desires to keep a reunified 
Germany in NATO would clash with Soviet desires for Germany to remain in the 
Warsaw Pact or make Germany a neutral country.61 The administration believed that the 
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Soviet Union would present the most obstacles to American desires, while the British and 
French were more likely to follow America’s lead so long as they received satisfactory 
guarantees to their concerns. This would require Bush maintain America’s presence in 
Europe as it re-evaluated its security arrangements as a counterbalance to reunited 
Germany.62  
Therefore, Bush’s efforts to successfully reunite Germany would rely on his 
ability to get Soviet cooperation and compromises with American goals. It would also 
require Bush to cooperate and compromise with the British and French on their security 
concerns, while ensuring that none of compromises Germany made threatened German 
sovereignty. Even as Bush cooperated with the Four Powers, he aligned more with the 
Western Europeans because the Cold War had not ended. This ensured that Bush looked 
upon Soviet proposals warily while he attempted to maintain the warm US-Soviet, and 
while ensuring that American and German desires were met.  
Bush’s ability to navigate the competing desires of American allies, the 
Germanys, and the Soviet Union would determine the success or failure of German 
reunification. At the same time, the pressure that European concerns placed on the United 
States revealed the growing independence of America’s Cold War from US leadership in 
matters of their own security. While Bush contended that the United States still had 
important interests in Europe, the changing dynamic of the Cold War also changed US-
Western European relations. Bush’s ability to cooperate with a changing Europe 
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demonstrated his flexibility that would after the Cold War, and how he could use 
cooperative security arrangements to respond to larger international crises. 
Bush’s desire to preserve the spread of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, 
meant the United States would find that the most difficult aspect of reunification would 
be the other Four Powers. They recognized that each country had individual concerns 
about Germany’s position in Europe, and all shared fears that a reunified Germany would 
threaten Europe again. The administration recognized that Bush’s ability to steer the 
reunification process, get all four countries to agree, and avoid any issues or debates that 
could stop the reunification process would test his leadership and diplomatic skills. It 
would also test how well the administration could work with the Soviet Union without 
endangering the improvement in US-Soviet relations, and avoid pushing the Soviet Union 
out of the process.63 The administration’s ability to predetermine the challenges it would 
face in the reunification process enabled Bush to develop responses publicly and 
diplomatically that could limit or reverse those obstacles. These studies also prepared the 
administration to undertake similar studies on conflicting interests among US allies when 
participating in a multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War period. By understanding 
its allies contradicting interests the Bush and American policymakers could better ensure 
international cooperation.  
Along with observing the Soviet Union, Bush and his administration also 
monitored Western Europeans concerns about German reunification. The Bush 
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administration decided the best way to complete Germany’s reunification was to 
cooperate more with the Western governments towards obtaining a consensus to limit 
Soviet influences in the talks. This included convincing Germany to voluntarily accept 
constraints and commitments that would satisfy European concerns, while also 
convincing the Western European leads to accept a reunified Germany with full 
sovereignty. This required Bush to negate Britain and France security concerns by 
guaranteeing American assistance against German aggression to create a united front that 
would discourage Soviet opposition.64  
NSC Policy Evaluations of Eastern Europe 
The continued adherence to Cold War attitudes among Bush’s staff and advisors 
hindered the administration’s ability to adjust policies to European crises and conflicts. 
While this was true of much of Bush’s administration and less so of Bush who practiced 
diplomatic realism, some of Bush’s policymakers recognized the need for more of the 
administration to adapt US policies to the changing situation in Europe. Those that 
suggested policy changes that changing US policies would prevent the United States from 
endangering improved US-Soviet relations, and worsening the instabilities in Eastern 
Europe. Robert Blackwill, special assistant to the president for European and Soviet 
Affairs, and Condoleezza Rice, director of NSC Soviet and East European Affairs 
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department, were among those members of the Bush’s administration that supported 
implementing policies that were more attentive to the situation in Europe.65  
In a letter to Brent Scowcroft, Blackwill wrote that many in the administration 
failed to recognize the repercussions of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union on the Cold War status quo and US policies. He wrote, “I am confident that 
we are as critically in need of such a reconceptualization/action plan as we were in the 
spring of last year.”66 Blackwill pointed to ending the administration’s fixation on 
traditional Cold War strategies and interests, and urged the administration to begin 
formulating policies based on the existing situation.67  
Condoleezza Rice joined Blackwill in proposing the NSC adjust US policies and 
national security interests in response to changes in Eastern Europe. Condoleezza Rice 
argued that much of the administration lacked general knowledge of the Soviet Union, 
and the changes that perestroika had brought. Rice continued: 
“The U.S. government is shaping policy toward the Soviet Union from functions 
and regional perspectives rather than from the point of view of the overall 
relationship. More importantly, these policies are developed with little 
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understanding of the deep chaos into which the Soviet Union is sinking or the 
impact our policies have on a very unstable situation there.”68  
She argued that as the Soviet Union grew more unstable the Kremlin would become 
overwhelmed by internal matters, and the United States would pay a heavy price for an 
inattentive policy towards the Soviet Union.69 Rice and Blackwill revealed that the 
administration needed to adjust its policies toward the Soviet Union in ways that reflected 
the turmoil occurring there. The changing dynamics in the Soviet Union required a policy 
and strategy reassessment to avoid exacerbating the instabilities in the Soviet Union. The 
move to reunify Germany was one of many causes of Soviet instability, and if the 
administration failed to correctly analyze the strains on Soviet leaders then the Bush 
administration risked Soviet cooperation during Germany’s reunification. Since the 
reunification of German required the cooperation of the Four Powers, Bush could ill 
afford to implement policies that would undermine US-Soviet relations and the 
reunification talks. Rice’s and Blackwill’s critique of the administration’s policy 
weaknesses point to entrenched Cold War ideologies that were preventing policy 
changes.  
Despite the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the United States could not 
ignore that the Soviet Union remained the only other nation in the world capable of 
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matching American military strength, and possessed the most powerful European 
military. This fact drove the administration’s policies during the reunification of 
Germany as much as Cold War attitudes. In a letter to Kohl before the Two-Plus-Four 
talks began Bush wrote:  
“Even if, as we hope, the Soviet Union withdraws all its troops from Eastern 
Europe, it will still remain far and away the most powerful single military power 
in Europe. U.S. troops in Germany and elsewhere on the continent, backed by a 
credible deterrent, must in my view continue to help preserve the security of the 
West…As our two countries journey together through this time of hope and 
promise, we can remain confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of 
freedom.”70  
Bush’s letter reveals that his administration continued to fear the Soviets would resort to 
military repression and resume expansionist polices in Eastern Europe in response to 
instability and its declining influence. If the Soviet’s resorted to military force to regain 
control in Eastern Europe it would eliminate any improvement in US-Soviet relations, or 
the possibility of reuniting Germany. Despite the Soviet’s continued military threat, Bush 
understood that he could not avoid working with the Soviets, and that his best strategy 
was to convince the Soviet’s to acquiesce to Western preferences.  
NSC Suggestions to Ensure German Reunification 
Beginning in 1990, the NSC posited that the United States could develop policies 
that were not limited to the strategy of containment, and included policies that supported 
Soviet restraint in Eastern Europe and improved US-Soviet relations. The NSC contended 
Gorbachev’s reforms had given the United States an opportunity to promote integrating 
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the Soviet Union into the international system. This did not mean that the United States 
would not continue to monitor the Soviet Union. Instead, the NSC decided “the United 
States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue, and institution by 
institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that the Soviet leadership 
itself has enunciated.”71 The NSC determined the best policy the US could take towards 
the Soviet Union was to support and encourage additional reform policies. However, for 
this strategy to succeed the NSC contended the policy needed to recognize that 
Gorbachev’s reforms came at high cost to Soviet economic and political systems, 
regardless of the benefits to the United States. The NSC continued that the changes 
Gorbachev initiated contradicted the Soviet objective for the past forty years, and if his 
policies create too much instability it would provide Gorbachev’s opponents with an 
opportunity to remove him from power.72  If this occurred it was highly likely that the 
Soviet Union would resume repressive policies to maintain influence in Eastern Europe, 
including restoring the communist party to power in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and GDR. 
The NSC believed that if German reunification caused the Soviet Union too many 
problems or the GDR became too unstable, the Soviets might militarily intervene. Should 
the Soviet intervene in the GDR it was more likely the Soviets would also intervene in 
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The NSC contended that a Soviet intervention in 
Eastern Europe would threaten improved East-West relations and US-Soviet relations. 
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This did not mean that the other allies were not threats the reunification of Germany, but 
that the British and French were the less likely to act if they disapproved of the direction 
reunification took.73  
Soviet Questions 
On 19 December 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze posed seven 
questions to the European Parliament that expressed Soviet conditions to begin the 
reunification of Germany. These questioned included guarantees against future German 
aggression, the roles a reunited Germany would have in Europe, and how German would 
establish its permanent border and resolve its territorial claims in Poland. He raised issues 
about the structure and mission of Germany’s military, and the possibility of a 
demilitarized and neutral Germany with restructured ties to Eastern Europe. He 
questioned what attitudes Germany had about Allied troop presence after reunification 
and the 1971 quadripartite agreement. Shevardnadze also raised questions about the 
reunification process. He questioned if German reunification would abide by the Helsinki 
process, if it would lead to constructive developments that overcame the division of 
Europe, and if the Germans were willing to include other European interests and 
collective action as part of the process.74 
Shevardnadze’s questions came from many influences that included European 
fears of Germany’s past and the threat a reunified Germany posed to European security 
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and peace. There were also economic concerns as a reunified Germany would resume its 
place as the largest economy in Europe which would require the Western states to adjust 
their economic policies. From these seven questions, the administration recognized how 
strongly the Soviets feared the repercussions of German reunification, and that the 
Soviets would be less inclined to oppose German reunification if these concerns and 
interests were addressed during the talks conducted. They also realized that the Soviets 
were ambiguous about how far they would push a reunited Germany security and 
economic concerns.75 Shevardnadze’s questions provided the Bush administration with a 
foundation to understand where any Soviet opposition would occur and an opportunity to 
prepare solutions that would prevent the Soviet Union from hindering the process. It also 
made it easier for Bush to avoid any problems that would inhibit cooperation between the 
former, and to resolve any problems that occurred.  
Following Shevardnadze’s speech, the administration recognized that the Soviet 
Union opposed a quick reunification in preference for a phased eight to ten-year 
reunification process. However, with euphoria and internal support growing, the Germans 
were highly likely to oppose efforts to impose a lengthy timeframe for Germany’s 
reunification, demilitarization, or neutrality. Additionally, Soviet desires to keep 
Germany out of NATO would be opposed by the United States and Western Europe, as 
they would view it as a threat to their security.76 Thus the administration had to convince 
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the Soviets to cooperate on measures that it opposed, while maintaining cohesion with the 
British and French. This required Bush and his staff to understand the web of 
contradicting interests and desires among its former WWII allies, which would prove 
crucial once the Two-Plus-Four talks began in the summer of 1990.  
Conflicting Western European Interests 
While the administration was focused on the conditions and proposals the Soviets 
might make, they also analyzed the interests the other countries involved had in the 
reunification process. The administration noted that FRG would prefer a treaty that 
ratified an agreement between the two Germanys. The administration posited it could 
convince the FRG to accept a peace conference if some Soviet conditions were 
acceptable, and the conditions placated the rest of Europe. In the GDR, the administration 
noted that the GDR would use the talks to prolong its existence as it was most likely that 
the FRG would absorb the GDR to create a single German state.  
The administration noted that while the British and French did not agree with all 
the Soviet’s proposals, there were some proposals those two countries agreed with. This 
included resolving reunification through an international conference, especially one that 
was slow and organized. However, neither country would publically announce their 
support for these proposals, and they would only support them if the FRG did. Outside of 
the main six, Poland expected the conference to resolve Germany’s territorial claims on 
its territory. Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe also expected the conference to avert 
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Soviet repressive measures that would thwart their democratic movements.77 While not 
every country that was analyzed was participating in Germany’s reunification, Bush 
needed this information to cooperate with the other Four Powers to successfully resolve 
the issued around Germany’s reunification. Bush would have to juggle multiple agendas 
to achieve as many US objectives as possible.  
The administration’s analysts contended that it was in US interests for the Four 
Powers to resolved the German situation. Additionally, analysts proposed waiting until 
after FRG elections in December 1990 to begin any conference between the Germanys 
and the Four Powers on Germany reunification. However, they recognized that if the 
FRG agreed with Gorbachev on a peace conference it would be impossible to delay the 
conference until after the elections. They continued that a FRG and Soviet agreement on 
a peace conference should not prevent the United States from rejecting Soviet proposals 
for reunified Germany that was not a member of NATO. It defended this assertion that: 
“Given the difficulties of managing a peace conference proposal issued by a 
desperate Gorbachev, our aim should be to ensure that such a Soviet initiative 
never comes to pass. This means using such influence as we have to slow down 
artfully the reunification process this year and bring some order and predictability 
to it—for our sake as well as Gorbachev’s.”78  
The CIA added that West Europeans were worried about integrating East 
Germany into the EC and the monetary union. They pointed to Europeans fears that a 
rushed reunification would create new problems or worsen existing ones in the EC. The 
                                                 
77 Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, “Responding to Soviet Calls for a German 
Peace Conference” n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 “German 
Reunification [2]” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
78 Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, “Responding to Soviet Calls for a German 
Peace Conference” n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 “German 
Reunification [2]” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
 51 
CIA contended that though the British and French could not slow down the move toward 
German reunification, the two countries might try to delay it, especially if Germany 
appeared insensitive to EC concerns. Along with Britain and France, Eastern European 
nations wanted a managed reunification process that could be used later to integrate their 
states into Western Europe. The CIA concluded that they expected legal reunification to 
complete within one year.79 Despite these concerns from US allies and other friendly 
states, a unified Germany served US interests in Europe. It served US security interests as 
a member of NATO because it strengthened NATO, whereas a neutral Germany 
weakened NATO and threatened European security. In addition, reunifying Germany 
served a significant lessening of East-West tensions, and further opened the Iron Curtain. 
With this information, Bush and his administration entered negotiations with its former 
WWII allies to reunify Germany. 
Last Minute Concerns 
On 30 January 1990, the CIA reported that there were scenarios that would hinder 
the move toward German reunification. The CIA based its scenarios on the unstable 
political climate in Eastern Europe that could become a source of tension in East-West 
relations. The CIA argued that the scenarios were: if GDR freely elected a government 
that achieved impressive economic growth and resisted political and economic 
domination by FRG; the FRG hesitated to move forward on reunification due to popular 
resentment over associated costs; the four powers required a neutral Germany as a 
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prerequisite of reunification or Kohl was replaced; the Soviet Union intervened or 
threatened to intervene militarily; Moscow used international methods to obstruct 
German reunification; or refused to withdraw its troops after a settlement, especially if 
Gorbachev lost power. The CIA postulated these were highly unlikely to occur, but due 
to the political climate in Europe felt that the administration should be aware of them 
while preparing for the Two-Plus-Four.80 Even as Bush prepared to convince the other 
Four Powers, their cooperation was constantly threatened by the changing environment in 
Europe and Cold War tensions. As the Soviet Union was withdrawing around the world, 
Soviet leaders desired to maintain some influence in Eastern Europe. However, Bush was 
unwilling to allow Soviet desires to affect Germany’s future in Europe or American 
interests there.  
In a memorandum that updated the situation in Europe and Germany’s 
reunification, the CIA reported that the East German election had strengthened Kohl’s 
negotiating position, and dashed French, British and most of Europe’s hopes that the 
election would slow the move toward German reunification. In addition, the FRG and 
GDR had agreed to use Article 2381 of the FRG Basic Laws (constitution) to integrate the 
GDR into the FRG. It noted that the French and British supported this decision because 
Article 23 created an orderly path to reunification, kept Germany in NATO, and 
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preserved Allied influence in future talks on German reunification. The CIA also reported 
that despite the successful vote, the Germans still needed to pacify Western European 
nations on their stances toward the EC and border issues with Poland. This was 
particularly important as many European states were concerned about Germany’s 
territorial claims in Poland, despite Kohl’s public announcements renouncing those 
claims.82 These final developments in Germany, set the situation that Bush would 
negotiate with the Four Powers to reunify Germany. These events also answered many of 
the questions regarding the way that reunification would occur and a created a clearer 
picture of everyone’s interests in Germany’s reunification. This included knowing that 
the fiercest debates would be with the Soviet Union over Germany’s role in integrated 
European economic and security institution. With this knowledge, Bush set out to 
cooperate with the other Four Powers on German reunification.  
 
Two-Plus-Four and German Reunification 
In February 1990, Secretary Baker and Bush had meetings with the foreign 
ministers of Britain, France, and West Germany. During these talks, Bush and Baker 
convinced the others that the Four Powers should resolve Germany’s reunification. Upon 
gaining a Western consensus, Baker met with Shevardnadze and gained Soviet support 
for a Four Powers conference on Germany’s reunification. After this, Bush and Baker 
convinced the British, French, and Soviets that the two Germanys should be involved in 
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the conference from the beginning, and not brought in after the Four Powers had 
established the initial policies for reunification.83  
Bush and Baker also convinced the others that only the two Germanys and Four 
Powers should formally participate in the discussions. They argued that only the Four 
Powers had the legal authority to reunify Germany and the FRG opposed NATO or 
CSCE involvement. In between meetings at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa, 
Canada, the Bush administration finalized the framework for the Two-Plus-Four talks. 
Baker confirmed the framework for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and gained Gorbachev’s 
consent that the Two-Plus-Four Talk would occur after the GDR elections in March. 
They also agreed to format the Two-Plus-Four Talks as a series of monthly meetings to 
resolve all international questions by November 1990 in time for the FRG to have all-
German elections.84  
Bush and Baker’s ability to get the Four Powers and Germanys to cooperate relied 
on the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These changes 
warmed US-Soviet relations, and enabled democratic movements to reintegrate Eastern 
Europe with the West. These changes did not eliminate Cold War attitudes, as the Bush 
and his administration continued to worry that the Soviet Union would resume repressive 
tactics in Eastern Europe. However, the negotiations that Bush and Baker conducted with 
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the Soviet Union demonstrated that US-Soviet cooperation was possible. Like the Yalta 
and Potsdam conferences ideological differences limited cooperation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Yet determining Eastern and Western Europe’s future was 
more pressing than ideological differences, especially when political changes threatened 
instability and European security. 
Two-Plus-Four Talks 
The six parties met in Bonn, FRG on 14 March 1990 to establish protocols for the 
following meetings, before the first Two-Plus-Four meeting was held in Berlin on 5 May. 
During this preliminary meeting, the participants agreed to hold all meetings on German 
soil alternating between the FRG and GDR. The participants concurred that all decisions 
would occur through consensus, and no other country could formally join the talks 
though Poland would be invited to participate when the talks discussed the German-
Polish border. They also assented that the talks would resolve the occupational powers 
for the Four Powers.85 These steps set the stage for cooperation during the talks. 
Despite these agreements, the six still held significant differences on important 
issues that could undermine Western cohesion. The British and French wanted to resolve 
the German-Polish border before the talks progressed too far. There was also a 
disagreement on the form of the final settlement. The FRG opposed calling the resolution 
a peace treaty because they viewed a peace treaty as humiliating and that it insinuated 
that the war was not over. On the other hand, the Soviets approved describing the 
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solution a peace treaty because the Four Powers were relinquishing their occupation 
powers over Germany. The Four Powers also disagreed about the scope of the talk’s 
agenda. The Bush wanted to focus solely on ending occupation authority and legally 
reunifying Germany, while the Soviets wanted a broader agenda that included Germany’s 
membership in NATO, the future deployment of Allied troops in Germany, and the status 
of nuclear weapons on German soil.86 Eventually, the six agreed to a limited agenda of 
devolution of Four Powers for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and that a reunited Germany and 
the Allies would determine Germany’s security standing in the future, and not to 
constrain Germany’s sovereignty by denying it the right to self-defense or to determine 
its own military and diplomatic alliances.87 
The Two-Plus-Four Talks and the reunification of Germany proceeded in monthly 
sessions among the six foreign ministers through the summer of 1990. In the final treaty, 
the Four Powers relinquished their rights, removed occupation forces from Berlin, and 
supported a reunited Germany’s sovereignty without outside controls or constraints. The 
treaty established that Germany’s borders were permanently established on the combined 
borders of FRG, GDR, and Berlin, and reunited Germany abandoned all territorial claims 
in Poland. Germany declared l all acts of preparations for or acts of aggression other 
unconstitutional. Finally, the reunified Germany agreed not to produce or possess 
weapons of mass destruction and to reduce its military personnel to 370,000 ground, air, 
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and naval forces combined. The Soviets agreed to remove their forces from Berlin and 
GDR by 1994, and the other three Four Powers agreed keep their forces in Berlin at 
Germany’s request.88  
Conclusions 
Due to Gorbachev’s policies and leadership, the Soviet Union underwent a period 
of political reform that weakened its power and influence. These changes made it 
possible for the Berlin Wall to open in 1989. However, these changes did not guarantee 
that the Germanys would reunite. Instead, continued changes and Bush’s diplomatic 
efforts convinced the Four Powers to end their occupation authority and support German 
reunification. Bush’s understanding of the situation in Europe made it easier for him to 
manage and maintain six’s Four Powers and Germanys cooperation to resolve the issues 
surrounding reunifying Germany. At the same time, Bush’s administration began to 
realize that the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union warranted a re-
evaluation of US policies towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, Cold 
War attitudes were deeply entrenched and difficult to overcome. Thus, the Bush 
administration remained most concerned about Soviet reaction to developments in 
Germany and Eastern Europe. This did not prevent the Bush administration from 
cooperating with Soviet leaders while pushing its own preferences for Germany’s future.  
While the Bush cooperated with Soviet leaders to reunify Germany, those efforts 
resembled the Yalta and Potsdam conferences where the United States and the Soviet 
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Union, discussed the future of the Europe and the world despite their ideological 
differences. German reunification was not another period of détente between the United 
States and Soviet Union. Instead the reunification of Germany would prove that the Cold 
War was ending. This continued as the international community responded to the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait. During this conflict, the United States led a multinational coalition, 
that included the Soviet Union, against Iraq and eventually successfully defeated Iraqi 
forces during the First Gulf War in Spring 1991. Bush once again demonstrated his 
diplomatic skills and flexibility cooperating with nations with diverging interests and 
agendas to successfully resolve Iraq aggression. 
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CHAPTER III  - BUSH, THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, AND THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER 
Introduction 
By 1990, US-Soviet relations had improved as the Soviet Union abandoned 
repressive policies that used military power to maintain influence and control in Eastern 
Europe. These changes led to democratic revolutions in Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and reunification of Germany. As this 
occurred, the threat of war between the United States and the Soviet Union decreased as 
regional instabilities and conflicts rose. Diminished Soviet influence around the world 
allowed the United States to develop national security strategies and foreign policies that 
were less focused on containing Soviet expansion, and to re-evaluate US relationships 
around the world. These re-evaluations led some countries, like Iraq and Yugoslavia, to 
lose American support, as these states were no longer deemed necessary partners to 
defend US interests abroad. These re-evaluations also meant that the United States was 
more likely to support international opposition against its former friends when they acted 
aggressively. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Saddam Hussein learned quickly that 
the United States would no longer turn a blind eye to his aggressive acts against his 
neighbors in the Persian Gulf.  
This chapter argues that following the reunification of Germany and successful 
cooperative efforts with some of its WWII allies, the United States led by Bush continued 
to re-evaluate US national interests and security strategies. The culmination of this re-
evaluation would become Bush’s New World Order that emphasized collective security, 
international liberalism, and the rule of law as the paths to secure global security and 
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stability. While this differed from the strategy of containment, Bush’s New World Order 
continued themes in US foreign policy of global stability and international cooperation to 
deter aggression to defend the United States and its interests since the founding of the 
nation. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Bush used his military and diplomatic 
experiences to implement policies and strategies based on the New World Order that 
allowed him to gain and maintain international cooperation to end Iraq’s illegal 
annexation Kuwait. Before his election to the presidency, Bush had served as a fighter 
pilot in the U.S. Navy during WWII, U.S. House of Representatives for Texas, US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, and 
Director of Central Intelligence agency and Vice President to Ronald Reagan. These 
senior positions provided Bush with military, foreign policy, and intelligence experience 
that he would rely on during his presidency. His experiences in the UN ensured that Bush 
was familiar with the way the UN worked, his UN post and position as Vice President 
ensured that Bush had numerous contacts and relations with other foreign leaders that he 
could use for the Persian Gulf Crisis. 
The Persian Gulf Crisis89 also allowed Bush to publicize his views and strategies 
for the new period, and transition US national security strategy and foreign policies away 
from the strategy of containment. The change in the global environment as the 
international community responded to Iraqi aggression demonstrated that most Cold War 
attitudes had been overcome.  
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Iraqi Behavior in the Persian Gulf 
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a consequence of the Iraq-Iran War, which was 
fought from1980 to 1988. The Iraq-Iran War began over Hussein’s desire control Iranian 
oil fields along the Iraq-Iran border. During the war, Hussein borrowed billions of dollars 
from Kuwait. After the war ended in a ceasefire Iraq owed Kuwait a large debt. This led 
Hussein to bully Kuwait and Iraq’s other neighbors to force them to raise oil prices, and 
forgive Iraqi debt from the war. Hussein’s behavior peaked in July 1990 when Tariq 
Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, delivered a letter to the Arab League that accused Kuwait 
of several charges. The charges included that Kuwait was guilty of military aggression 
against Iraq for refusing to settle the Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary dispute, refusing to forgive 
the multi-billion Iraqi debt to Kuwait, and pumping more oil than the agreed OPEC 
production quotas. When the Arab League failed to force Kuwait to provide Iraq with a 
satisfactory response, Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait.90  
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was quickly met with international outrage and 
condemnation. Following American leadership, the international community cooperated 
to isolate Iraq, and defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. As Bush 
cooperated with the other nations with interests ending Iraq’s invasion, he and his 
administration began implementing the policy changes advocated by Blackwill and Rice 
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during efforts to reunify Germany.91 Bush’s response to the Persian Gulf Crisis 
formalized the policy revisions he and his administration had initiated. Additionally, Iraqi 
aggression against Kuwait forced Bush to re-evaluate his policies to maintain stability in 
the Persian Gulf, and US interests in the region. This was part of a trend of re-evaluating 
US interests around the world, and understanding which allied and friendly states could 
support US efforts since the Soviet Union was no longer America’s greatest adversary to 
global security. 
Bush’s National Security Strategy: 1990-1991 
In his first national security strategy, Bush acknowledged the successful defense 
of American national interests during the Cold War, and he noted that in the post-Cold 
War period changes were occurring:  
The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by 
developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet our goals 
and interests remain constant. And, as we look toward—and hope for—a better 
tomorrow, we must also look to those elements of our past policy that have played 
a major role in bringing us to where we are today. It is our steadfastness over four 
decades that has brought us to this moment of historic opportunity. We will not let 
that opportunity pass, nor will we shrink from the challenges created by new 
conditions.92 
Bush wrote that Cold War national security strategies had focused on containing the 
Soviet Union expansion and dominance in Europe and Asia through diplomatic, 
                                                 
91 In separate memos Blackwill and Rice noted different pitfalls the Bush administration was 
falling into as the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union changed. Blackwill argued that the 
administration needed to take notice of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and begin adopting 
policies that did not rely on the strategy of containment. Rice argued that the administration was hurting its 
policies and successfully implementing those policies if the administration did not begin educating itself on 
the current situation in the Soviet Union, and began preparing for the fallout of Soviet instability. 
92 George Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990” Preface. 
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080. 
 63 
economic, and military means. He continued that this strategy had created conditions and 
opportunities that allowed the United States to emerge as a global leader with a primary 
duty to ensure the stability of the international community. He argued that as Soviet 
dissolution brought changes to the international situation, America’s goals, values, and 
responsibility to maintain global security and stability remained the same.93 While the 
United States no longer needed to defend the world from communism, the world 
remained threatened by international acts of aggression and internal conflicts that 
threatened world stability and security. 
Bush contended that America’s national interests were to first deter aggression 
and improve strategic stability; and second to encourage greater recognition of human 
rights, free market principles, free elections, and restrained military spending in the 
Soviet Union.94 To accomplish this, Bush continued significant principles from the 
strategy of containment. This included continuing the US reliance on flexible options to 
deter and respond to aggression. It also required the United States to seek out alliances 
with other states that shared American values and security interests to create a system of 
collective security.95 At the same time he combined these principles with theories and 
policies from before the Cold War. Even as the Cold War came to an end, US 
policymakers had a difficult time breaking away from Cold War attitudes and strategies. 
that had defended US national interests for over forty years. Bush realized that containing 
                                                 
93 NSS90, 1-3. 
94 NSS90, 1-3. 
95 George Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990” 23, 
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080. 
 64 
outbreaks of aggression around the world served US interests better that containing the 
insolvent Soviet Union. He also noted that while the United States had the military 
prowess to defend its interests unilaterally, it was in America’s interests to cooperate with 
international friends and allies.  
Bush noted, “The security environment we face in the 1990s is more hopeful, but 
in many ways also more uncertain than at any time in the recent past.”96 He contended 
that the United States faced numerous questions about how to ensure international 
stability as global interdependence and multipolarity rose out of the disintegration of the 
US-Soviet bipolarity. There were also questions about the character of America’s new 
leadership role in a post-Cold War international environment, how the United States 
should plan for reversals of strategic gains, and determine what risks to its interests the 
United States was willing to accept. Bush was also concerned about the adaptability of 
US forces to changing situations as the USSR collapsed, the viability of diplomatic 
efforts to maintain cohesion with allies and friendly countries as their common threat 
weakened, and the future of post-Soviet Europe.97  
From this point, Bush and his administration created a post-Cold War framework 
for US foreign policy to create a future that was more peaceful and hopeful than the past. 
It was a grand strategy that recognized the possible holes left by the end of the US-Soviet 
rivalry, and what those holes meant for alliances based on Cold War antagonisms. The 
administration also prepared to respond to changes in international conflicts, though it 
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would fail to recognize that the destabilization brought by the Soviet Union’s collapse 
would lead to intra-state conflicts that would threaten US interests. The administration 
also understood that the Cold War’s end would force all countries to adapt their 
diplomatic and military strategies. It also understood that the United States would need to 
adjust how it established cooperative efforts and initiated multinational responses to 
international aggression. These insights prepared the United States for some of the chaos 
that would follow the end of the Cold War. After successfully using Bush’s new strategy 
during the Persian Gulf Crisis, these insights, especially those about the nature of future 
conflicts, would leave Bush struggling to implement his New World Order strategy 
elsewhere. 
In the post-Cold War era, the United States remained a superpower and a world 
leader, but in the new world environment without the Cold War dichotomy Bush would 
have to direct the world toward collective action to create a future of global stability and 
peace. As part of his national security strategy, Bush promoted the rule of law, diplomatic 
solutions for regional conflicts, maintaining regional balances of power, and promoting 
the spread of democratic institutions. It would also support humanitarianism, trade, and 
financial policies that promoted economic, social, and political progress throughout the 
world. It would also pledge the United States to protect democratic institutions from 
aggressions, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and drug trafficking.98 Bush’s 
1990 national security strategy outlined the most important aspects of his New World 
Order—collective security and deterring aggression, and he would finalize the New 
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World Order throughout preparations for the Persian Gulf War. Thus, even as Bush’s 
post-Cold War framework was in development, he had determined the direction he 
wanted to take the United States—to lead the world toward collective action to deter 
aggression and to defend peace. 
The New World Order 
During this period, Bush introduced a new perspective on American national 
security that included a non-containment framework for his policies. However, Bush 
would not begin explaining this strategy until the buildup for Operation Desert Storm. 
The Bush called his new strategy the “New World Order,” and he in multiple statements 
argued his strategy would help the world eliminate terrorism, pursue justice stronger, 
improve security to bring about peace, and promote a harmonious and prosperous global 
community. He also contended his New World Order strategy would create new ways for 
nations to cooperate, and deter aggression.99 Additionally, the New World Order would 
introduce a different type of global security that emphasized an enduring international 
commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity against aggression. 
Bush rejected any notions that the New World Order would create a Pax Americana or 
was a euphemism for the United States as world policeman. Instead, he posited that the 
New World Order strategy would help the United States act as one of several leaders 
among nations and within international organizations.100  
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Bush’s description of the New World Order Woodrow Wilson’s call for the 
League of Nations after WWI to avoid another world war and to bring about world peace. 
Bush’s call for international cooperation to address aggression and crises revealed the 
Bush wanted the United State to be a leader in the global community not the leader of 
the world. Bush’s strategy looked as the United States’ position as the world’s only 
superpower, and created a strategy that emphasized multilateralism while leaving 
unilateral action as an option when necessary to defend US interests. Even with unilateral 
action still available, Bush’s plan for America’s post-Cold War leadership had a greater 
emphasis on collaboration with friends and allies. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait tested the 
feasibility of Bush’s framework in the post-Cold War world, and how far Bush’s ideas 
would be accepted by the international community. Bush’s ability to help lead the 
international opposition to Iraqi aggression would determine the possibilities for future 
international cooperation that Bush wanted to become the standard for the emerging era.  
As Bush continued to discuss the New World Order strategy, the administration 
noted that New World Order strategy could be described by multiple principles and 
theories—a commonwealth of nations governed by the Rule of Law, nations joined in 
collective action against aggression, liberal or democratic internationalism, or a global 
partnership of nations pursuing peace, security, and justice. The administration noted that 
these many of these theories were incompatible with each other. They also noted that 
justifying the intervention in the Persian Gulf through some principles and theories, like 
the rule of law, was problematic because historically the UN charter had been applied 
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arbitrarily even though it was internationally accepted. Additionally, many Persian Gulf 
regimes did not abide by the rule of law or adhere the other theories.101  
The multiple influences in the New World Order strategy pulled on American 
traditions since Woodrow Wilson and World War I, that used American leadership to 
encourage international cooperation to deter aggression. The New World Order strategy 
also demonstrated that Bush recognized that crises and conflicts would continue after the 
Cold War. He also accepted that without the US-Soviet rivalry he would face new 
challenges and had to use different means to secure international cooperation, even with 
support from US allies. The memo showed that would struggles similar to main struggle 
Bush faced would be generating consensus among international leaders that no longer 
had a unifying threat to their interests as he attempted to establish international 
cooperation. However, the crisis created by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait created a 
temporary threat that the world united against because it bridged any differences or 
conflicts among the nations.  
National Security Policy Toward the Middle East 
After World War II, US interests in the Middle East increased as part of the policy 
to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union, protect Israel, and gain access to cheap oil. 
To contain communism, the United States initiated military and diplomatic arrangements 
with strategically important Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, 
Israel, Kuwait, and others. In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalist and anti-American 
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movements produced regime changes in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and other 
countries experienced major instability that altered America’s security strategies in the 
Middle East. In response, the United States increased economic and military support for 
those countries that continued to support US policies in the region.102  
Along with political relationships, the United States has been involved with 
Middle Eastern oil since 1928, though it was not until after WWII that oil became a 
national security interest. After the end of WWII, the world’s demand for oil increased, 
and the oil embargo during the 1970’s shifted power from oil consuming countries to oil 
producing ones. However, the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, oil 
conservation measures, and an alliance with Saudi Arabia protected the United States 
from the oil hike in 1979 caused by the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War. The 
combination of those methods also lessened the influence oil diplomacy could have on 
the United States. By the mid-1980s, US oil policy shifted from defense against oil 
supply instabilities to defending oil producing countries from regional or international 
threats. To defend the Persian Gulf region, the United States aligned with Iraq. This 
relationship remained in place until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 decreasing 
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America’s need to rely on Iraq to defend the oil producing Persian Gulf countries against 
Soviet expansionism.103  
As America’s national security and foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern 
changed in response to the changing international situation some policies remained 
constant including maintaining access to oil. However, other policies the United States 
had implemented changed the ways the United States went about protecting its oil 
interest in the Persian Gulf. For instance, without the Soviet threat the United States no 
longer needed Iraq to defend the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the United States became less 
forgiving of Iraqi aggression, though the government had some difficulties expressing 
this change diplomatically, or acknowledging Hussein’s willingness to use aggression to 
achieve his goals. Nonetheless, after Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, the US 
response demonstrated how little room the United States was willing to provide Iraq to 
implement policies that threatened any US interests in the Persian Gulf.  
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National Security Directive-26 
Upon taking office in 1989, Bush outlined his policies toward the Persian Gulf in 
National Security Directive-26. In this directive Bush contended that, “access to Persian 
Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national 
security,” and that the United States would defend vital interests in the region through 
military force if necessary.104 In addition to defending US interests in the Persian Gulf, 
Bush wrote that the United States was committed to supporting collective self-defense 
efforts of friendly Persian Gulf countries because it would enable those states to have a 
more active role in their own defense and reduced the need for US unilateral actions. This 
included encouraging mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships 
with the Cooperation Council for the Arab Sates of the Gulf (GCC) created by the Iraq-
Iran War.105 In this NSD, continued his policies towards international cooperation Bush 
by using the strategy as part of his regional policies towards the Persian Gulf. He also 
addressed the policy changes to respond to the end of the Soviet threat in the Middle 
East, and the rise of anti-American attitudes.  
As a means of buttressing America’s position in the Middle East and to 
counterbalance Iran, Bush continued friendly relations with Iraq, but caveated America’s 
support for Iraq to US long-term interests. This included maintaining relations also long 
as Iraq promoted stability in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. To encourage the desired 
behavior from Hussein, Bush proposed using economic and political incentives to 
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encourage Iraq to moderate its aggressive behavior and to increase America’s influence 
there. Bush also directed the administration to create contingency policies that included 
economic and political sanctions against Iraq if Hussein used chemical or biological 
weapons. Lastly, Bush wanted policies that would encourage Iraq to stop meddling in 
other Middle Eastern affairs, and to play a constructive role in the Middle East peace 
process.106  
This policy recognized Iraq as a regional power the United States could rely on to 
promote regional stability, and it provided Bush with an opening to drop Iraq as an ally if 
its policies threatened Middle Eastern stability and access to oil. However, it also 
recognized that Iraq’s usefulness was limited. While the United States wanted to pursue a 
policy of collaboration with Iraq, Bush also prepared to respond to any Iraqi action that 
undermined his policies to promote regional stability and maintain access to oil.  
While Bush developed these policies, the policies were limited by assumptions 
about Saddam’s intentions. The Bush administration believed that after fighting against 
Iran and incurring a large debts and destruction of the military, that Saddam was tired of 
war and needed time to rebuild its forces. The administration believed this weariness 
would encourage Hussein to rely on diplomatic coercion rather than military force. The 
administration also assumed that it could deter any act of aggression through diplomatic 
and economic methods.107 Unfortunately, these assumptions were incorrect, as Saddam 
began rebuilding Iraq’s military forces shortly after the end of the Iraq-Iran War, and US 
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diplomatic efforts to discourage Saddam’s aggression were ineffective. This policy 
failure forced Bush to classify Hussein and Iraq as threats to the United States and the 
world. As the world recognized Iraq as a threat to every country’s oil interests, Bush 
found an easy conflict to generate cooperation around. Bush’s efforts to cooperate with 
the rest of the international community to develop a consensus towards Iraq brought his 
post-Cold War strategy to life. The Persian Gulf Crisis led Bush to issue two other NSD’s 
as the situation changed and to develop policy responses. At the same time, Bush began 
working with the international community to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi 
aggression.  
National Security Directive-45 
On 20 August 1990, Bush released NSD-45, which maintained that the Persian 
Gulf was vital to US national security, and that the United States would use military force 
to protect those interests if necessary. He argued that the Iraq invasion of Kuwait placed 
US interests in danger and outlined four principles to guide his policy response. The first 
principle had the United States call for Iraq to immediately, completely, and 
unconditionally withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait. It also called for Iraq to restore 
Kuwait’s legitimate government. Third, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to 
the Persian Gulf’s security and stability. Lastly, Bush pledged the United States to protect 
American citizens from any danger from Iraqi forces. Additionally, Bush directed the 
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United States to support the implementation of UNSC resolutions 660108 and 662109 Bush 
also instructed Baker to work with American allies and the international community to 
find a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf Crisis.110 
Bush’s first policies implemented economic sanctions in line with UNSC 
resolution 661111, and froze all Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. He also 
started Operation Desert Shield which deployed US troops to Saudi Arabia to defend the 
country against an Iraqi invasion. As part of Operation Desert Shield Bush ordered US 
forces to protect American interests Saudi Arabia by establishing defensive positions to 
deter Iraqi aggression. Bush also ordered those forces to defend American allies in the 
region if necessary, and to enforce UNSC resolutions 660 and 661.112 Bush’s experiences 
in the UN had ingrained on him how beneficial cooperating with the UN was to protect 
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US interests and to execute US foreign policies. As part of his New World Order, Bush 
relied on the UN to implement his collective security framework, and demonstrate the 
UN’s post-Cold War possibilities to support cooperative security arrangements and to 
respond to international aggression. 
NSC Policy Discussions After the Invasion of Kuwait 
From the start of the Iraqi invasion the NSC/PC and NSC/DC met to help Bush 
formulate policies to respond to additional Iraqi actions in the Persian Gulf. On 1 August 
NSC/DC had its first meeting on the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. During the meeting, 
the NSC/DC started drafting plans for the United States to coordinate with the UN and 
US allies to create a concerted response. The NSC/DC also discussed the Kuwait 
government’s desire for the United States to fulfill its commitments to Kuwait. This 
included America’s commitment to defend Kuwaiti security and sovereignty. 
Additionally, the NSC/DP discussed the Kuwaiti request for the United States to issue a 
strongly worded statement that condemned Iraqi aggression, denounced Iraq’s violation 
of the UN Charter, and demanded Iraq to immediately cease the invasion and 
immediately withdraw all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.113  
From its first meeting on the Persian Gulf Crisis the Bush administration decided 
that it was going to seek international support to oppose Iraqi aggression and end the 
illegal invasion of Kuwait. Bush adhered to the New World Order early in the planning 
process towards the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, by deciding at the beginning that the United 
                                                 
113 Memorandum “Minutes of Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq, August 1, 1990,” folder Has, 
Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 “DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 
Re Persian Gulf” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.  
 76 
States would seek a multilateral approach instead of a unilateral one. Bush’s decision to 
create an international opposition to Iraqi aggression demonstrated Bush’s commitment 
to cooperative security methods to respond to aggression. It was also a way to show other 
countries that the United States had not interests ensuring global security and stability 
alone, but that the United States intended to cooperate with other countries and regions.  
The first actions the administration focused on was generating international 
support for economic sanctions against Iraq. The NSC/DC decided its first actions were 
to implement economic sanctions that froze Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets based in the United 
States to prevent Hussein from stealing from Kuwait, and to deny Hussein funds to 
maintain his military. The NSC/DC also made plans for members of the administration to 
call President Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
to request their assistance pressuring Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, copy American 
calls for Iraq to agree to a ceasefire, and for Iraqi forces to avoid harming American 
citizens and other foreigners in Kuwait. The NSC/DC decided that the United States 
needed to side with Kuwait in UN meetings, get as many other UN members to support 
US efforts, and to ask the Soviets to stop supplying the Iraqis with arms.114 The 
administrations planning demonstrated its determination to implement a multilateral 
approach to resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis. It also revealed that the administration knew 
that it faced challenges that would stymie efforts to create an international response. 
Additionally, this planning would demonstrate that Bush and the United States possessed 
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the skills necessary to resolve post-Cold War conflicts without having to police the world 
alone. 
As the administration drafted policies, it faced diplomatic hurdles from some of 
the countries it was trying to work with. These challenges included convincing the Soviet 
Union to work with the United States, and Middle Eastern states that were ambivalent to 
the US efforts. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union had provided Iraq with 
military supplies. After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviets were reluctant to end their 
military support of Iraq, or support the sanctions and embargoes passed by the UNSC. 
However, the US diplomats eventually convinced the Soviet Union to stop supporting 
Iraq and to enforce UN sanctions and embargoes.115  
Jordan was another state that repeatedly hindered efforts to resolve the crisis. 
While Jordan did not unconditionally support Iraq, it had strong ties with Saddam. This 
led Jordanian officials to reluctantly supported UN sanctions, and to repeatedly attempted 
to connect the Middle East peace process to the resolution for the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait. US diplomats were less successful convincing the Jordanians to change their 
policies. However, the Jordanians were part of a minority that supported Iraq and where 
often unable to sway the members of the UN.116 Jordan and the Soviet Union represented 
some of the challenges Bush and his administration faced in their efforts to create an 
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international opposition to Iraq. Nonetheless, Bush and his administration created policies 
that overcame or limited any negative effects from any resistance to the international 
effort. However, this did not stop other challenges from emerging and hindering the 
multilateral effort to stop Iraq. 
In the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States struggled to work with 
allies to pass UNSC resolutions, and get international cooperation to enforce economic 
sanctions against Iraq. The British and the French repeatedly clashed with the Soviet 
Union over the language of UNSC resolutions. As the sanctions continued, less 
prosperous countries needed relief from the negative effects of sanctions on their 
economies.117 The Bush and his administration responded to these challenges by relying 
on cooperation and diplomacy to draft solutions. In response to the disagreements over 
language the United States worked to draft resolutions that provided compromised 
between the British, French, and the Soviet Union. The United States also established a 
system to help the more prosperous countries provide relief for those states suffering 
from the effects of UN sanctions. These efforts, further demonstrated the possibilities of 
Bush’s New World Order’s ability to create a secure post-Cold War period. Bush’s 
policies revealed that his cooperative security strategy was focused on responding to 
aggression, and managing other problems that might occur. 
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In September, US officials continued diplomatic efforts to get Iraq to withdraw, 
and strengthen sanction enforcement among UN members. The administration also 
drafted an arms bill to sell aircraft and armaments to Saudi Arabia to bolster its 
defenses.118 The administration’s work establishing and maintaining the coalition and 
concerted action required Bush and his administration to constantly adjust tactics and 
respond to demands. The Bush could had decided to move unilaterally at any point to 
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but he did not. Instead, Bush remained dedicated to 
collective opposition against Iraq, and used his and Baker’s diplomatic skills to minimize 
any differences within the coalition. Bush’s efforts up to this point were designed to 
establish a precedence for future post-Cold War international responses to conflicts and 
crises. It demonstrated Bush and America’s determination to work with the international 
community to resolve conflicts, rather than relying on US unilateral action. Bush’s 
policies demonstrated that the United States wanted to apply this strategy to US 
leadership in the post-Cold War period.  
The Bush administration’s diplomatic efforts were not limited to the UN and 
maintaining the coalition. Bush’s policies also included diplomatic efforts to encourage 
opposition within the Iraqi people to force Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
By the end of October, the administration had initiated public diplomacy efforts through 
USIA aimed at convincing the Iraqi public to pressure Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, 
or to encourage the Iraqi people to overthrow Hussein’s presidency. These efforts 
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included Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts into Iraq, films depicting coalition strength 
and unity, and radio addresses from Bush.119  These efforts continued into December, 
when the DOD joined the USIA to create videos that depicted coalition military power. 
At the same time, the VOA started “Around the Gulf” a television program that provided 
non-government controlled news to the Iraqi people. These public diplomacy efforts were 
designed to motivate the Iraqi people to pressure Hussein to abide by UN resolutions or 
face the consequences.120 Public diplomacy abroad and domestic served to disseminate 
diplomatic policies and strategies to the public, and can be used to garner support from 
domestic and foreign audiences. While these efforts were unable to create change within 
Iraq that convinced Hussein to withdraw his efforts, they demonstrated the variability of 
US methods to end to invasion of Kuwait diplomatically.  
As Bush outlined in NSD-46 Bush was willing to use military force to defend US 
interests in the Persian Gulf if necessary. However, Bush’s policies up to the declaration 
of war on January 16, demonstrated Bush’s desire to resolve the conflict without such 
measures. Even as Bush attempted to resolve the conflict diplomatically quickly accepted 
the necessity of military force. Bush’s decision to resort to military force set another 
precedence for his New World Order by establishing that there was a deadline to 
peacefully resolve a conflict before the United States would turn to military power.  
                                                 
119 Diplomatic issues and policies discussed in Deputies Committee Meetings during October 1990 
from folder Hass, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 “DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes 
August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential 
Library.  
120 Memorandum Nancy Bear to Robert Gates “Persian Gulf Public Diplomacy Update—May 
Come Up At Today’s Deputies Meeting, December 10, 1990” folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings Files 
OAID 90018-002. “NSC/DC 228 - December 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, 
Keywords Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library  
 81 
National Security Directive-54: Operation Desert Storm 
On 15 January 1991, the day before the Persian Gulf War began, Bush issued 
NSD-54 which outlined the US military response to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. 
From his original policy directives in NSD-26, and those established in NSD 45 Bush had 
outlined the strategic interests the United States had in the Persian Gulf region and its 
determination to defend those interests. In the opening of NSD-54 Bush argued: 
“prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States in that 
it would increase the cost of eventual military action, threaten political cohesion 
of the coalition countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for continued brutalization of 
the Kuwaiti people and the destruction of their country and cause added damage 
to the US and world economies.”121  
By publishing of NSD-54 Bush acknowledged that diplomatic efforts had been 
exhausted, and that a consensus had been reached among most UN members that a 
military operation was the only way to liberate Kuwait. In NSD-54, Bush noted that 
Hussein’s defiance of the UN and its resolutions had forced Bush to deploy US and 
coalition forces to end Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait. NSD-54 established that 
Operation Desert Storm’s objective was the liberation of Kuwait. It also established 
operation objectives that included destroying Iraqi military power, and that the coalition 
would not invade Iraq or overthrow Hussein unless he used chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons against coalition forces.122 In addition to military objectives, NSD-54 
also established diplomatic measures for the operation to maintain full coalition 
cooperation, and to avoid any events that could divide the coalition, and threaten the 
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Operation Desert Storm’s success. By the time, Bush finalized his directive for the 
United States, he had obtained a consensus within the UN for the objectives for 
Operation Desert Storm.  
As Bush needed the full participation of coalition partners in every aspect of the 
operation, he focused his diplomatic effort overcoming any differences or resistance 
coming from the Middle Eastern countries participating in the coalition. This included 
overcoming reluctance to challenge Iraq, support the United States, and opposition to 
Israeli military participation. Bush convinced Syria and Turkey to deploy additional 
forces to their borders with Iraq to distract Iraqi forces and draw their resources away 
from Kuwait. Additionally, He discouraged Israeli military participation by promising 
Israel that the United States would defend Israel from Iraqi attacks, especially if Iraq 
began launching attacks against Israel. Bush also had to continue to discourage Jordanian 
participation and support for Iraq. Bush’s efforts to manage the different angles of 
coalition cooperation also required Bush to defend Iraq from any attempts to use 
Operation Desert Storm to annex Iraqi territory. This did not mean that Bush rejected 
removing Hussein from power. Instead, Bush was conditionally willing to implement 
regime if Hussein used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or supported terrorist 
acts against any coalition member.123 As NSD-54 showed that Bush would have to 
continue his diplomatic efforts to maintain coalition cohesion once Operation Desert 
Storm started. Again, Bush demonstrated his determination to make international 
cooperation a foundation of international relations during post-Cold War period. His 
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efforts to quell discord within the coalition, settle differences between UN members 
about language in UNSC resolutions, and find remedies for countries that suffered from 
unintended consequences of economic sanctions and embargo, demonstrated Bush’s 
commitment to creating a secure and stable post-Cold War period. 
Conclusions 
As the post-Cold War period emerged, Bush used Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to 
share and lead the world towards his New World Order. Bush’s New World Order was 
based on collective security, deterring aggression, and maintaining global and regional 
security and stability. Throughout the conflict, Bush successfully used his diplomatic 
experience to create international unity, and build a coalition force to end Iraq’s 
aggression. Bush outlined his policies and policy changes through his national security 
strategy and individual directives on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. 
From these guidelines, Bush and his administration drafted policies that allowed Bush to 
unite the international community against Iraq. Bush began by establishing that the 
United States and the rest of the world had invested interests deterring and ending Iraq’s 
aggression to prevent conflicts and instability from dominating post-Cold War 
international relations. This cooperation was the basis of Bush’s New World Order, and 
Bush’s belief that using multilateral responses against acts of aggression was the key to 
generating global security and stability.  
As Bush said, “The New World Order” was emerging. However, the question was 
what would the post-Cold War world resemble, and how would the United States adapt to 
it. This was important since the United States remained the only global superpower with 
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significant influence and roles around the world.124 Bush decided that post-Cold War 
American leadership should focus on helping regions and the world cooperate to bring 
stability and security. This strategy was possible with the end of Cold War tensions, and 
an emerging belief that the post-Cold War period could be peaceful. Bush’s desire to 
have the United States lead this stable and secure period, resembled Wilson’s efforts after 
WWI to create the League of Nations to spread liberal internationalism to promote global 
peace and stability. Additionally, Bush’s desires also remained consistent with 
longstanding themes and principles in US foreign policy, even as the changing 
international system changed the ways US foreign policy followed them. However, like 
Wilson’s attempt, Bush would also face additional crises that would reveal that despite 
his desires, it was still difficult to bring security and stability to the world.  
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CHAPTER IV – THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BUSH 
PRESIDENCY 
Following the successful reunification of Germany and international effort to end 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Bush directed his attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. The 
year 1989 proved to be an eventful year for Europe: democratic revolutions in Hungary, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and the beginning of the 
collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, like the German 
Democratic Republic and the Warsaw Pact, was born of the Cold War. Throughout the 
Cold War the United States and NATO relied on Yugoslavia to act as a bulwark against 
Soviet expansion into Western Europe. To keep Yugoslavia’s support, the United States 
and other governments provided Yugoslavia economic aid, which the Yugoslav 
government used to finance government spending and to promote economic prosperity as 
the Yugoslav economy faced difficulties throughout the Cold War.  
However, Gorbachev’s reforms and the warming of US-Soviet relations decreased 
the Soviet threat to the United States. Thus, the Bush administration and NATO 
determined that Yugoslavia was no longer needed to defend Western Europe from Soviet 
aggression, and there was no longer a need to provide Yugoslavia economic aid. Without 
international economic support, the Yugoslav government and economy destabilized 
worsening ethnic tensions and political divisions that emerged after Josip Broz Tito’s 
death in 1980. The destabilization of Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the rest of 
Europe and presented a challenge to US security interests in Europe and maintaining 
European stability and security. In 1990, the Bush was focused on preserving European 
stability as Germany reunified and re-stabilizing the Persian Gulf region and the world 
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after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. These conflicts were given higher priority over 
Yugoslavia even though the Yugoslav conflict also had the ability to destabilize a world 
region. After the international community had resolved the issues in Germany and 
Kuwait, Bush and Western European leaders focused on solving Yugoslavia’s ethnic and 
political divisions. Unfortunately, by the time that occurred those tensions had turned into 
democratic and secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia that were spreading to 
other Yugoslav states.125 
This chapter argues that following the diplomatic successes in Germany and the 
Persian Gulf, Bush had established a new cooperative security strategy for the United 
States that he could use to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. This strategy followed US 
foreign policy themes of international cooperation and maintaining global stability and 
security. However, Bush’s attempts at collaboration with NATO and later the UN failed 
to resolve the Yugoslavia’s crisis. There were several reasons this collaboration failed: 
the United States and NATO’s delayed response to the crisis, internal divisions in NATO, 
strategy disagreements between NATO and the United States, Bush’s decision to not to 
have any leadership role in NATO efforts or to help bridge divisions in NATO, and 
Bush’s insistence that the solution maintain Yugoslavia’s integrity. Bush’s decision to 
withhold US leadership was uncharacteristic of Bush, but it reflected the public’s 
growing hesitancy to the United States policing the world and attempting to resolve all 
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international conflicts. These factors combined to produce the first failure of Bush’s New 
World Order. Bush’s inability to use the New World Order to resolve the Yugoslav crisis 
revealed the limitations of cooperative security, especially when that cooperation lacked 
any US leadership.  
Yugoslavia’s March Toward Disintegration 
Ever since the Ottoman Empire reached as far as Eastern Europe, the Balkans had 
experienced ethnic divisions and conflicts. After World War I the allies created Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia out of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—with internal borders along ethnic and historical 
lines. During WWII, the ethnic divisions and animosities worsened as the Serb and Croat 
Chetniks collaborated with the Nazis, while communist Partisans supported the Allies. 
Throughout the war the Chetniks and the Partisans committed atrocities against each 
other. After WWII, the Allied Powers supported Josip Broz Tito and the communists and 
their efforts to establish a communist government in Yugoslavia. Tito established the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and installed a satellite of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia in each republic’s government. Under Tito’s leadership 
Yugoslavia was espoused as the model middle way between a planned economy and a 
capitalist economy, and Yugoslavia enjoyed economic prosperity with limited ethnic 
conflicts. Following Tito’s death in 1980, no other leader emerged capable of managing 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic divisions. At the same time, the federal government proved 
incapable of responding to political, economic, and national challenges. As tensions 
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increased ultranationalist groups spread propaganda reminding the Yugoslavs about the 
atrocities from WWII encouraging ethnic fighting and Yugoslavia’s collapse.126  
Shortly after Tito’s death the first cracks in Yugoslav unity emerged in student 
demonstrations in Kosovo, and calls for an Albanian republic in Kosovo. As more 
students protested for an independent Kosovo state, the Serbs responded with demands 
for a Greater Serbia in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the non-Serb majorities in Kosovo and 
Sarajevo began calling for separation from Serbia. By 1986, Serb nationalism emerged to 
oppose Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. This Serb nationalism evoked national myths 
and argued that the Serbs bore the brunt of the economic burdens of Yugoslavia’s 
modernization. That year, Slobodan Milošević was elected the head of the Serbian 
republic through appeals to the Serb nationalism. Following his election, Milošević 
removed all liberal communists from the government and gained the Yugoslav army’s 
support becoming the sole leader of Serbia. He also encouraged anti-Muslim sentiments, 
which had been grown along with Serbian nationalism. Like Serbia, Slovenia 
experienced a rise in nationalist sentiments. Slovene intellectuals drove the Slovene 
national movement duplicating Serbian arguments that Yugoslavia’s modernization had 
retarded Slovene efforts to modernize and fix their economy.127  
As the world focused on German reunification and then Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, Croatia and Slovenia held free elections that brought democratic officials and 
new governments to power. In response, the Yugoslav Army tried to disarm the national 
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defense installations in Croatia and Slovenia, but Croat and Slovene forces rebuffed the 
army. Following these altercations, Croatia and Slovenia began illegally buying weapons 
to prevent future retribution from the Yugoslav government. On 23 December 1990, 
Slovenia held elections, during which an overwhelming majority voted for independence 
from Yugoslavia. By mid-March 1991, Milošević had turned his attention toward 
creating Greater Serbia. On 3 May 1991 Croatia voted to secede from Yugoslavia. After 
the election in Croatia and Slovenia, the Croat and Slovene governments announced they 
would declare their independence on 26 June. However, Slovenia declared its 
independence on 25 June. The Slovenes also cut off power, communications, and water 
to the Yugoslav army bases in Slovenia to prevent the Yugoslav army from stopping 
Slovene secession.128  
As Yugoslavia's dramatically changed internally, it faced similarly significant 
changes to its international standing. During the Cold War Yugoslavia refused to align 
with the Soviet Union or the United States. As a non-aligned nation, Yugoslavia gained 
military and economic support from the United States to counter Soviet expansion. 
Yugoslavia's non-aligned status also allowed it to get loans from Western European 
governments. So that by the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia had borrowed over twenty 
billion dollars in r loans from the United States alone. As US-Soviet relations and the 
democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe weakened Soviet influence and power, 
Yugoslavia’s international standing and its security importance diminished. Also, the 
changes occurring among the former Warsaw pact nations made them more suitable 
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candidates for monetary aid than Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia’s economic resources dried 
up, the economic problems increased domestic turmoil and decreased the government’s 
ability to prevent ethnic conflicts.129  
The crisis in Yugoslavia was caused by the end of the Cold War and the strategy 
of containment. Without the Soviet threat, the United States and NATO no longer found 
viewed Yugoslavia as a security partner to help defend Western Europe from Soviet 
expansion. This re-evaluation led these countries to end their economic support for 
Yugoslavia, which the government had become entirely dependent on to function. The 
governments growing decay sparked economic problems that antagonized ethnic 
divisions. The rise of ethnic hostilities was worsened by ultranationalists in Yugoslav 
states who urged the states to secede from the Yugoslav federation. The secession of 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina sparked an ethnic conflict the Balkans that 
also threatened to destabilize Yugoslavia’s neighbors and the rest of Europe. As the crisis 
in Yugoslavia threatened the rest of Europe, Bush began drafting policies to support 
NATO efforts to mediate a resolution to the conflict.  
National Security Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe 
In his 1990 national security strategy review, Bush continued to focus on the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. He wrote that communist states “were mired 
in stagnation, paralyzed by outmoded static ideologies that stifle innovation and 
productivity. Poor economic performance, especially in contrast with the West, has 
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discredited a system that prided itself on its mastery of economic forces.”130 He continued 
that in response to the changes occurring in the East, the United States and its Western 
European allies were dedicated to overcoming Cold War divisions in Europe. To achieve 
this, Bush wanted to ensure the core of post-Cold War Europe rested on democratic 
institutions and values, and that a high priority was placed on quickly decreasing force 
levels and improving stability. The United States would also support economic 
development, democratic institutions, and overall stability in Eastern Europe.131  
Even as he promoted core US foreign policy values of promoting and defending 
democratic institutions, decreasing aggression, and improving global stability, Bush was 
unable to implement this national security strategy equally as he did not mention 
Yugoslavia or the Balkans. Instead Bush remained focused on Eastern Europe and former 
members of the Soviet States, even as US –Soviet Relations improved. This fixation 
allowed Bush to miss the crisis happening in Yugoslavia and its role in European security 
and stability. At the same time, Bush was preoccupied with the reunification of Germany 
and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. So, these two situations combined to create a policy 
vacuum towards Yugoslavia that Bush would have to respond to in 1991.  
In his 1991 national security strategy review, Bush discussed changes to US-
European relations. He noted that changes in Eastern Europe created a greater need for 
NATO members to cooperate and deter aggression in Europe. Additionally, NATO 
needed to continue to serve as a channel for American involvement in Europe. He posited 
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that the United States should use its membership in NATO to prevent aggression among 
NATO member states. 132 These notes established that Bush intended to help Europe 
adapt NATO from a Cold War alliance against the Soviet Union into a European 
cooperative security institution similar to the UN. By refashioning NATO into a 
cooperative institution, Bush hoped to encourage New World Order strategies and 
principles in Europe. By maintaining an active role in NATO and other European security 
institutions, and maintaining America’s military presence in Europe.133 He’s plan would 
also allow the United States to remain active in European security discussions and to 
encourage cooperative actions against aggression.  
Bush also noted in his national security strategy that Soviet influence had frozen 
disputes between and within Eastern Europe countries. He used the crisis in Yugoslavia 
as evidence that the collapse of the Soviet Union had unleashed security problems on 
Europe. Bush contended that the Yugoslav government had managed to suppress ethnic 
animosities during the Cold War, but without the Cold War competition, fighting 
between ethnic groups was creating security problems.134 Tito overcame Yugoslavia’s 
ethnic divisions by creating a communist government that focused on representing 
everyone as a Yugoslav communist first and their ethnicity second. Tito also promoted 
economic reforms which also discouraged ethnic divisions, by using economic aid he 
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received from the United States in return for standing against Soviet communism.135 
Bush suggested creating policies that relied on the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and NATO to resolve the turmoil.136 Bush's decision to 
rely on CSCE and NATO leadership to resolve the Yugoslav crisis fit within the 
parameters of Bush’s New World Order. Through this policy, the CSCE and NATO 
would cooperate to establish mediation between the Yugoslav states to resolve their 
differences so that Yugoslavia would survive. This was essential to Bush’s post-Cold 
War strategy, since Europe would have to respond to conflicts caused by the collapse of 
governments sponsored by the Soviet Union or the United States during the Cold War. 
However, this policy limited Bush’s ability to exert American influence in the mediation 
process, to reinforce NATO decisions, and resolve disagreements in NATO. 
Contradicting Views of Yugoslavia and America’s Response 
As Bush was drafting his policies towards Yugoslavia, NSC and CIA analysts 
studied the situation in Yugoslavia. While the NSC and CIA agreed on the fundamentals 
about the situation in Yugoslavia, they differed about the ability of the United States to 
prevent Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The analysis papers the NSC and CIA analysts 
provided Bush and his advisors revealed their divergences. The NSC paper focused on 
the impact Yugoslavia’s impact would have on US interests while the CIA focused on the 
feasibility of any US policies to influence the situation in Yugoslavia and prevent its 
collapse. 
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In the NSC paper, the analysts noted the dissolution of Yugoslavia would cause 
local, regional, and continent-wide problems in Europe. In addition, the ethnic makeup of 
Yugoslavia would cause violence as the individual states attempted to separate from the 
federation. The authors argued that US interests were served by a repeating the 
developments in the former Soviet states in a united Yugoslavia: 
 “Our interest in avoiding violence among the Yugoslavs and instability at the 
Balkan and European levels, our interest in promoting political democracy, 
market-based economies, and enhanced respect for human rights, as well as 
relevant principles of international law and relevant international covenants all 
would seem to point in the direction of preserving Yugoslavia’s unity.”137  
This paper established that Bush’s security goal in Yugoslavia should resolve the 
conflict, keep Yugoslavia united, and encourage democratic reform. This analysis 
contradicted the democratically decided secession movements in Yugoslav states. It also 
reversed Bush’s policies that supported German self-determination during Germany’s 
reunification. The administration would not reconcile this contradiction as it supported 
NATO and CSCE efforts to mediate a solution. Instead, the Bush administration would 
exacerbate this contradiction as it continued to implement policies in Yugoslavia 
designed to prevent Yugoslavia’s dissolution while supporting democratic reforms. The 
NSC analysis also dissented with the CIA national intelligence estimate on Yugoslavia 
that presented a different evaluation of the situation in Yugoslavia and the possibilities 
for the success of US policies there. 
                                                 
137 Memorandum, to Robert Kimmit, Paul Wolfowitz, Admiral David Jeremiah, and Richard Kerr 
"Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia: Discussion Paper" October 11, 1990, folder H-Files 
NSC/DC Meetings Files, OAID 900017-006, "NSC/DC 212 – October 12, 1990-NSC/DC Meeting on 
Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library 
 95 
On 18 October 1990, the CIA issued NIE 15-90 “Yugoslavia Transformed.” It 
opened: 
"Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year and will 
probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. 
Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav 
confederation. There will be protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo. 
A full-scale, interrepublic war is likely, but serious intercommunal conflict will 
accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be 
intractable and bitter. There is little the United States, and its European allies can 
do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to 
advocacy of democracy and self-determination."138 
CIA analysts argued that the collapse of Yugoslavia was inevitable and caused by 
the Yugoslav’s inability to create an all-Yugoslav political movement after the Titoist 
vision collapsed. They noted that without an all-Yugoslav movement nationalism, local, 
and economic aspirations would determine Yugoslavia's future. They continued that 
neither the Communist Party nor the Yugoslav National Army would keep Yugoslavia 
together. At the same time, historic religious antagonisms and cultural identification in 
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia would serve as strong factors that would worsen the 
conflict. The analysts wrote they did not believe it was possible for any option other than 
dissolution to succeed. They pointed to diverging ideas about government and economic 
reforms between the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.  
The authors also attempted to predict the situation in Yugoslavia once the collapse 
began. The analysts predicted that the collapse would start sporadic and spontaneous 
ethnic violence that would progress into a civil war. They also noted that the Serbs would 
encourage ethnic uprisings among Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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further spreading the ethnic violence.139 Unfortunately, Bush and his advisors ignored 
NIE 15-90 because it contradicted their security strategy for the Balkans and Europe.140 
Instead, the Bush administration’s followed the advice presented in the NSC paper and 
initiated policies designed to keep Yugoslavia united even as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Macedonia, voted to secede from Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was 
collapsing Bush prioritized American security strategy over the realities of the situation 
in Yugoslavia. Part of this was a desire to recreate the successes in Germany and Kuwait 
in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the administration miscalculated the challenges posed 
creating a cooperative security solution to an intranational conflict versus an international 
one. 
NSC/DC Meetings on Yugoslavia, 1990-1992 
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the NSC Deputies was primarily 
responsible for crafting US policies, and established Americans initial position and 
strategy towards Yugoslavia. From October 1990 to the end of Bush’s presidency, the 
NSC/DC met twenty-nine times to discuss policy options and the situation in 
Yugoslavia.141 The NSC/DC proposed the administration plan for the rapid collapse of 
Yugoslavia accompanied by escalating cycles of inter-ethnic violence, Serbian repression 
of the Albanian population in Kosovo, and splintering of the Yugoslav Army along ethnic 
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lines as Yugoslavia moved toward a civil war. The committee suggested starting 
consultations with principal allies and regional institutions, and consider using the UNSC 
or CSCE to mediate between the parties. The NSC/DC believed that if the CSCE could 
successfully resolve the Yugoslav conflict, then the CSCE’s could establish a precedence 
for future CSCE efforts to mediate disputes, like the UN’s response to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait.142  
The NSC argued that the United States could not prevent Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from declaring their independence then the United States should 
follow traditional principles on recognizing new states. However, the NSC caveated this 
policy that the United States should only recognize those states if the Yugoslav 
government did not contest their independence. The NSC posited that if the declaration of 
independence were contested then the United States should encourage the seceding states 
to continue mediation.143 From the beginning the NSC designed strategies and policies 
around keeping Yugoslavia from disintegrating and recreating the successful cooperative 
action against Iraq. The administration also decided that it would only grant recognition 
conditionally. These decisions limited Bush’s policy choices, even as the administration 
hoped to use international mediation efforts to resolve Yugoslavia’s conflict. However, 
the NSC’s decisions rested on a selective analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia, and a 
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miscalculation of America’s or the CSCE’s ability to effectively influence political and 
social divisions in Yugoslavia to resolve the conflict. This foundation prevented the 
administration from adjusting to the situation in Yugoslavia and the growing inevitability 
of dissolution.  
Based on its findings, the NSC/DC recommended that the United States should 
encourage Yugoslavia to adopt democracy, pressure the Serbs to democratize, and push 
all Yugoslav groups to deal with their affairs through a federation government. NSC/DC 
also suggested that the United States needed to clearly explain that US assistance was 
only for a united Yugoslavia, and announce that the United States would not recognize 
declarations of independence from Yugoslav republics. The NSC/DC recommended that 
the United States oppose any Yugoslav military action to prevent the states from 
seceding. It argued that any forceful repression of independence threatened the 
democratic process and democratic aspirations in Yugoslavia. Lastly, committee 
encouraged Bush and the State Department to work with the EC to develop a policy 
consensus towards Yugoslavia to facilitate cooperative actions.144  
As the NSC/DC continued to layout US policy principles towards Yugoslavia, the 
committed continued to contradict the principles and strategies it had proposed earlier. 
The NSC did this by refusing to recognize the seceding states, while refusing to support 
Yugoslavia’s use of force to maintain public order and prevent the states from seceding. 
This policy also contradicted with the government's right to use force to maintain public 
order, and how to support the use of one without violating the other. Another issue was 
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the NSC/DC determination of policy without including any references to NATO and 
CSCE policies towards Yugoslavia. By establishing its Yugoslavia policies this way, the 
administration established few alternatives for any disagreements with Europe as the 
situation in Yugoslavia progressed. This would make it difficult for the United States to 
fully support CSCE and NATO initiatives to mediate the Yugoslav conflict. 
From Yugoslav Unity to Deterring and Containing the Yugoslav Conflict 
In January 1991 after three months of deadlock and increased violence in 
Yugoslavia, the NSC/DC changed its policy direction to focus on crafting policies that 
deterred and contained the escalating violence in Yugoslavia. This policy included 
responding to Yugoslav army’s human rights violations, getting the CSCE to focus on 
Yugoslavia, and getting the EC to lead negotiations between the parties to end the 
conflict.145 From January to July the United States attempted to encourage the CSCE and 
EC efforts to create an agreement between the Yugoslav states that would end the ethnic 
division and violence. Unfortunately, the CSCE and EC were unable to convince the 
Yugoslavs to mediate their differences. In July, the NSC/DC decided to change US 
policies again to respond to the EC’s failed mediation efforts, and increased Serbian 
violent repression against the seceding states.146  
As the NSC/DC recognized American policies in Yugoslavia and Europe were 
failing to end the conflict, the administration redirected its policies to prevent the conflict 
from affecting any other areas in Europe. Bush and his advisors also began to recognize 
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that the CSCE and EC were less capable of exerting their influence within Yugoslavia or 
encourage the parties to reconcile their problems. At the same time, members of Bush’s 
National Security Affairs department recognized the test that the Yugoslav conflict was 
placing on America’s role and relationships with Europe. In particular, the unwillingness 
of the United States to take a leading role in mediation efforts was hampering Europe’s 
cooperative security arrangements and endangering Bush’s New World Order. 
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
sent a memorandum to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, that critiqued 
American leadership in Europe during the Yugoslav crisis. Gompert argued the United 
States faced increased international pressure to take the lead in Europe as the EC’s 
mediation and peacekeeping efforts floundered in Yugoslavia and Milošević realized his 
"Greater Serbia". He contended that if the United States wanted to continue to claim that 
it was European power in the post-Cold War period, then the United States should expect 
Europe to look to the United States for ideas and direction. 147  
Gompert continued that if the United States, like the EC, failed to create a plan to 
end Yugoslavia’s conflict, then two things would happen that were against US interests. 
He posited that a civil war would break out consuming some or all of Yugoslavia, and the 
civil war would have the ability to affect other Balkan countries. Second, the United 
States would lose domestic and international confidence in NATO, CSCE, and the New 
World Order. He argued the Bush administration had to make a choice: the United States 
                                                 
147 Memorandum David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft “Yugoslavia and American Leadership” 
August 5, 1991, folder Gompert, David C. Files, Subject Files OAID CF01306-004 “Yugoslavia [1]” 
National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
 101 
and EC push the CSCE to create a large-scale peacekeeping force and the United States 
takes a more assertive mediator role, or the United States can encourage the French, 
British, and Dutch to intervene in Yugoslavia without NATO or the CSCE.148 He noted 
implementing one of the options would affect US policy agendas. He wrote that using the 
CSCE would strengthen CSCE’s standing as a European collective security institution, 
but using the CSCE could hinder efforts to establish NATO in the post-Cold War as the 
foundation for European security. On the other hand, having the French, British, and 
Dutch act unilaterally would support independent European security arrangements, which 
would undermine any attempts to promote cooperative security arrangements in 
Europe.149 Gompert’s analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia and America’s policy 
choices revealed significant interests at stake for the United States, Europe, and 
Yugoslavia. He also revealed that the United States needed to take a firm stand and 
greater leadership in CSCE and EC to prevent the situation in Yugoslavia from 
worsening or threatening US interests in Europe.  
Along with his policy analysis, Gompert described possible European reactions to 
America’s policy choice. In Yugoslavia, Milošević would oppose either action since it 
prevented him from creating Greater Serbia, but the Yugoslav army would not forcibly 
resist a European peacekeeping force. The Europeans would oppose allowing the British, 
French, and Dutch to deploy peacekeepers out of fears the peacekeepers would face 
violence from paramilitary units in Yugoslavia. Gompert noted that the United States 
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could easily overcome any opposition or initial resistance in the EC to either option. He 
continued that the only way either policy would succeed was for the United States would 
to fully support the policy it chose. He continued that it the United States continued to 
enact lukewarm policies, the United States should not expect the Yugoslav crisis to 
resolve itself. He argued that it was likely that the Europeans would try to mediate a 
solution if the violence worsened again. However, without US support and direction 
European efforts were unlikely to succeed. He continued that: 
 "We will shortly need to decide not only which approach we favor but, as importantly, whether 
the U.S. will get behind the wheel. We will not need to be visibly in the lead, nor will the White House 
need to play a role. Moreover, direct U.S. involvement in either the peacekeeping or peacemaking effort 
will continue to be unnecessary if not unwise. At most, we might appoint a senior Yugoslavia crisis 
coordinator, reporting to Secretary Baker.”150  
As Gompert’s memorandum reveals the policies established by the NSC towards 
Yugoslavia were failing to push the parties towards resolving the conflict. Additionally, 
Bush’s reliance on the CSCE to lead mediation efforts was revealing divisions with the 
CSCE membership on the best way to bring peace back to Yugoslavia. Bush’s reliance 
on European cooperative institutions was jeopardizing Bush’s efforts to establish 
cooperative security as the strategy for the post-Cold War period. Additionally, the 
Yugoslav conflict would reveal how little influence international actors had to address 
internal causes of intranational conflicts. The inability of the CSCE, NATO and the 
United States to encourage the Yugoslav parties to accept mediation and end the conflict 
revealed the difficulties external parties would have in the future resolving intra-state 
conflicts.  
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Following Gompert's memorandum, the NSC implemented some policy changes 
but did not deviate far from the original strategy developed by in October 1990. As Bush 
and his staff worked with Europe to resolve the Yugoslav conflict, the United States 
continued to face difficulties collaborating with the CSCE and NATO to mediate an end 
to Yugoslavia’s conflict. The administration also ignored Gompert’s suggestion that the 
United States take on greater a leadership role in the CSCE and NATO to end the conflict 
in Yugoslavia. Instead of adjusting policies to promote the changes it desired more 
effectively, the Bush administration continued ineffective policies that were not helping 
resolve the Yugoslav conflict and endangered the feasibility of Bush’s New World Order. 
The conflict in Yugoslavia would prove that post-Cold War intranational conflicts 
required different resolution methods and a deep understanding of local politics and 
culture for international efforts to succeed. 
In September, the NSC/DC decided the United States should assertively argue 
against instant recognition of the seceding Yugoslav states. The NSC/DC suggested two 
policies. First, the Bush administration could promote a policy that recognized Slovene 
and Croat independence, with the knowledge that their independence would exacerbate 
ethnic violence in Yugoslavia. Second, they could encourage a policy that isolated 
nationalist Serbia’s leaders to pressure other Serbian leaders to agree to an internationally 
supervised cease-fire and negotiations. The committee noted that the major drawback of 
the isolation policy was that it required EC consensus to nonrecognition of the seceding 
states to work efficiently. However, the NSC/DC also wanted to follow and support those 
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efforts the CSCE’s lead, and the CSCE was moving to recognize the seceding states.151 
This put US policy in a contradictory position. The United States supported CSCE 
policies, and the administration did not want it to appear like the United States wanted to 
take over mediation efforts. However, the United States opposed recognizing the 
independent states, or ending negotiations. This strategy put the Bush administration in a 
position to undermine CSCE efforts to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia and limit further 
violence. It also endangered Bush’s New World Order, and Bush’s post-Cold War 
revisions of the CSCE and NATO.  
The Move Toward Recognizing Seceding States 
In December, the CIA released an analysis explaining which European countries 
supported recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The CIA noted that Germany was leading 
efforts to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within several weeks, but that this would not 
hinder efforts to settle the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Croatian Serbs. The 
CIA contended that Germany was pushing for recognition to force the Serbs to accept a 
settlement within previous borders and limit their ambitions. The CIA noted that 
Germany hoped its strategy would prevent the civil war from transforming into an 
international conflict. The agency also noted that CSCE debates on recognizing the 
former Yugoslav states had increased pressure on the United States to become more 
involved. Additionally, several US European allies were indicating that only US pressure 
could delay the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. If the CSCE agreed to recognize the 
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two states, then the CSCE expected the United States to have direct involvement in the 
crisis.152 This divergence between the US strategies and CSCE strategies added to the 
difficulties the cooperative arrangement faced. The lack of consensus within the CSCE 
and between the CSCE and the United States highlighted different priorities. It also 
revealed that without a strong leader a consensus was unlikely to emerge, and Bush’s 
desire to establish international cooperative security as the international strategy would 
flounder against intra-state conflicts.  
Shortly after the CIA released this report, the NSC/DC discussed the possibility of 
copying the EC policy for Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to earn 
formal recognition from the United States. It also discussed America’s response to the 
CSCE decision to implement a similar policy for recognition by 15 January 1991. During 
discussions committee members argued that continuing America’s policy against 
recognition kept the United States and EC divided and undermined CSCE efforts to stop 
Serb aggression.153 The NSC/DC also that the policy led the international community to 
question America’s resolve to end the Yugoslav crisis through EC-lead mediation efforts 
if the United States did not support CSCE efforts. The committee believed that by 
mirroring EC policies those problems could be avoided, but it would not stop the Serb 
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military from forcefully carving up those states even after they were recognized.154 As 
1991 was closing, the Bush’s NSC/DC committee began proposing policies that mirrored 
the CSCE’s. It also accepted that continued divisions between the United States and 
CSCE were hindering peace efforts. As Bush and his advisors began to implement this 
policy change they also began to invest US energies towards better supporting CSCE 
negotiation efforts. However, US reluctance to support and mirror CSCE efforts began 
negatively affected Bush’s New World Order cooperative security efforts. 
The Bush administration initiated this policy change on 13 December. That day 
during its meeting the NSC/DC decided that the United States would implement a policy 
of earned recognition for former Yugoslav states. The committee had the State 
Department develop the criteria for the states to gain US recognition, and establish 
evaluations for American humanitarian aid and ways to expand it if necessary. The 
NSC/DC also decided to support the Vance-Carrington negotiations, and to support UN 
peacekeeping efforts.155 The policy changes that the NSC/DC initiated began to bring US 
policies towards Yugoslavia back in line with Bush’s New World Order. These policies 
dedicated US support to European-led strategy with mediations led by UN special envoys 
Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington. The changes in US policy towards the collapse of 
Yugoslavia reflected the Bush administration’s coming to terms with the reality that the 
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Yugoslav federation would not survive because of internal problems the international 
community was not influential enough to change from outside.  
To prevent a policy division from reoccurring between the United States and 
Europe, The NSC/DC suggested the United States consult with the EC and NATO about 
de-recognizing Yugoslavia to prevent any implications or semblance that the United 
States or NATO usurping CSCE. The NSC/DC suggested having discussions with UN 
Secretary Vance about his intended approach to the peacekeeping mission, and what 
assistance he would seek from the United States if the UN approved deploying a 
peacekeeping force.156 As Bush and his advisors increasing accepted that Yugoslavia’s 
divorce was unpreventable, they increased their efforts to buttress European efforts to 
prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia from exacerbating the violence and instability in 
the Balkans. This policy change demonstrated that Bush and his staff was dedicated to 
the New World Order. However, Bush’s prioritization of the US interests by maintaining 
Balkan stability through Yugoslav unity rather than attempting to mediate a better path to 
dissolution supported the problems in Yugoslavia and created divisions between US and 
European policies. 
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By 16 January 1992, the NSC/DC finalized the method for recognizing the former 
Yugoslav states.157 The committees’ method began with supporting the cease-fire and the 
UN peacekeeping force that Vance recommended to the UN, and tied US recognition to 
former Yugoslav states cooperation with the future peacekeeping mission. After the 
former Yugoslav states had demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with the UN and 
Vance then, the United States would recognize a state.158 However, the Bush 
administration continued to delay Slovenia and Croatia throughout February, even though 
forty-five other countries recognized them. However, The United States was not the only 
country that delayed recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Greece refused to recognize 
Macedonia which stalled the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Greece argued that it 
could not recognize the country of Macedonia because the name “Macedonia” had 
significant historical and cultural value to Greece. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recognition was 
delayed as the EC waited for the results of its independence referendum among its 
Muslim, Croat, and Serb population. The EC believed it was likely that Bosnia-
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Herzegovina would vote for independence even though it would exacerbate ethnic 
tensions in the country.159  
On 21 February, the UNSC approved a resolution to create a peacekeeping force 
for former Yugoslavia. In preparation to recognize the independent states, the State 
Department decided to mirror the Commonwealth of Independent States set up by the 
former Soviet countries, which included clear distinctions between recognized statehood 
and conducting of diplomatic relations. The State Department offered five recognitions 
policy strategies. First, only recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Second, immediately 
recognize Croatia and Slovenia while delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia pending consultations with the EC. Third, recognize, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina but not Macedonia. Fourth, recognize all four independent states. 
Fifth, recognize Croatia and Slovenia, and recognize Bosnia and Macedonia when the EC 
recognizes them. Of these five options the State Department recommended recognizing 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, but not Macedonia.160 This strategy discussion revealed 
that the Bush administration continued to face difficulties cooperating with Europe. At 
the same time the situation in the EC revealed that it still faced difficulty coming to a 
consensus among its members. These issues hindered cooperative action to resolve the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The difficulties the United States and EC faced creating viable 
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policies to respond to the intranational conflict in Yugoslavia revealed their difficulty 
adjusting to this growing post-Cold War style conflict.  
In preparation for a foreign ministers meeting on international Yugoslav policy, 
the State Department advised Baker delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina risked 
intimidation from Serbian hardliners and Croats for Bosnia to accept its partition along 
ethnic lines rather than gaining recognition. They noted that if Bosnian Serbs and Croats 
attempted to push for partition with would create a civil war in Bosnia. However, if the 
international community could create a policy consensus and concerted response then it 
was possible for the international community to stabilize Yugoslavia and move it toward 
a peaceful solution consistent with CSCE principles.161  
The department also advised Baker there was no option to recognizing Bosnia 
since it had voted for independence on 3 March. Additionally, recognizing Bosnia-
Herzegovina would make it difficult for Serbia and Croatia to leave the mediation efforts. 
The State Department believed that recognizing the four Yugoslav states would hinder 
Milošević's designs for a Greater Serbia out of parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
It suggested recognizing Serbia and Montenegro as a Yugoslav state and continue 
diplomatic relations with the new Yugoslavia on the condition that it acknowledged and 
respected the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav republics. It was also important 
to pressure the new Yugoslavia to grant the ethnic minorities in Serbia the same rights it 
demanded the Serb minority in Croatia. Baker was encouraged to get a US-EC 
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recognition of Bosnia, a strong warning against Serbian efforts to destabilize Serbia, and 
joint support to encourage cooperation among Bosnian ethnic groups to find a way to 
coexist.162 As the State Department’s memo explained the foreign ministers meeting in 
March would have ramifications for future international cooperation resolving the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and preventing a civil war in Bosnia. The memo relayed that 
Bakers ability to negotiate with the European foreign ministers and come to a consensus 
about policy towards former Yugoslavia was paramount to any attempts to limit further 
violence caused by Yugoslavia’s end.  
On 10 March, Secretary Baker met with EC Foreign Ministers to formalize a US-
EC agreement on recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In 
preparation for his meeting, the State Department acknowledged that the United States 
and EC did not agree on which states to recognize. The State Department admitted that it 
would be difficult for reach an agreement because the Greeks continued to stall efforts to 
recognize Macedonia, and several EC members remained ambivalent about recognizing 
Bosnia out of fear that ethnic divisions among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs would start a 
civil war.163 
Following the foreign ministers meeting, Baker reported that though the meeting 
had provided the EC and United States with an excellent opportunity to coordinate their 
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policies on the Yugoslav crisis, they were unable to reach an agreement on recognizing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia. However, Baker and the other foreign ministers 
concurred that Greece could no longer delay the vote to recognize Macedonia, and they 
set 6 April as an informal deadline for EC action.164 Baker’s meeting with European 
diplomats revealed that the United States and the EC had not completely overcome their 
policy disagreements. It also revealed that entrenched policies among EC members and 
the United States would continue to hinder cooperative actions towards Yugoslavia. At 
the same time, Baker’s report revealed that those disagreements were decreasing as the 
United States and Europe found increasing strategies to agree on.  
On 3 April Thomas M. T. Niles, US ambassador to the European Union, informed 
Baker that the European and Canadian Affairs office recommended two policy options to 
the NSC in response to EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. The analysts 
recommended the United States recognize Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
or shortly after 7 April if the EC recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. However, if 
the EC did not, then the analysts recommended that the Bush administration take no 
action towards recognizing any of the former Yugoslav republics. Instead, they suggested 
that Bush send a letter to the President of Macedonia informing him of America's intent 
to recognize Macedonia after the issues with Greece were resolved, while Baker sent 
send letters to the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro expressing American willingness 
to begin discussing future relations between the United States and Montenegro and Serbia 
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as a new Yugoslavia. They also supported removing sanctions against Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia while keeping sanctions in place against Serbia. 
They noted the Bush administration explain the sanctions were conditional upon the end 
of Serbia’s blockade of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.165 On 7 April 1992, the 
United States formally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia. 
Conclusions 
Bush and his administration’s response to the collapse of Yugoslavia was 
hindered by its focus on the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and 
the reintegration of former Warsaw pact nations into Western Europe. At the same time 
that Bush successfully implemented the New World Order in the Persian Gulf, the 
conflict in Yugoslavia led many to expect that Bush’s application of the New World 
Order in Yugoslavia would continue to demonstrate the capabilities of post-Cold War 
cooperative security methods on the regional scale. However, Bush’s policies towards 
Yugoslavia did not successfully translate the New World Order to respond to 
Yugoslavia’s intra-state conflict. Instead, several policy decisions at the beginning of 
America’s response made it difficult to influence change in Yugoslavia. The first 
decision was based on a national strategy assessment that US interests in Europe were 
served with a united Yugoslavia. This decision created an impediment that prevented the 
administration from readily adapting to the situation in Yugoslavia. Additionally, this 
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policy contradicted with American principles and values on democracy and self-
determination that Bush and his administration had pursued in Germany.  
The next policy decision Bush and his advisors made was to avoid taking a 
leadership role and to support CSCE later UN sponsored negotiations with Yugoslav 
representatives. This policy limited American influence in European discussion and 
American policymakers’ ability to create a consensus among the European states. When 
the administration decided to change policies, the changes focused on addressing 
violence and restoring stability to prevent instability from spreading to the Balkans and 
Europe. At the same time, the Bush administration encountered policy disagreements 
with the CSCE and EC which preferred a stronger US presence in negotiations. However, 
Bush viewed the Yugoslav conflict as a crisis the CSCE, NATO, and EC should resolve 
Thus, Bush pursued a Europe-led strategy to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. However, 
after forty-plus years of directing Western European foreign policies, this proved difficult 
and negatively affected resolution efforts with the EC. Additionally, the EC and NATO 
were unable to recreate the UN's collective efforts against Iraq even with Bush's support.  
As the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the Balkans and the rest of 
Europe, and endanger the democratic revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe, NATO, 
with US support, attempted to mediate a solution. Unfortunately, NATO efforts would 
prove unsuccessful and the Yugoslav federation collapsed. However, the collapse of 
Yugoslavia did not end the ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Instead, the collapse of 
Yugoslavia led to a conflict in Bosnia as Bosnian Serbs attempted to ethnically purify 
Bosnian territory to annex to Serbia to create Greater Serbia. While Bush’s policy and 
strategies failed to prevent Yugoslavia from collapsing they remained in line with core 
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US foreign policy principles of international cooperation, deterring aggression and 
ensuring global security and stability.  
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CHAPTER V – BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE BOSNIAN WAR 
Following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, ethnic violence erupted in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina after it declared its independence. In Bosnia, Serbian nationals 
working with Slobodan Milošević and Serbia carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing 
to create Greater Serbia out of parts of Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs with support from the 
Serbian army and Serbian government systematically forced Bosnian Muslims and 
Catholic Croatians to flee their homes, sent them to concentration camps, or 
systematically killed them. As it had during the collapse of Yugoslavia, the international 
community attempted to stop the violence through collective actions that included UN 
sanctions and negotiations. The Bosnian War was one of several international crises that 
President Clinton would inherit from his predecessor, President Bush. Lacking foreign 
policy experience, Clinton would initially continue Bush’s policies before implementing 
his own. Clinton and Bush made policy decisions based on transcendent values that have 
shaped US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century that included defending and 
spreading democracy, deterring aggression through international cooperation, and 
ensuring American stability and security. While American presidents used different 
methods the values at the heart of those policy decisions did not change. 
This chapter argues that both Bush and Clinton relied on similar understandings 
of international cooperation but relied on different methods and leadership styles to 
resolve the Bosnian War. Bush preferred a European-led cooperative arrangement that 
focused on humanitarian relief, while Clinton gradually introduced American leadership 
into international mediation efforts and redirected the focus of UN sanctions to end the 
war in Bosnia. Both men also continued to abide by traditional US foreign policy themes 
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and principles as they worked with the European community to restore stability and 
security to the Balkans. While Bush and Clinton’s methods differed, the principles 
guiding their decisions remained the same. Thus, Clinton’s method allowed him to bring 
more American pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Bosnians, and Croats to 
mediate a solution. However, Clinton, like Bush, struggled to find a strategy that 
effectively used outside influences to end the intra-state conflict in Bosnia.  
Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Muslims, Croatians, and Serbs in Bosnia 
began fighting amongst themselves over territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian 
Croats and Bosnian Serbs gained support from Croatia and Serbia to defend the areas 
where their ethnic group was a majority. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims attempted to 
maintain the cohesion of Bosnia as contiguous state. During the fighting, Bosnian Serbs 
with support from Slobodan Milošević and Serbian military forces initiated ethnic 
cleansing to remove Bosnian Muslim from areas of Bosnian to create Greater Serbia, 
while Bosnian Croats supported by Croatia annexed Bosnian territory they historically 
claimed as part of Croatia.166 This policy of ethnic cleansing eventually led to dramatic 
scenes of refugee streams, cities under siege, and tales of genocide, as the international 
community attempted to convince the three parties to end the fighting, and punish 
Bosnian Serbs and Serbia for its policy of ethnic cleansing.  
Bush’s Policies and the Bosnian War 
After recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent country, Bush 
confronted continued violence in former Yugoslavia as the Croatian, Muslim, and Serb 
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ethnic groups fought for control of territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Bosnian 
War the Serbs carried out ethnic cleansing to remove non-Serbs from areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to create Greater Serbia. As the Bush administration prepared to respond, 
the CIA released a NIE report analyzing the situation and the methods available to 
respond and contain the violence. The analysts wrote, “nothing short of large-scale, 
outside military intervention—which no European country is now prepared to 
undertake—can end the fighting in Yugoslavia.”167 The report continued that a UN 
peacekeeping mission would not resolve the conflicting territorial claims and growing 
animosities among Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians. Also, the greatest obstacle to 
peace was Serb-inspired fighting in Bosnia to create Greater Serbia. The CIA argued that 
the only way to the international community could prevent the violence from 
destabilizing the rest of Europe was by using all available sanctions and rewards to 
exploit internal problems in Serbia that would force Serb leaders to participate in 
settlement negotiations.168  
As the CSCE focused its attention on resolving the conflict in Bosnian, Bush 
applied his Yugoslav strategies towards Bosnia. This included not deploying US forces to 
enforce peace in Bosnia. Bush also remained committed to supporting European policy 
decisions towards Yugoslavia and using international cooperation to end the fighting 
there. However, the administration did support sanctions to pressure the parties to 
mediate a solution to the civil war. As the United States and international committed 
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worked to establish sanctions against the parties in Bosnia, they agreed that humanitarian 
aid was needed in Bosnia.169 
In June 1992, the UN passed resolution 757,170 which encouraged UN members to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to those displaced by the Bosnian conflict.  
In support of UN resolution 757, Bush analysts studied humanitarian needs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish US humanitarian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
analysis explained that humanitarian aid was critically needed in Bosnia since the 
UNHCR and ICRC had stopped delivering aid to Bosnia because of guerrilla fighters and 
refused armed escorts to deliver humanitarian aid. They also noted that without UNHCR 
and ICRC humanitarian supplies, Croatia was the only country delivering help to 
Sarajevo. The analysis also described that the UN’s inability to broker a cease-fire had 
hindered efforts to set up the Sarajevo airport to deliver aid.171 As the administration 
decided how to deliver the much-needed aid to Bosnia, it also discussed ways to 
cooperate with allies to ensure that humanitarian supplies reached Bosnia with as little 
interference as possible. To accomplish this the NSC/DC developed a diplomatic strategy 
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to get consensus from European leaders to support US efforts and use their influence in 
former Yugoslavia to prevent any hindrances to US humanitarian deliveries. 
The NSC/DC suggested getting Russia and European allies to deliver démarches 
to Belgrade that expressed US intentions to provide aid to Bosnia, and that the United 
States expected Serbia to unblock the Sarajevo airport, withdraw their forces from the 
area, and respect the UN-brokered agreement that had opened the airport. The NSC/DC 
argued that rather than making a simple decision for or against US participation in 
delivery efforts, that the administration needed to determine which circumstances 
warranted the US involvement.172 It explained that the advantages of providing 
humanitarian aid demonstrated American concern for Bosnian, supported Bosnia’s 
president, increased Serb opposition against Milošević, tempered Milošević’s aspirations,  
pressured Croatia to stay out of Bosnia, and a US commitment increased the operations 
probability of success. However, the disadvantages were that the situation in Bosnia 
could worsen and endanger the lives of American soldiers, aid could remain undistributed 
at the airport, the EC could become reluctant to follow through leaving the United States 
to carry the greatest share of the burden, guerrilla attacks on aid deliveries could resume, 
and there would be calls to expand humanitarian deliveries beyond Sarajevo.173  
This analysis of US humanitarian policies revealed that the Bush administration 
did not want the United States to be provide humanitarian relief for Bosnia if the 
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Europeans were not willing to participate. To prevent the United States from bearing the 
burden of the relief efforts unilaterally or becoming caught in a quagmire in Bosnia. 
Especially when CIA, NIE, and NSC memos demonstrated there was little resolve among 
the Europeans to assertively end the conflict or start a peacekeeping operation. The CIA 
report reaffirmed the costs to end the violence in Bosnia, and the lack of willingness 
among European states to undertake the necessary actions to end the violence. 
Recognizing that no country was willing to deploy their military to stop the violence in 
Bosnia and that a UN peacekeeping mission would not resolve the issues causing the 
violence, the NIE recommended international sanctions against Serbia. While the 
international community recognized the violence occurring in Bosnia there was little 
drive to introduce forceful policies that would pressure all sides to mediate a solution to 
the conflict. Bush’s decision to consider supporting humanitarian relief while 
encouraging NATO and UN to resume theirs revealed that the United States, like Europe, 
was hesitant to forcefully intervene in the Bosnian intra-state conflict.  
Balkan Task Force Established 
During a meeting on 4 June to discuss the memorandum on humanitarian aid to 
Bosnian, the NSC/DC concluded that the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated further and 
there were no signs that the violence would abate soon. International efforts to help 
Sarajevo had also stalled as the UN was unable to deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo or 
open the Sarajevo airport. However, the states were enforcing the sanctions. In an attempt 
to better develop policies to respond to Bosnia Bush agreed to establish a group dedicated 
to examining the situation in Bosnia and to propose solutions that could successfully 
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deliver aid to Bosnia.174 Shortly after this meeting, the Bush administration established 
the Balkan Task Force, and its first report described the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia. 
 The BTF was created on 12 June 1992 and headed by Jim Carson, CIA Chief of 
Security Issues Division, and made up of analysts from the Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and 
other agencies as needed. The BTF’s objective was to ensure the efficient use of 
American resources and US intelligence analysis by centralizing and coordinating the 
development and implementation for America’s response to Bosnia. It also centralized 
and coordinated sanctions monitoring according to UNSC resolution 757, coordinated 
general and tactical military intelligence analysis, and drafted contingency plans to 
support the delivery of aid to Bosnia.175 Bush established the BTF’s original mission to 
focus solely on America’s humanitarian policies towards Bosnia. Since Bush was not 
prepared to expand US support any further, the BTF’s objectives remained narrow in 
focus. Bush’s formation of the BTF reveals that US policies towards the Bosnian conflict 
needed more resources to analyze the situation and readily recommend policy changes. 
The BTF was not tasked with developing recommendations for policies toward ending 
the conflict in Bosnia or international cooperation. However, the BTF did provide 
situation reports on the effects the Bosnian conflict was having on the rest of Europe.176 
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 In an August intelligence memorandum, the BTF reported that the violence in 
Bosnia had created a “terror campaign that threatened to destroy civil society and inflict 
famine and disease on a large population.”177 The report noted that the Serb policy of 
ethnic cleansing had created a severe refugee problem with over 1.3 million Bosnians 
displaced internally, 500,000 refugees had fled to Croatia, and 9,000 killed in the 
fighting. It continued that in response to continued fighting and increased domestic and 
international pressures the Western European governments would have to revise their 
refugee policies.  
It also described the destruction of residential areas, government buildings, major 
thoroughfares into the cities were blocked, and most of Bosnia’s airports. Additionally, 
municipal services including electricity, water, and sewage treatment were erratic and 
scarce in urban areas, and rural fighting was pushing refugees into urban areas 
exacerbating the conditions there.178 The BTF agreed that the humanitarian situation 
would worsen during the winter of 1992-1993 and that, “the current conflict and 
atrocities are a result of residual resentment over acts committed by all sides during the 
Second World War.”179 The BTF report continued to blame the violence on "ancient 
hatreds," while describing the humanitarian disaster. Bush decided to continue US 
cooperation with Europe to provide humanitarian relief to the Bosnians. He also 
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continued to resist deploying US military forces even as the Europeans began planning to 
deploy their forces to Bosnia.180 
Bush’s strategy towards Bosnia was primarily focused on devising ways for the 
United States to support humanitarian relief efforts for the civilians displaced and 
suffering from the Bosnian War. His strategy was also devised to prevent the United 
States from deploying its military forces to try and end a political conflict that required 
diplomatic resolution efforts not an outside enforced peace. Bush also focused on 
allowing the Europeans to resolve its own security concerns, so that Europe could 
establish post-Cold War cooperation frameworks. However, Bush remained dedicated to 
America’s core foreign policy themes and principles of deterring international 
aggression, supporting international efforts to resolve crises, and defending US interests 
around the world.  
Clinton and the Bosnian War 
In November, the Bush had lost his re-election bid for the American presidency to 
Bill Clinton. When he assumed the presidency, Clinton initially continued Bush’s focus 
on humanitarian relief for Bosnia. At the same time, the Clinton administration started to 
draft its national security strategy for the United States. First Clinton’s administration 
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needed to “decide what it wants to achieve and what price it is prepared to pay to get 
it.”181  
In his 1994 NSS, Clinton outlined that European stability was vital to US security. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had an unparalleled 
opportunity to contribute to a free and undivided Europe. Part of this strategy required the 
United States to work to end the Bosnia War, and to prevent the war from enveloping 
Europe and its new democratic countries. To do this the United States needed to stem the 
flow of refugees, stop civilian deaths, and confirm NATO’s centrality to post-Cold War 
European security. Clinton also acknowledged the violence in Bosnia demonstrated that 
military forces remained relevant, and that the United States faced difficult decisions 
about the use of its military power to respond to post-Cold War intranational and 
international conflicts.182  
Clinton’s first steps upon taking office was to recognize the threat the Bosnian 
War posed to US interests in Europe. He also reaffirmed NATO’s role in European 
security, and America’s role as a NATO member in European security. Clinton’s security 
strategy also recognized that the United States needed to create a strategy to determine 
when military interventions were feasible options for intranational conflicts. Clinton’s 
national security strategy also demonstrated reluctance to deploy US forces as part of a 
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, though US interventions in other intranational conflicts 
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were possible. The national security strategy also revealed that Clinton was not willing to 
usurp the EC and NATO but desired greater cooperation with those institutions. Clinton 
first national security strategy went further than Bush’s strategy in recognizing the future 
threats that intranational conflicts posed to US interests. However, like Bush, Clinton also 
lacked a clear strategy for preventing and responding to those conflicts. As he continued 
to comprehend and respond to the Bosnian War  
In his first Presidential Review Directive,183 Clinton outlined a new policy focus 
based on campaign promises to do more in Bosnia. This included relying on intelligence 
documents inherited from the Bush administration. While Clinton’s first policy decision 
was to continue delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia, he also directed Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Director of Central Intelligence R. 
James Woolsey, and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to consider 
the policy options available for Clinton to consider beyond enforcing the no-fly zone in 
Bosnia.184 Through his directive, Clinton provided his advisors and their staffs with the 
initial direction he wanted his Bosnian policies to go. He also established that for the 
Bosnian War, the United States would continue to take a support role in international 
efforts to end the conflict.  
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Clinton requested his advisors consider methods to guarantee the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, end Serbian aggression, reverse Serbian 
territorial gains, punish Serbia for its actions, provide additional support to the Vance-
Owen negotiations, reaffirm and better explain Bush’s Christmas demarcate185 and how 
the administration planned to implement it. Clinton sought ideas on how to pursue 
concerted action with European allies and the world community to place economic and 
military pressure on Serbian leaders to end the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and participate 
in negotiations. He also asked for clarification on ways the administration could tighten 
sanctions against Serbia, deny Serb military forces access to land and water 
transportation routes, increase international efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal, 
encourage Milošević’s opposition in Serbia, and other options that did not involve a US 
military intervention and the costs of each strategy. Lastly, Clinton asked his advisors to 
consider all possible actions except military force such as alternatives to air dropping 
humanitarian supplies, the best options to provide defensive military supplies to the 
Bosnians, and actions the U.S. could take to help implement the Vance-Owen plan if it 
was accepted.186  
Clinton’s policy directive revealed that he wanted to implement more assertive 
polices in Bosnia. However, he wanted to continue humanitarian relief and wanted to 
                                                 
185 On December 25, 1992, Bush sent Slobodan Milošević a letter warning him that the United 
States would deploy its military forces against Serb military forces in Kosovo and Serbia if the Serbs 
provoked additional fighting in Kosovo. Bush also warned Milošević the United States was willing to use 
military forces to defend UN peacekeepers if the UN decided to increase enforcement of the no-fly zone 
over Bosnia. Art Pines, “Bush Warns Serbia Against Escalation: Balkans: Administration hints at U.S. 
intervention if ethnic fighting spreads to the province of Kosovo,” LA Times, December 29, 1992, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-29/news/mn-2755_1_bush-administration.  
186 PRD-1  
 128 
avoid deploying American forces to end the conflict. While Clinton wanted to be able to 
fulfil Bush’s warning to Milošević, Clinton remained hesitant to deploy US forces to 
intervene. Clinton’s advice request revealed that he was initially focused on diplomatic 
and non-military options to force the Serbs to participate in the Vance-Owen process, and 
that he wanted to end Serbian support for Bosnian Serb actions. Clinton’s request also 
revealed that he wanted to maintain US support and cooperation with the international 
community to end the Bosnian conflict. However, Clinton did not ask for any 
recommendations on increasing American leadership in efforts to end the Bosnian War.  
Additionally, these initial steps demonstrated that the Clinton wanted to 
implement more aggressive policies to end the Bosnian war, but with little deviation from 
Bush's policies. Instead, the administration wanted more aggressive policies versions of 
Bush's policies. As the administration continued to respond to the violence in Bosnia and 
negotiation efforts stalled or failed, the administration was forced to reconsider initial 
policies and the best ways to achieve them.  
Clinton Keeps the Balkan Task Force 
Another holdover from Bush’s presidency was the BTF. Clinton decided to 
continue the BTF, and expanded its mission beyond recommending humanitarian policies 
to include working with the NSC to guide discussions and policy strategy options. This 
decision allowed Clinton to take advantage of a resource dedicated and experienced with 
studying the Bosnian War to provide additional policy recommendation. At the end of 
March, the BTF issued a paper on Serbian war goals, it noted:  
“The central Serb goals in Bosnia have been and remain the destruction of Bosnia 
as a viable independent state and the incorporation of Serb-claimed regions into a 
greater Serbia. The current Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia should be 
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seen in this context; it appears aimed at eliminating the few remaining Muslim 
enclaves in the region. Barring the introduction of an external force strong enough 
to compel them to desist, the Serbs are unlikely to stop until they have achieved 
that goal.”187  
It continued that the Vance-Owen Plan encouraged the Serbs to accelerate their 
efforts to force the international community to recognize Serb territorial gains before a 
settlement was reached. The BTF noted the Serbs continued to resist the Vance-Owen 
Plan because the map only recognized Serb territorial gains in the Bosnia's Drina River 
Valley. The BTF concluded that the Vance-Owen Plan had not encouraged the Serbs to 
stop their actions, because the Serbs knew continued violence in Bosnia would prevent 
the international community from implementing the Vance-Owen Plan or any other peace 
agreement. This encouraged the Serbs to eliminate the few remaining eastern Bosnian 
Muslim enclaves the Serbs to gain military and demographic control of the region.188  
The task force contended that the siege of Sarajevo had little military value to the 
Serbs, especially since the Serbs lacked the personnel to engage in house-to-house 
fighting necessary to claim the city. Instead, the siege of Sarajevo was a Serb plan 
designed to destroy Sarajevo as a symbol of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. The siege was also 
designed to pressure Izetbegovic to leave the talks, so the Serbs were not the only party 
opposed to the Vance-Owen Plan.189 The BTF memorandum concluded that Serb 
“actions reflect political reality; there is little doubt that Serb ‘agreement’ to a version of 
the Vance-Owen Plan will not imply compliance with the letter or spirit of an accord. The 
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Serbs are not likely to withdraw from any territory they occupy barring the arrival of an 
international force able and willing to compel them to do so.”190 As the BTF reported the 
Serbs were the main culprit for the continued violence in Bosnia. The BTF report showed 
that the Serbs were taking advantage of the international community’s reluctance to 
militarily intervene to annex Bosnian territory and drive out non-Serbs from those areas. 
It also revealed the difficulties Clinton and his administration faced ending the Bosnian 
War, if the international community was reluctant to respond forcefully enough to 
pressure the parties to negotiate a settlement. However, Clinton established in PRD-1 that 
he too was reluctant to deploy American military power to Bosnia to end the conflict.  
The BTF analysts contend that if the international community successfully 
undertook the mission then the Serbs would grudgingly comply while encouraging 
guerrilla attacks. The BTF argued, though difficult, the administration could implement 
policies that pressured the Serbs to alter their policies. It suggested lifting the arms 
embargo against Bosnia to encourage Serb cooperation. However, the BTF noted that the 
United States would have difficulty persuading the UN, Russia, and EC to support the 
policy change because they would argue lifting the embargo endangered UN troops and 
humanitarian operations. The BTF’s alternative policy suggestion was to tighten 
sanctions against Serbia further, which would increase pressure against Milošević. 
However, this policy would radicalize Serbian public opinion and increase the influence 
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of ultra-nationalists, which would require the United States to increase aid to Macedonia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria to gain their cooperation.191  
The BTF’s policy recommendations revealed another issue Clinton faced in his 
efforts to encourage the international community to pressure the parties to negotiation: 
the lack of consensus among the international community on policies to end the Bosnian 
War. The BTF report revealed that while the United States supported lifting the arms 
embargo against Bosnia, other members of the community opposed it fearing danger to 
their troops and the humanitarian mission. Like the international community’s reluctance 
to deploying military forces to Bosnia to forcibly end the war, the opposition to this 
policy demonstrated the international community’s limits on intervening in intra-state 
conflicts beyond supporting negotiations. This opposition to ending the arms embargo 
against Bosnia was one policy that repeatedly stymied Clinton and his administration’s 
efforts at international cooperation to end the Bosnian conflict. As Clinton increased the 
assertiveness of his policies and introduced American leadership to the peace process, 
international opposition to more forceful policies gradually decreased. 
NSC Meetings 1993-1995 
From 1993 to 1995 Clinton used various responses to end the Bosnia conflict and 
slowly abandoned Bush’s policies towards Bosnia. During the first two NSC/PC 
meetings, the Clinton administration discussed Bush’s strategy and ways to use the BTF 
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under NSC Director for Europe Jenonne Walker’s leadership 192 The NSC/PC also 
established three categories of actions to pressure the Serbs to end their campaign. The 
first category focused on humanitarian policies including air drops and closing Serb 
detention camps. The second dealt with sanctions and public diplomacy in Serbia. The 
third category explored policies that included American military power, including air 
power, and ending force restrictions on UNPROFOR.193 Early in 1993, Clinton and his 
advisors had a strategy foundation for Bosnian policies. Clinton initially decided to 
continue several of Bush’s policies towards Bosnia. This included the BTF, Bush’s 
warning to Milošević against spreading violence to Kosovo, limiting American military 
involvement to end the fighting, and cooperating with the UN and EU. At the same time, 
Clinton altered these policies to fit his strategy.  
The NSC/PC agreed early on that the United States was willing to use force to 
implement an agreement. As part of this, the committee had the military draw up a 
possible military intervention in Bosnia. The intervention included targeting Serbian 
military, industrial, and government sites, and required American access to allies’ 
airbases, and deploying US Naval forces to the Balkans. The military noted that the 
intervention would lead to high civilian casualties and increase refugee flows out of the 
Balkans, European allies would oppose a military intervention, and it would alienate 
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Russia.194 The NSC/PC also discussed European opposition to ending the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and US support for Bosnian Muslims. The committee discussed European 
threats to abandon the peace process if the United States insisted on ending the embargo 
forcing which would force the United States negotiate unilaterally with the three groups. 
They noted that this situation isolated the United States from its allies and limited US 
options.195  
The administration’s discussion on cooperation with the EU and UN revealed that 
while the United States had accepted and was reluctantly willing to militarily intervene in 
Bosnia to end the war or end the arms embargo against Bosnia, America’s allies were not 
ready to make that step. Instead, EU and UN remained dedicated to negotiating an end to 
the conflict, and remained determined to avoid military entanglements in Bosnia before a 
peace agreement was reached. At the same time, while the EU and UN had confidence 
the Vance-Owen negotiations would succeed, Clinton and his administration were less 
confident and believed the Vance-Owen Plan was not aggressive enough. The differences 
in strategy preferences between the United States and the international community were 
not lost to Clinton and his advisors. However, Clinton’s commitment to an international 
approach to end the war, required him to make compromises with the international 
community to bring peace to Bosnia.  
                                                 
194 “1993-01-29 BTF Memorandum re: Principals Committee Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, 
January 28, 1993,” Clinton Digital Library accessed November 20, 2015, 
http://clinton/presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12303, 3.  
195 1993-02-04, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia February 3, 
1993,” Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, 
http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12306, 1. 
 134 
To compromise American policies with the international community, Clinton’s 
advisors debated US diplomatic strategy beginning with four broad approaches: 
1. Replacing the Vance-Owen Plan with a more aggressive US approach,  
2. changing the Vance-Owen map for one more morally acceptable and 
enforcing it,  
3. ending US participation in EU-led negotiations while maintaining pressure 
on all parties to accept the agreement, 
4. focus US efforts on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia and ending all 
US political and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.196  
The NSC/PC immediately eliminated the first and last options as placing too restrictive 
on US strategy. The continued diplomatic discussions based on the third and second 
option.197 As policy disagreements with EU limited Clinton’s strategy choices, Clinton’s 
advisors set aside military options and focused on humanitarian and diplomatic strategies 
that worked “in parallel with the Allies and Russia rather than in concert” that included a 
two-track strategy—humanitarian aid and acquiescing to Vance-Owen negotiations.198  
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While Clinton was unwilling to break with international efforts to end the conflict in 
Bosnia, the divergences between American policy goals and the international 
community’s goals hindered efforts to end the intranational conflict.  
Clinton’s Policies Towards the Vance-Owen Plan 
Since 1991 Lord David Owen, EU Envoy to the UN Secretary-General had 
worked to create a negotiated settlement that would end the fighting in Bosnia. In the first 
half of 1993 the Vance-Owen Plan was the international community’s best chance to end 
the Bosnian War. In 1993, Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy to UN Secretary-General joined 
Lord Owen and together the men created the Vance-Owen Plan. The Vance-Owen Plan 
created a Bosnian constitution, military solution, and established Bosnian territorial 
boundaries and ethnic provinces based on ethnic population. The Vance-Owen Plan 
relied on the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia’s provisional constitution, 
plan to demilitarize Bosnia, and a map that divided Bosnian into ten provinces with 
proportional representation in the government. The map also rejected most of the Serbs 
territorial gains outside of the Drina River Valley.199  
The Vance-Owen map would cause the Serbs and Muslims to reject the plan 
initially while the Croats accepted it. The Serbs rejected the plan because it voided their 
territorial gains in Bosnia, and the Bosnian Muslims rejected the map because it 
recognized Serbian territorial gains through ethnic cleansing.200 The Vance-Owen Plan 
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compromised the international committee’s commitment to reject territorial acquisitions 
made through aggression or genocide. This compromise was the main problem Clinton 
and his administration had with the Vance-Owen Plan, and why they wanted to push for a 
“more morally acceptable” map.201 While the Clinton administration worked to support a 
Vance-Owen settlement, the administration discussed their disapproval of the Vance-
Owen Plan. The discussed their moral apprehension to recognizing any of the Serb's 
territorial gains from ethnic cleansing. Another issue was the large number of troops 
required to implement the plan.202 While the Clinton administration disliked the Vance-
Owen Plan, they were unwilling to reject it because they were not ready to lead mediation 
efforts.203 Despite Clinton and his advisors’ antipathy to the Vance-Owen Plan, their 
commitment to an international effort to end the Bosnian conflict and reluctance to take 
over leadership of the settlement overruled their opposition. Even as the Clinton 
administration hoped the Vance-Owen Plan would succeed the administration drafted 
contingency policies and continued to work on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia.  
 Following its initial meetings, the NSC/PC and NSC/DC continued to meet as the 
Vance-Owen negotiations progressed, and the international community held high hopes 
the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would accept the Vance-Owen Plan. By April the 
Muslims and Croats had signed the Vance-Owen Plan. In preparation for an agreement, 
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Clinton’s advisors began debating the roles the United States would take to implement 
the Vance-Owen Plan.204As the deadline approached to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, 
Milošević continued to hold off on the agreement. In April, Lord Owen met with 
Milošević and other Serbian leaders and personally presented the plan. After this meeting 
Milošević signed the Vance-Owen Plan, and sent it to the Serbian parliament for final 
approval. Milošević accepted the plan to reduce international pressure and economic 
sanctions against Serbia, and because he believed the international community would not 
provide the military force necessary to enforce the Vance-Owen Plan. 205  
As the Clinton administration waited for Serbian parliament to agree, the NSC/PC 
drafted requirements for US military support for the settlement. The NSC/PC required the 
parties to abide by the settlement and their fighting. However, if the parties ignored the 
settlement and fighting continued, US forces were prevented from deploying to 
Bosnia.206 Even as the NSC/PC confirmed US willingness to help implement and enforce 
the agreement, it also worked to protect US military forces entering an unresolved 
conflict where American soldiers would get caught between opposing sides. Along with 
the safeguards, the NSC/PC requested the CIA establish a method the administration 
could use determine which party was responsibility for refusing to comply with the 
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Vance-Owen settlement.207 As it appeared possible the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were 
reaching an agreement, the administration determined that the United States would 
participate in multinational efforts to implement and enforce a settlement. Even as 
Clinton broke with Bush's strategy, he still followed the EC's lead though he increasingly 
pressured the EC to act more assertively.  
Between March and May, the administration concentrated on collaborating with 
the UN and NATO to implement the Vance-Owen Plan and discussions in the UNSC to 
develop concerted responses in case Serbia refused to sign the agreement. There was a 
general consensus in the UN that the UN should enact harsher sanctions against Serbia if 
it refused the settlement.208 As the mediation efforts continued into April, the Serbs were 
the only party that had not signed the agreement. Despite Milošević’s arguments for 
signing the agreement, the Serbian Parliament disagreed and refused to ratify the plan.209 
The Vance-Owen Plan’s failure forced the Clinton administration to re-evaluate 
its strategy. The administration decided to continue encouraging EC efforts to create a 
new peace settlement. The administration also continued to review the possibility of 
deploying US forces, and disagreed about sending US airpower to support NATO safe 
havens or defending UNPROFOR. The NSC/PC decided to send Secretary Christopher to 
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discuss strategy options with European foreign ministers, and the committee discussed 
contingency plans in case the Europeans rejected any of the proposals. These 
contingencies included taking unilateral actions, abandoning the negotiations completely, 
adopting the European approach to military force, try to contain the fighting to Bosnia, 
start punitive airstrikes against Serbia to force Serbia to accept an agreement, support the 
UN cease-fire, or to make no changes. These debates were not significantly different 
from the discussions the administration had in January, except that the administration 
added the use of force to the options list.210  
After the defeat of the Vance-Owen Plan, the international community continued 
its efforts to get the Bosnian parties to agree to a settlement. The United States continued 
to push for ending the arms embargo on Bosnia and preventing the fighting from 
spreading beyond Bosnia. In September, another agreement was attempted by the British 
on HMS Invincible, but it failed as the Bosnian Muslims continued to oppose any map 
that recognized Serb territorial gains and the Serbs rejected any settlement that did not. In 
response, the Clinton administration began working to establish cooperation between the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats to limit fighting in Bosnia.211  
 The Clinton administration’s policy discussions following the rejection of the 
Vance-Owen Plan demonstrated that the plan’s failure had reinvested the administration 
into the possibility of deploying American forces to Bosnia. At the same time, the 
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administration did not deviate far from its policy discussion at the start of Clinton’s 
presidency. The administration remained dedicated to an international effort to end the 
Bosnian War, and to avoid acting unilaterally. 
1994 
In February 1994, Secretary of State Christopher, NSA Anthony Lake, and Vice 
President Al Gore met with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and the Croatian 
Foreign Minister Mate Granic. This meeting began a US-led effort to create cooperation 
between Bosnian and Croat governments. On 1 March the Muslims and Croats finalized 
the Washington Agreement.212 The Washington Agreement established a cooperative 
framework for a confederation agreement between the Bosnian government and Bosnian 
Croats. On 18 March, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the Bosnian Croat Leader 
Zubak signed a constitution that created a confederation for those Bosnian areas with 
Croat and Muslim majorities.213 The Washington Agreement, stopped the fighting 
between the Muslims and Croats making it possible for the Muslims to receive weapons 
through Croatia.214 The Clinton administration’s efforts to create the agreement between 
the Bosnian government and its Croat population demonstrated it was possible to reduce 
the fighting the Bosnian conflict. The Clinton administration’s ability to influence an 
intranational conflict like Bosnian revealed that international pressure was viable.  
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In April, the Serbs launched an attack on the city of Gorazde, which the UN had 
designated as a safe haven. Clinton administration responded by urging the UN to tighten 
sanctions against Serbia, increased US forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia and provided 
more equipment to UNPROFOR.215 It also discussed how the international community 
was enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zones in Bosnia and how to make those 
zones more effective.216 On 23 April, the administration discussed the possibility of 
NATO airstrikes against Serb artillery in retaliation for Gorazde. They also decided to 
send Christopher and Albright to discuss America’s “unhappiness” about the UN’s 
refusal to authorize NATO airstrikes against the Serbs with Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali.217 The NSC/PC also discussed plans for possible NATO airstrikes on 24 April if 
the Serbs refused to abide by the ceasefire and remove their weapons from Gorazde.218 
The Washington agreement and the attack in Gorazde established a turning point for 
Clinton’s Bosnia policies. Following these two events the Clinton administration 
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gradually adopted a more aggressive diplomatic strategy to end Bosnia’s war. While 
Clinton would slowly introduce more assertive policies, policies of humanitarian aid, 
participating in international peace efforts remained core components of Clinton’s policy. 
These core policies, especially cooperation with the international community would 
provide the main hindrances to Clinton’s more assertive policies.  
As 1994 continued, the US reaffirmed its policy to only participate in 
peacekeeping measures under NATO auspices and continued to support negotiation 
efforts. Yet the makeup of the international negotiation team was changed as the US and 
Russian envoys, and representatives from UN, EU, and ICFY created the Contact Group, 
to handle negotiations following settlement failures in 1993.219 The Contact Group began 
drafting a new settlement in April. The first change the Contact Group made was to the 
division of Bosnia. The first settlement divided gave the Bosnians 34 percent, the Croats 
17 percent, and Bosnian Serbs 49 percent of Bosnian territory. This map also recognized 
the settlement reached in the Washington Agreement and recognized the Muslim and 
Croatian territories as a confederation.220 In concert with the Contact Groups strategy, the 
Clinton administration tried to encourage Bosnia to accept the Contact Group's Proposal 
for a 51/49 territory division with Serbia, and reiterated the US’s commitment to 
supporting a viable settlement that ended the conflict. They also decided if the Serbs 
remained the only holdout to the Contact Group proposal then the US would tighten 
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sanctions against Serbia.221 When the Serbs rejected the Contact Group plan in July the 
United States to push for increased sanctions against Serbia in the UN. The irony of the 
Contact Group’s division of Bosnia was that it accepted some Serbian territorial gains 
even though the Clinton administration had disagreed with the Vance-Owen Plan for the 
same reason. However, following the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan and several other 
efforts, the destruction of Bosnia, and the population changes forcibly created by Serbian 
ethnic cleansing, the international community had little power to overturn the ethnic 
changes in Bosnia. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration remained determined to 
pressure the Serbs to accept a settlement that stopped the fighting. 
During the summer, Secretary Christopher attempted to convince the Contact 
Group to implement more robust options to punish the Serbs for refusing the settlement. 
The administration recognized that it was becoming frustrating trying to convince the 
other Contact Group members they needed to implement more forceful actions against 
Serbia.222 Along with the Contact Group, the Clinton administration faced resistance in 
the UN to strictly enforce the existing zones of exclusions, end the arms embargo against 
Bosnia, and to a proposed Omnibus Sanctions resolution that included options to loosen 
or tighten sanctions against Serbia based on Serb actions in Bosnia.223 Despite these 
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challenges, the administration continued to push for more forceful policies against the 
Serbs.  
Throughout 1994 the administration’s strategy continued as it had during 1993. 
However, the Washington Agreement and the attack on Gorazde had encouraged the 
Clinton administration to implement more aggressive action. Beginning with its role in 
the Contact Group, the Clinton administration began exercising American leadership and 
encouraging more assertive policies in the international community. Additionally, after 
disagreeing with the Vance-Owen Plan for its morally ambiguous map, the Clinton 
administration increasingly accepted that there were no good options for a Bosnian 
solution because no morally acceptable settlement would satisfy all parties or the morally 
acceptable solutions created residual local-level conflicts for the new governments 
handle.  
Policy Re-evaluations After Two Years 
In 1995, Clinton reassessed the Bosnian War and its impact on UN security 
concerns. Clinton argued that while the Bosnian War did not threaten US security or 
warrant an American unilateral military action, it remained a threat to post-Cold War 
security that the United States could not ignore. Therefore, Clinton focused US policy 
towards Bosnia on obtaining a political settlement that preserved Bosnia's territorial 
integrity, provided all Bosnians a viable future state, prevented the war from spreading 
into Europe, stopped refugee flows, ended ethnic cleansing, and reinforced NATO’s 
central role in post-Cold War European security.224  
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When compared to the NSS93, NSS94 only differed with the additions of 
objectives to achieve a political solution to the conflict and creating a viable Bosnian 
state. Clinton’s decision to continue participating in international efforts to end the 
Bosnian War, even though the war did not threaten US interests, demonstrated Clinton’s 
commitment to keeping the United States engaged in the world. These changes revealed 
that after two years of participating in unsuccessful international efforts to end the 
Bosnian conflict, the Clinton administration was ready to end the conflict, and start a 
peacekeeping mission. The US faced several hurdles to achieve its goals. It faced 
divisions within the international community and the Contact Group over the strength of 
punitive policies, and the best method to convince all three parities to agree to a 
settlement.  
In January, the administration agreed the US had to avoid all appearances of 
departing from its commitment to the Contact Group despite continued hindrances to 
negotiations. The administration also decided they needed to deal with the possible end of 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of March if the UN did not extend its mandate.225 In 
February the administration assessed its policies and noted it had successfully prevented 
the war from spreading, kept relief supplies available, and maintained cohesion with its 
allies. However, the administration had been unable to produce a political settlement that 
all parties accepted, and it had not reversed enough Serb territorial gains to convince the 
Bosnians and Croatians to agree to a settlement. They noted the US lacked leverage with 
the Bosnian government and Croats and had been unable to effectively use economic 
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sanctions against Serbia to pressure the parities to accept a settlement. They also noticed 
that none of the parties had a peacemaker, and that Milošević was unwilling to make the 
Serbs stop fighting. In a policy review, it stated that: 
"If we stay on our present course the prospects are for an escalation of the war in 
Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited 
achievements to date and increased pressures for U.S. involvement…If the war 
escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will 
become increasingly likely—creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in 
former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to 
avoid.”226 
At this point the administration recognize it had failed to prioritize its policies in 
any meaningful way, and that it had strategic choices to make based on Clinton’s 1995 
national security strategy. These options included continuing current policies, adopting a 
neutral position, and focusing on containing the fighting, arguing for the international 
community to isolate Greater Serbia and impose UN sanctions, supporting the Bosnians, 
and applying military force through UNPROFOR or NATO air strikes to pressure the 
Serbs to accept a settlement.227  
In early 1995, the administration continued to focus on political and democratic 
measures to create a political settlement in Bosnia. As the year continued the 
administration realized that diplomatic and political methods were not yielding the results 
they desired. However, America’s limited leverage and the needed to maintain 
international cooperation the administration could ill afford to end its diplomatic efforts, 
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providing humanitarian relief, and containing the conflict.228 The administration’s 
numerous policy re-evaluations up to 1995 revealed the administration was unable to find 
satisfactory solutions to its disagreements with the international community on policy 
choices. At the same time the administration remained committed to using international 
pressure to convince the parties to settle the conflict, even though the international 
community was unable to place sufficient pressure on the parties to accept an agreement. 
In February, the Clinton administration attempted a new method to end the war. It 
did this by attempting to convince Milošević to recognize Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, 
and the other former Yugoslav states.229 However, Milošević rejected the 
administration’s suggestion because it "would be tantamount to recognition of the 
Izetbegovic government, a move which would be counterproductive as it would drive the 
Bosnian Serbs into a war fever."230 Milošević also replied that the only way to convince 
the Serbs would be full and immediate sanctions relief.231 The administration floundered 
through the rest of the summer trying to convince Milošević to accept the recognition 
plan.  
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Dayton Accords 
In August, the Clinton administration started plans for a US-led peace settlement. 
The administration planned to work in in conjunction with the Contact Group to negotiate 
with the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs to finally achieve a settlement. In Geneva, the 
Contact Group drafted the principles of an agreement that included recognition of Bosnia 
and a political settlement to the conflict. The Contact Group also agreed to use NATO 
Forces to implement the peace plan after it was accepted.232 As 1995 headed to a close, 
the Clinton administration prepared to lead negotiations between Serbia, Bosnia, and 
Croatia to settle the conflict and begin restoring peace to the Balkans.  
The Clinton administration’s efforts at the end of 1995 culminated the gradual 
changes it had implemented following the Washington Accords and the bombing of 
Gorazde. Ever committed to international cooperation, the administration introduced 
American leadership to the Contact Group and upcoming negotiations that was able to 
leverage international pressure to convince the parties to accept US-led negotiations. Like 
the Vance-Owen Plan before it, the Clinton administration’s attempt to end the conflict 
would reveal Clinton’s ability to participate and lead international efforts to resolve other 
intranational conflicts. 
Throughout November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base near Dayton, 
Ohio, Secretary Christopher, EU Special Representative Clark Bildt and Russian First 
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov negotiated with Croat, Bosnian, and Serb presidents 
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to settle the Bosnian conflict. The first days of the conference began with positive steps, 
and all three presidents attended all the sessions. The Serbs were not emotional and 
provided constructive feedback to various proposals while the Bosnians pushed for the 
end to the arms embargo.233 The opening days of the Dayton Conference started the 
negotiations on a positive note. However, this positive beginning did not predict a good 
outcome for the US-sponsored negotiations, especially when territory remained the 
biggest hindrance to a settlement.  
As the Bosnian parties worked on the map, constitution, elections, and the 
federation of Bosnia, Milošević tested Contact Group members.234 On 8 November 
Kerrick reported that the Serb and Bosnian presidents had agreed to a joint meeting with 
the US delegation to discuss the Bosnian constitution, election issues, and the map.235 
Beginning 9 November, the US delegation led intensive talks on the constitution, 
election, and the map236 As the conference continued, progress was made on the 
constitution and federation while map discussions stalled. The Clinton administration 
resolved the impediment by proposing a map while Secretary Christopher conducted 
intensive talks with the Bosnians and Serbs about the map. In December, the Bosnian, 
Croat, and Serb presidents signed The Dayton Accords in Paris after agreeing to a map, 
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constitution, and establishing elections.237 However, concerns remained about the 
international community's ability to enforce the agreement and Bosnian Serb reactions 
since many were unaware of the agreement until the last minute. 
The Clinton administration’s ability to conduct the peace conference at the end of 
1995 was due to a determined effort to pursue an aggressive diplomatic effort. The 
administration faced considerable challenges encouraging the allies to support aggressive 
policies and early humanitarian strategy inherited from the Bush administration. While 
Bush had encouraged EC to lead efforts to resolve the Bosnian War, Clinton and his 
administration attempted a strategy with greater US participation. Nonetheless, both 
administrations had focused on limiting US military involvement in Bosnia. Both 
administrations recognized that any military intervention to enforce a Bosnian peace 
settlement would be large-scale and for a long duration.  
Conclusions 
Bush and Clinton developed different strategies towards the Bosnian War, while 
relying on the same principles of US foreign policy to guide their decisions. While 
Bush’s strategy towards Bosnia was an adaptation his strategy used during the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia and heavily relied on European mediation efforts, Clinton’s strategy took 
Bush’s strategy and incrementally introduced more American leadership and assertive 
policies to pressure the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats to accept a peace settlement. Bush’s 
strategy focused on humanitarian relief and supporting European leadership. Clinton’s 
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strategy was repeatedly bogged down by policy disagreements with Europe that were less 
inclined to adopt more forceful policies, especially over the use of military force and 
ending the arms embargo against Bosnia. 
In 1994, the signing of the Washington Accord by the Bosnians and Croats and 
the bombing of Gorazde encouraged Clinton to implement a more aggressive diplomatic 
strategy that pushed for tighter sanctions against Serbia and ending the arms embargo 
against Bosnia. However, Europeans remained opposed to these sanctions.  In 1995 the 
Clinton administration used its leadership skills and led an international conference that 
settled the Bosnian War in Dayton, OH. The signing of the Dayton Accords was possible 
because Clinton effectively used American influence to bring the Bosnians, Serbs, and 
Croats to the negotiation table.  
Throughout the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton and Bush created policies based on US 
foreign policy core principles of international cooperation against aggression. While both 
presidents faced difficulties creating strategies to respond to the intranational conflict 
their strategies and policy decisions demonstrate the timelessness of US core principles to 
defend the United States and the deter aggression around the world. The Bosnian War 
was not the only intranational conflict that posed different and additional challenges to 
American foreign policymakers. The coup in Haiti would also test Bush and Clinton’s 
ability to implement policies based on US foreign policy principles and respond to the 
growing influence of race. 
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CHAPTER VI – THE COUP IN HAITI: BUSH AND CLINTON 
Introduction 
Since the 1950s the United States had faced increasing pressures from African-
Americans and other peoples of color in the United States for social, economic, and legal 
equality. These demands inspired the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth 
century, which resulted in African Americans making significant strides to improve their 
situation and standing in the United States. African-Americans have always had some 
interest in US foreign relations238 and during the Cold War US foreign policymakers 
relied on African Americans to defend against the Soviet threat.239 In the post-Cold War 
period, American society continued to face questions about race and race relations at 
home, but also how the United States would respond to race in post-Cold War 
international relations. As African Americans gained political power they increased their 
influence in American foreign policies towards African and the Caribbean.240 The 
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overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 was one test of racial 
politics in US foreign policy, especially as African Americans gained more power to 
influence US foreign policy after the 1980s. 
This chapter argues that Bush and Clinton’s responses to the Haitian revolution 
reflected their understandings of the place of race in US foreign policy after the Cold 
War. Throughout the twentieth century US foreign policymakers relied on peoples of 
color to promote US foreign policy and improve relations in non-Western countries. 
Bush’s and Clinton’s policies continued this strategy and demonstrated their 
understanding and interests in relying on peoples of color to support US foreign policy 
goals and US relations around the world after the Cold War. While Bush and Clinton did 
not rely on African American diplomats as part of their responses they did acknowledge 
lobbying efforts by the Congressional Black Caucus on US policies towards Haiti. 
relations. The Congressional Black Caucus’s lobby efforts were especially influential in 
Clinton’s decisions in 1994. During the Haitian coup, both presidents had to decide how 
they were going to defend democracy after defeating communism from internal threats in 
Latin America and elsewhere. Bush’s policies followed his New World Order national 
security strategy and relied on negotiations led by the Organization of American States 
(OAS) to diplomatically resolve the coup and restore democracy to Haiti. As he had in 
Bosnia, Clinton initially adopted Bush’s policies. However, Congressional Black Caucus 
lobbying efforts increasingly pushed for a change in US immigration policies towards 
Haitian refugees, to take more aggressive actions against coup leaders in Haiti, take 
leadership in OAS negotiations, and agree to deploy US military forces to Haiti. The 
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Congressional Black Caucus also supported Aristide’s efforts and defended Aristide’s 
reputation against those that support the Cédras regime.  
The Haitian Coup 
After decades of military rule and a five-year period of revolving governments, 
Haiti freely elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the first democratic president of Haiti in 
1990. During his presidency, Aristide implemented social reforms to curtail drug 
trafficking and government corruption. Unfortunately, Aristide’s policies introduced 
changes that angered Haitian elites that benefited from the drug trade and government 
corruption. On 30 September 1991, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the Haitian 
army in a coup that ousted Aristide and exiled him to Venezuela. Cédras then established 
a three-man junta with himself, Lieutenant-Colonel Philippe Biamby, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Michel-Joseph Francóis. During its rule, the Cédras regime carried out numerous 
human rights violations that included political murder, mutilations, and rape against 
Aristide supporters and others in Haiti. To gain support for his return to Haiti, Aristide 
relocated to the United States where he lobbied for international assistance from the OAS 
and the UN. Aristide also petitioned the United States for support and gained support 
from the CBC and liberal members of Congress.241 
Bush’s Policy Strategy Regarding the Haitian Coup 
In his 1991 national security strategy, Bush acknowledged that Latin America and 
the Caribbean believed the United States was only interested in their region when the 
Western Hemisphere was threatened. He argued that in the post-Cold War period the 
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United States had to promote mutual common destiny of all the regions in the Western 
Hemisphere, especially as the Western Hemisphere had become more significant to US 
interests after the Cold War as democracy spread there. The United States proximity to 
Latin America and the Caribbean made the United States more susceptible to threats from 
instabilities in those countries. Bush also acknowledged that the Western Hemisphere 
was on its way to becoming completely democratic with the introduction of democracy in 
Haiti and Panama, and the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua. Bush noted that these 
democracies were fragile and the United States needed to support them.242  
In his 1991 national security strategy Bush posited that the United States could no 
longer have waxing and waning interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
opening of the region to democracy and the decline of Soviet influence required the 
United States to make greater efforts improve its relations there. This included supporting 
democratic governments that were emerging in the region as a recognition of the 
common interests the United States had with Latin and Caribbean countries. However, 
Bush did not outline how the United States would improve relations with Latin and 
Caribbean countries in his security strategy, or how the United States would support the 
fragile democracies in the United States. After promoting right-wing dictators in Latin 
America and the Caribbean as part of the strategy to contain communism,243 the United 
States faced significant challenges improving its relations with Latin America and the 
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Caribbean after the Cold War. Nonetheless, Bush was dedicated to reinvigorating 
cooperative security to promote international stability and security in the Western 
Hemisphere.  
Bush’s initial policy response to the Haitian coup included publically condemning 
the coup and the illegal government. However, Bush decided against taking a leadership 
role in the resolution process. Instead, he used the strategy he was using in Yugoslavia– 
American supported UN and OAS-led negotiations to respond to Haiti’s crisis. Bush’s 
strategy promoted cooperative action.244 Due to a combination of American foreign 
policy values and Bush’s preference to avoid deploying the US military to intervene in 
political conflicts, and that regional security and cooperation institutions were better 
situated to mediate regional instabilities.245 By supporting OAS diplomatic efforts, Bush 
encouraged the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to settle the conflict 
between the Haitian junta and President Aristide so Aristide could return to power and 
restore democracy to Haiti. Bush’s decision not to put the United States in a leadership 
role was to encourage cooperative action, a sense of common destiny and mutual 
responsibility with OAS members. As part of his support for OAS policies towards Haiti, 
Bush declared a national emergency towards Haiti, and prohibited financial transactions 
between Haiti and the United States on 4 October.246 On 28 October, He issued a second 
order that expanded the prohibited financial transactions between the United States and 
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Haiti.247 Bush’s policies towards Haiti began by economically isolating Haiti and 
establishing that the United States did not recognized the junta’s government. As he had 
in Yugoslavia, Bush pushed for a collaborative effort to resolve Haiti’s crisis rather than 
adopting a unilateral response. As the Cédras regime solidified its control and 
international sanctions took hold, Haitians began fleeing the violence and worsened 
poverty in their country. The refugees fled to the Dominican Republic, Latin American 
nations, and the United States.  
Eventually, the refugee flow caused by the Haitian crisis began affecting 
American immigration resources. Bush responded by establishing a refugee processing 
center at Guantanamo base in Cuba. Through November the refugee flow to the United 
States increased and overcrowded the center at Guantanamo. This led Bush to abide by 
the 1981 US-Haiti immigration agreement. This agreement by Reagan and Haitian 
dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier allowed the United States to interdict Haitian 
refugees at sea and return them to Haiti without following traditional asylum practices.248 
Bush defended his decision by arguing that most of the refugees were fleeing the 
economic sanctions in Haiti, not the military junta. The administration decided to begin 
repatriations with the Haitian refugees in Guantanamo. The Haitians were returned to 
Port-au-Prince aboard a US Coast Guard cutter. The Haitians were only allowed to return 
to the ship if their life or safety was in immediate danger where the United States would 
provide humanitarian assistance. The administration also decided it would suspend 
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repatriation if any Haitian migrants were brutalized by the illegal government upon 
disembarking. However, the Haitians had to return to US ships under their own power.249  
While Bush’s executive orders demonstrated the United States supported OAS 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis, and Bush’s commitment to international 
cooperation. Bush’s refugee policy opened the Bush administration to questions about its 
commitment to defend human rights abroad. Unlike the conflict in Yugoslavia where 
America’s distance from the conflict protected the United States from threats to its 
interests, America’s proximity to Haiti ensured the country received some of the refugees 
fleeing the military junta and international economic sanctions against Haiti.  
As Bush responded to the crisis in Haiti, the CBC pressured Bush to ensure that 
the Aristide was returned to power and democracy was restored to Haiti. The CBC was 
founded in 1971, and is the successor to the Democratic Select Committee founded by 
Congressman Charles Diggs. The Democratic Select Committee was created to bring 
African American Representatives to meet sporadically. In 1969 African American 
Congress members began coordinating their efforts in response to the Nixon presidency 
that led to a protracted confrontation between African American Congress members and 
the president and led to a sense of common purpose and identity. The CBC also emerged 
at a point that the Civil Rights Movement was in decline and the African American 
community was placing emphasis on political accomplishments. The original CBC 
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mission was as “Congressmen at large for twenty million Black people.”250 As the CBC 
continued it expanded its mission from a domestic focus to include foreign policy as well.  
CBC efforts to discuss Bush’s policies towards Haiti was part of the CBC’s 
growing influence in Congress and foreign policy discussions. Beginning on 1 October 
1991 the CBC and its members began contacting Bush and his administration with policy 
advice and encouraging Bush to adopt “all diplomatic means to restore the legitimately 
elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide…and encourage you to call on 
the United Nations and the Organization of American States in seeking a peaceful 
resolution to this conflict.”251 The CBC encouraged Bush to seek international 
cooperation to end the Haitian coup, but it did not encourage Bush to act unilaterally. The 
CBC also connected the rise of democracy in Haiti to America’s mission to spread 
democracy abroad, “As totalitarianism collapses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
the United States must reaffirm its commitment to the democratic roots of Haiti.” 252 The 
CBC’s letter to Bush indicated it concerns about the situation in Haiti, and connected 
Haiti’s crisis to US interests. 
During Bush’s presidency and the early part of the coup, the CBC exercised few 
attempts to influence Bush to adjust his policies in Haiti. This would change as the crisis 
continued, refugees continued to flee to the United States and military junta refused to 
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cooperate with international mediators. The CBC would increase its influence on policy 
decisions during Clinton’s presidency. As Bush and Clinton struggled to determine 
America’s role in the post-Cold War period, and how the United States would encourage 
international cooperation, the CBC gained influence in US foreign policy decisions 
towards Haiti. While CBC efforts were less assertive during Bush’s presidency, Clinton’s 
presidency created more opportunities for the CBC to influence foreign policies. In 
particular, the CBC would prove capable to convincing Clinton and other policymakers 
that the Haitian crisis posed a significant risk to US interests that warranted a US 
intervention to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti. At the start of the Haitian coup, 
race did not heavily influence Bush’s foreign policy. Though he faced opposition for his 
immigration policies towards the Haitian refugees, most of the critics opposed the 
repatriation of Haitian refugees for humanitarian reasons. Additionally, the CBC was less 
outspoken of Bush’s policies. 
Race and Clinton’s Foreign Policy 
Three months after beginning his presidency, Clinton had his first White House 
meeting with Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After the meeting, Presidents 
Clinton and Aristide held a joint press conference. During the conference Clinton said it 
was important to him and to the United States to restore democracy to Haiti and return 
President Aristide to power. He continued, “I want to make it clear in the strongest 
possible terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal 
government in Haiti…And I want to make it clear that the United States is committed 
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strongly to a much more aggressive effort to restore Mr. Aristide to his presidency.”253 
Many including the CBC viewed Clinton's statement as a change in his policy direction. 
However, it was not until 1994 Clinton carried out America’s commitment to return 
Aristide to Haiti. While Bush had been less influenced by race in his foreign policy 
decisions, the growing prominence of race and racial interactions in public debates 
between Bush’s and Clinton’s presidency required Clinton to pay greater attention to 
America’s policies in the Caribbean and Africa as he implemented his national security 
strategy of engagement and enlargement. He did this by connecting the Haitian coup to 
US interests promoting and defending democracy around the world.  
One of the reasons that Clinton’s Haitian policy differed from Bush’s was because 
of increased CBC lobbying and the changing race demographics in the United States. In 
1990, the Census Bureau noted that minorities made up 25 percent of the population, and 
were on track to constitute a majority of the population by 2050.254 These demographic 
and political changes shifted the priorities Clinton gave to non-Caucasian countries in his 
foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Clinton had a strong connection with African 
Americans having won 75 percent of the African-American vote in 1992. During his two 
terms, Clinton appointed seven African Americans to cabinet positions and 14 percent of 
his federal judge appointments were African American.255 Also US race relations 
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repeatedly dominated the domestic public agenda in the 1990s. In 1991, the broadcast of 
the beating of Rodney King by the Los Angeles police raised issues of police brutality 
and minorities, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of those continued 
the discussion brought those discussions back to the public agenda. In 1995 the O.J. 
Simpson murder trial returned American race issues to the forefront of the public agenda.  
Clinton’s childhood also mirrored that of many African American voters. He was 
from a working-class background and had been raised by a single mother who struggled 
to support him. On the Arsenio Hall Show during the 1992 presidential campaign Clinton 
famously played the saxophone demonstrating his affinity for jazz music and other music 
forms based on African American culture.256 In 1998, Toni Morrison called Clinton “the 
first black president” after his impeachment trial for having a martial affair with Monica 
Lewinsky. Morrison argued that Clinton’s treatment mirrored the treatment African 
American men received when they appeared to get out of their social place.257 These 
characteristics and the environment in America during the 1990s, presented opportunities 
for Clinton to continue and expand the influence of race in American foreign policy.  
Clinton's Foreign Policy Agenda for Haiti 
When Clinton became president, he began as he had for all of the crises he 
inherited from Bush by continuing some of Bush’s policies and implementing his own 
that put greater international pressure on the Cédras junta to step down.258 In his 1994 
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National Security Strategy, Clinton argued that the world still needed American 
leadership and that exerting American leadership abroad, deterring aggression, 
encouraging peaceful resolutions to conflicts, opening foreign markets, and supporting 
democratic regimes would make America safer and more prosperous. Clinton continued 
that it was in US interests to assist, defend, and restore new democratic governments 
around the world.259 Clinton also claimed that Haiti provided the United States with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its support and to increase the international community of 
democratic governments. As well as improve US national security and defend national 
interests. Clinton contended in the post-Cold War period, the United States had to be 
willing to take immediate and public positions to stop the overthrows of democracies. He 
posited the best ways to do this was by strengthening the pillars of civil society, and 
supporting internal efforts to combat corruption and political discontent by encouraging 
good these new democracies to adopt democratic governing practices. At the same time, 
Clinton called for selective engagement to prevent the United States from becoming the 
world’s policeman. He further defended selective engagement as a way for the United 
States to focus on those challenges that were most relevant to US interests, and to engage 
in those conflicts where the US involvement had the most impact. Part of this selective 
engagement established America’s defense and promotion of democracy was a tertiary 
priority to ensuring US military capabilities, and promoting cooperative security 
                                                 
259 William J. Clinton, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, preface, 1, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994),  
 164 
measures that opened foreign markets to encourage global economic growth and 
supported American prosperity.260 
Both presidents agreed in their national security strategies that America’s defense 
and promotion of democracy came after defending the United States from acts of 
aggression, and maintaining America’s military capabilities around the world. However, 
they differed in their strategies for defending democracy and determining when to limit 
American activism abroad. Where Bush’s limited engagement in international conflicts 
was done to encourage a cooperative environment where regional powers and 
institutions, and the UN could lead efforts to deter aggression and resolve conflicts 
without US leadership. Clinton’s selective engagement encouraged the United States to 
cooperate from a leadership position and a supportive role. Clinton strategy also accepted 
the United States needed more policies to engage with the non-Western world that would 
bring prosperity and stability. Bush and Clinton’s responses to the Haitian crisis further 
revealed their understanding of race’s influence in foreign policy decisions.   
By the time Clinton became president, the OAS and UN had issued several 
economic sanctions against Haiti. Clinton adopted OAS and UN economic sanctions to 
his foreign policy. First, he authorized immigration officials to denied entry to the United 
States to any Haitian national and their immediate family members who had impeded the 
negotiations to restore Haiti’s constitutional government. He also authorized the Treasury 
Department to freeze any US-based Cédras regime assets. Lastly, Clinton directed 
Secretary Christopher to consult with the OAS on ways to tighten sanctions, and he 
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directed Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright to consult with the UN to 
develop additional sanctions against the junta.261 On 16 June, the UNSC passed 
resolution 841 authorizing a trade embargo of Haiti to take effect on 23 June,262 which 
Clinton supported with Executive Order 12853 freezing the property of any Haitian 
supporting or doing business with the junta.263  
Clinton’s initial policy decisions toward the illegal government in Haiti continued 
Bush’s strategy. Clinton also issued executive orders that supported OAS and UN 
economic sanctions by denying the Cédras regime access to financial assets in the United 
States or denied any Cédras supporter to entry to the United States to flee Haiti’s 
economic hardships. Within Clinton’s first year, the Cédras regimes stalling and refusal 
to abide by negotiations eventually encouraged Clinton to implement more assertive 
policies against the Haitian junta. At the same time, these issues with Haitian negotiations 
encouraged the CBD to lobby for changes in US policies towards Haitian refugees and 
isolating the Cédras regime. 
Accord de Governors Island: A Sign of Hope? 
On 3 July 1993, after several months of UN and American economic sanctions, 
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Lt. General Raoul Cédras met at Governors 
Island, NY to sign an agreement that would end the military junta’s control of Haiti and 
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restore Aristide to power. In the Accord de Governors Island, Aristide and Cédras agreed 
to allow UN and OAS representatives into Haiti to observe Aristide’s return. In return, 
Aristide promised to grant amnesty to the Cédras and the other members of the junta 
according to Haiti’s constitution. Additionally, the international community agreed to end 
its economic sanctions against Haiti, to facilitate Haiti’s economic recovery. The parties 
agreed that Aristide would return to Haiti as president on 30 October 1993, and the junta 
leaders would resign their power to UN and OAS observers by 30 October.264  
Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their commitment to the Accord de 
Governors Island in October. When international observers arrived in the harbor at Port-
au-Prince, the junta instigated a mob that prevented international observers from 
disembarking off their ships forcing them to leave for the United States.265 Clinton 
responded to the Cédras government’s refusal to abide by the Accord de Governors 
Island, by issuing executive order 12872. Executive order 12872 froze the US-based 
assets of forty-one Haitian military officers and civilian supporters, as well as those who 
had supported the mob’s obstruction of the Accord de Governors Island.266 Clinton also 
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authorized the deployment of US Naval Forces to help re-establish UNSC resolutions 
841, 873, 875, and a petroleum and arms embargo of Haiti from.267  
In the first year of his presidency, Clinton and his administration supported 
international efforts to convince Aristide and the Cédras junta to agree to a negotiated 
settlement to the Haitian crisis. The international pressure led the two Aristide and Cédras 
to sign the Accord de Governor’s Island in July 1993. The Accord de Governor’s Island 
was a major breakthrough for international resolution efforts and demonstrated that 
international efforts were a viable method to resolve intranational conflicts. The accord 
demonstrated that regional institutions could manage their own security and stability. It 
also fulfilled Clinton’s national security strategy to promote and defend democratic 
governments. Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their promise to step down 
from power. Like the conflict in Yugoslavia, the Cédras’ regimes actions demonstrated 
that ending intranational conflicts went beyond getting the parties to make an agreement. 
The international community also had to demonstrate that there were consequences for 
refusing to abide by international agreements. The military junta’s rejection of the 
agreement was also a turning point for Clinton’s policies towards Haiti. Following junta’s 
refusal to step down the CBC increased its criticisms of Clinton’s policies and increased 
pressure on Clinton to implement more assertive policies against the Cédras regime to 
ensure Aristide’s return to Haiti and restore Haiti’s democracy. 
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Clinton, the CBC, and Haitian Policy Decisions after Accord de Governors Island 
Throughout the Haitian crises, the Clinton administration received numerous 
letters from members of Congress questioning, supporting, and criticizing his policy 
decisions. One of the most vocal supporters of American action in Haiti was the CBC, led 
by Representative Kweisi Mfume. The CBC was a Congressional body that pooled the 
strength of individual African American Congress members to lobby for domestic 
reforms and policies that affected the lives of African Americans, and influence 
American foreign policies towards the Caribbean and African countries.268 Throughout 
Aristide's exile, the CBC was the leading proponent encouraging Clinton to implement 
stronger policies against the junta and end the interdiction and forced repatriation of 
Haitian refugees. The CBC also promoted a positive public image of Aristide, countered 
allegations Aristide had violated human rights in Haiti, and challenged those that opposed 
stronger American opposition to the Cédras regime. The first policy success the CBC had 
was convincing Clinton to end US Coast Guard interdictions and forced repatriation of 
Haitian refugees.269  
The CBC achieved its goals through correspondence and meetings with Clinton. 
The first letters Clinton received from CBC members came in December 1993. One letter 
from Charles Rangel criticized CIA reports that publically defamed Aristide by charging 
Aristide of instability and inflexibility. Ragnel also wrote the CIA reports against Aristide 
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undermined America’s support in Haiti.270 Along with challenging negative reports of 
Aristide in the government, the CBC also challenged those assertions in the media. In a 
C-Span interview in July 1994, Representative Catherine Meeks argued against claims 
that Aristide has numerous human rights violations.271 The CBC’s efforts to encourage 
Clinton to change his policies included public campaigns to defend Aristide’s character 
and present him as defending Haitian democracy from an illegal overthrow. These efforts 
focused on Aristide’s rightful place as Haiti’s president, and that the United States had a 
responsibility to restore democracy to Haiti.  
In March 1994, the CBC started attacking Clinton’s Haitian policies as 
"ineffective and counterproductive," and that US lukewarm policies encouraged the 
Cédras regime to carry out violence and political suppression. They contended that the 
administration drastically needed to change its policy to avoid appearing to undermine 
democratic change in Haiti. The CBC urged Clinton to implement more sanctions and 
restrictions against Haiti. They suggested Clinton apply a total embargo of Haiti, a no-fly 
zone, deny visas to Haitian military leaders, and freeze Haitian military officials 
supportive of the Cédras regime US-based assets. The CBC also encouraged the president 
to deploy a multinational border patrol to stop violations of the embargo along the Haiti-
Dominican Republic border, and to stop intercepting Haitian refugees at sea and 
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returning them to Haiti.272 Clinton did not immediately apply all of the policy suggestions 
from the CBC. However, by the time Clinton decided to militarily intervene in Haiti he 
had implemented all of the CBC’s policy suggestions. The CBC’s efforts to keep the 
Haitian crisis a significant foreign policy crisis gradually influenced Clinton to 
implement more assertive policies against Haiti and to lead a multinational military 
intervention to end the coup. 
In May, Representative Cynthia McKinney wrote that she was offended by 
Ambassador Swings suggestion that Haitian boat people were only economic refugees, 
and that such messages undermined America’s moral ground to restore Aristide and 
democracy to Haiti. She informed Clinton that Americans wanted him to display 
leadership abroad and that he needed to "set a clear and workable path for the return of 
Aristide and democracy to Haiti; devote all necessary resources to achieve the goal." 
Representative McKinney urged Clinton to enlist support from among Aristides 
Congressional supporters and “to not to shy away from aggressive, affirmative measures” 
and “to stand for democracy and with Haiti.”273 Clinton responded to McKinney's letter 
informing her that he was working to strengthen sanctions and that the United States had 
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adjusted immigration procedure to allow Haitian boat people to apply for political asylum 
status.274  
In May, the administration acknowledged that CBC suggestions were consistent 
with Clinton’s strategy. The administration decided to encourage additional cooperation 
with the CBC to help the administration restore democracy to Haiti.275 The administration 
also scheduled meetings with the CBC to discuss Haitian policy and Clinton’s decisions. 
This included discussions on intensifying UN sanctions, making more assertive 
diplomatic policies, ending the policy of interdiction and forced repatriations to avoid a 
humanitarian disaster, supporting the UNMIH, and discussing other developments in 
Haiti and US policies responses.276 As Clinton continued to deal with the crisis in Haiti, 
he increasingly implemented policies the CBC recommended. This shift increasingly 
moved the United States towards a military intervention to restore Aristide to power. This 
strategy did not prevent disagreements between the CBC and the Clinton administration. 
Instead the CBC’s influence in the Clinton administration and on Haitian policies made 
Clinton and his advisors more receptive to CBC criticisms and more likely to adopt CBC 
policy suggestions. This administration’s policy changes were not supported by all of 
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Congress. Some Congress members disagreed that US policies towards Haiti needed to 
change or become more involved in the negotiation process.  
While the CBC supported stronger US involvement in Haiti, Congressional 
Republicans opposed greater US participation in Haiti, including a military intervention. 
Several leading Republicans informed Clinton that they firmly opposed any policy that 
sent US troops to Haiti to restore Aristide to power. They also found it troubling that 
Clinton was considering military intervention, and wrote the "persistent and widespread 
political problems affecting the Haitian people deserved the attention of the United States 
of America. But it is in the essences of leadership in such a situation to make use of only 
diplomatic and humanitarian methods best suited to the complicated political realities."277  
Republican opposition to increased US involvement in Haiti focused on keeping the 
United States out of a complicated political conflict. Republicans agreed with the Clinton 
administration that the United States should pay some attention to the crisis, but 
Republicans argued that the Clinton’s policies should focus on humanitarian and 
diplomatic policies. Republican suggestions to focus on diplomatic and humanitarian 
solutions followed Bush’s policies towards Yugoslavia and the Haitian policies. Despite 
the opposition, Clinton carried out the changes to his policies leading up to the 
deployment of US forces to Haiti as the last option to restore Aristides democratically 
elected government to Haiti. 
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The Move Toward A Military Intervention in Haiti 
In the spring of 1994, the Clinton administration began preparations for a military 
intervention in Haiti. In an undated Haitian policy paper, the Clinton administration’s 
Haitian observers argued that diplomatic policies were unlikely to pressure the Cédras 
regime’s rule to step down and allow Aristide to return. They argued that current US 
policies further entrenched the military regime. They argued that the longer the US 
followed diplomatic policies it increased violence, human rights violations and economic 
and physical resource destruction in Haiti, and encouraged continued refugee flows. 
Mirroring CBC arguments, the author contended that the administration needed to initiate 
more assertive policies that directly confronted the military regime. They recommended a 
strategy that forced the Cédras regime to surrender or face capture by US troops during a 
military intervention. They noted that after the Cédras regime was removed then the 
Haitian parliament should pass an amnesty law for officials of the illegal government. 
Next, US forces should escort Aristide back to Haiti as he calls for calm, and the UN 
should deploy peacekeepers to maintain law and order. As part of the rebuilding process, 
the Haitian observers recommended establishing a system to retrain and rehabilitate the 
Haitian legal system, and the Haitian military and paramilitary personnel. They also 
called for the demolition of 1915 circa US military infrastructure the Cédras junta had 
used to maintain control of Haiti.278  
Upon deciding to intervene in Haiti, the Clinton administration adopted most of 
these recommendations as part of mission for the US-led multinational intervention in 
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Haiti. Even as Clinton made these preparations he continued cooperative and diplomatic 
efforts to end the military regime demonstrating that a military intervention was a last 
resort, like Bush had in response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, 
Clinton recognized that continuing diplomatic and humanitarian methods would not 
remove the military junta from Haiti. Clinton’s decision for a military intervention 
recognized he had reached an impasse and the limits of peaceful cooperative action, and 
that the threat of force or force itself were the only options left.  
In July 1994, after repeated international efforts failed to restore Aristide and 
democracy to Haiti, the UN authorized its members to use all means necessary to remove 
the Cédras regime from power in Haiti.279 From July to September, the Clinton 
administration continued its efforts to remove the military leaders through diplomatic 
measures.280 This included Clinton’s last diplomatic attempts to negotiate the Cédras 
regimes and four executive orders that established a complete embargo against Haiti and 
the Cédras regime.281  
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Before UNSC resolution 940, Clinton’s strategy gradually increased the 
assertiveness of America’s policies towards Haiti, intensified pressure against the Cédras 
regime, and expanded America’s leadership in the negotiation process. After the UN 
authorized its members to use force to remove the Cédras regime from power, Clinton 
put the United States in a firm leadership role in cooperation with Aristide to create and 
deploy a multinational military force to restore Aristide to Haiti. Clinton's work with the 
CBC encouraged this policy shift. Clinton’s work with the CBC on US policies towards 
Haiti were due to the CBC’s lobbying efforts for the United States to take a more forceful 
stand against the Cédras junta. 
On 8 September Clinton approved Presidential Decision Directive-28 (PDD-28). 
In PDD-28, Clinton outlined US policies for Latin America and the Caribbean, beginning 
with a determination that it was a long-term US strategic goal to foster democracy in 
Latin America and the Caribbean as part of US efforts to promote the spread of 
democracy around the world. Clinton established that the United States would do this by 
encouraging and requiring state militaries to respect democratic governments, human 
rights, and civilian control of the military. It would also foster a greater respect for 
democracy within the military and develop greater civilian participation in the country’s 
defense policy. PDD-28 also called on the United States to quickly respond to coups in 
Latin America and the Caribbean that threatened to or did overthrow democratic 
governments. Clinton also charged the United States to work with the OAS and UN to 
defend and if necessary restore those governments.282 Clinton’s decision directive firmly 
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established his belief that the United States had a responsibility to defend and restore 
democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere as a way to protect the US interests. 
It also cemented Clinton’s directive to send US forces as part of a multinational military 
intervention in Haiti. PDD-25 also reaffirmed Clinton’s engagement and enlargement 
strategy by combining US engagement to promote global security and stability with 
enlarging and protecting the world’s democratic governments.  
On 10 September, Clinton authorized Operation Uphold Democracy to start on 20 
September. This gave Clinton ten days for one last attempt to peacefully end remove the 
Cédras regime from power. On16 September, as US forces prepared to leave for Haiti, 
Clinton dispatched a diplomatic mission that included former President Jimmy Carter, 
retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nun to Haiti. The combination of 
mobilizing US forces to Haiti and Carter-Powell-Nun negotiations convinced the Cédras 
regime to relinquish power. On 19 September US troops deployed to oversee Aristide’s 
return and Haiti's transition back to democracy.283  
Conclusions 
Bush’s policy towards the Haitian crisis focused on supporting OAS negotiations 
between Aristide and the Cédras regime. While Bush publically condemned the coup, he 
only initiated economic sanctions that abided by OAS sanctions against Haiti. Bush’s 
policies continued his New World Order directive to sponsor cooperative actions against 
aggression. His Haiti policies also relied on the same strategy for the Yugoslavia crisis, 
which focused on encouraging regional institutions to resolve the crisis, rather than using 
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American leadership to establish a settlement between Aristide and Cédras. During 
Bush’s presidency, he had little collaboration with the CBC. Though the CBC initially 
supported Bush’s policies towards Haiti, as the crisis continued and Bush’s refugee 
policy went into effect, the CBC began to criticize Bush’s Haitian policies. However, 
Bush was less influenced by CBC lobbying as Clinton was and continued to interdict and 
repatriate Haitian refugees.  
During Clinton’s presidency, debates African American interactions with the 
police and the justice system, and continued racial inequality increasingly dominated 
public discussions. The CBC and other groups for peoples of color worked to keep these 
issues on the public agenda. This increased the pressure on Clinton to work with the CBC 
on his Haiti policy. Thus, Clinton’s policies evolved into an aggressive stand against 
coup leaders in Haiti. Between 1993 and 1994, Clinton’s increasingly implemented 
policy suggests from the CBC. These policies increased US pressure on the Cédras 
regime to end their control of Haiti. The CBC was most responsible for making US 
policymakers focus on the Haitian crisis. The CBC’s lobbying efforts continued their 
tradition of encouraging the US to pay more attention on its policies towards the 
Caribbean and Africa. The CBC’s influence and Clinton’s security strategy of 
engagement and enlargement combined to lead Clinton towards a military intervention to 
restore democracy to Haiti. As Bush and Clinton implemented policies in Haiti that 
continued to abide by long-standing policy themes and principles, they faced challenges 
as they incorporated race into those themes and principles. Race became a significant 
theme in US foreign policy during the Cold War and policymakers attempted to refute 
Soviet claims of US racism. After the Cold War, race remained a part of international 
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relations as non-Western countries gained international power. The challenges Bush and 
Clinton faced with race in US foreign policy mirrored the racial challenges American 
society faced in the 1990s, as the African American community continued to push for 
economic, legal, and political equality after the Civil Rights Movements ensured African 
Americans were no longer treated as second-class citizens.  
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CHAPTER VII – CLINTON AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
During the post-Cold War period the United States faced two crises that involved 
the targeted killing of ethnic populations, the first in Bosnia and the second in Rwanda. In 
Bosnia, the ethnic violence occurred after the collapse of Yugoslavia which led the Serb, 
Croat, and Muslim populations to fight over territory in Bosnia. In Rwanda, the genocide 
occurred after a truce ending the Rwandan civil war between the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic 
Forces and the Hutu government failed following the death of Rwanda’s president in a 
plane crash. Additionally, the genocide occurred at the same time the United States was 
responding to the crises in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. The convergence of these crises 
occurring during the same period tested America’s ability to participate in peacekeeping 
operations around the world. It also led the American public and US Congress to question 
America’s participation in international peace efforts. These issues led the Clinton 
administration to undertake policy re-evaluations towards US participation in 
multinational peacekeeping operations. The publics concerns about America’s extensive 
participation in peacekeeping operations in response to intranational conflicts and desires 
to limit such participation created contradicting influences on Clinton’s policy decisions 
towards Rwanda.  
This chapter argues that as genocide occurred in Rwanda, Clinton attempted to 
alter how the United States cooperated with regional and international peace efforts, 
while maintaining America’s commitment to engage with cooperative security efforts in 
non-Western countries and regions. Clinton initiated the changes, outlined in Presidential 
Decision Directive-25, in response to public concerns that the United States was 
participating in too many unsuccessful peacekeeping missions that were overextending 
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US resources. PDD-25 attempted to balance traditional US foreign policy principles of 
supporting international efforts against aggression to promote stability and security and 
limit the possibilities the United States would participate in a peacekeeping mission that 
was likely to fail or become a quagmire. Clinton’s re-evaluations of America’s policies 
towards peacekeeping operations placed new limits on his national security strategy, 
foreign policy decisions, and American support for international cooperation that 
contradicted traditional policy themes and principles.  
Origins of Rwandan Genocide 
On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s jet was shot down 
killing him and Burundian President Cypriean Ntaryamira. In Washington, DC, Kevin 
Aiston, the State Department Rwanda desk officer, informed Prudence Bushnell, Deputy 
Assistant to the Secretary of State, of the crash. Bushnell drafted a memo to Secretary 
Christopher warning that after the Rwandan and Burundi presidents were confirmed dead 
there was a high probability of violence erupting in the two countries. She advised 
Secretary Christopher, “Our strategy is to appeal for calm in both countries. Soon after 
Habyarimana’s death was confirmed, the Hutu military killed moderate Rwandan 
politicians including the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Soon after 
the death of Rwanda’s moderate politicians, the Hutus started killing moderate Hutu and 
Tutsi civilians. Over 100 days after the death of Rwanda’s president, hardliner Hutus 
killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus.284 
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The Rwandan genocide was caused by ethnic divisions that originated during 
Belgium colonial rule of Rwandan. Under Belgium control the Tutsi minority were given 
privileged status and control over Rwanda and the Hutu, which the Tutsi used to 
discriminate against the Hutu majority. When Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the 
Hutu gained control of Rwanda and carried out retaliatory discrimination and violence 
against the Tutsi. In 1990, the Rwandan civil war began when the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, a group of mostly exiled Tutsi, invaded Rwanda. From 1990 to 1993 the RPF 
gained territory against Hutu government forces.  
In 1993, Tanzania negotiated the Arusha Accords between the RPF and Rwandan 
government with support from the major Western powers. The Arusha Accords ended the 
civil war, and created a power-sharing government between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The 
accords also established a UN peacekeeping mission that deployed over 2,000 UN forces 
to monitor the ceasefire and assist in demilitarization of the country. UN peacekeepers 
were also assigned to help provide a secure environment for Tutsi exiles to return to 
Rwanda. Despite efforts to introduce peace into Rwanda, Hutu extremists opposed the 
Arusha Accords. The Hutu extremists also feared Tutsi retribution since the Arusha 
Accords did not grant amnesty to anyone that committed human rights violations during 
the war.285 These fears combined with their continued hatred and mistrust of the Tutsi. 
Once the Rwanda’s president was dead the extremist Hutu acted to remove Tutsi and 
moderate Hutus from Rwanda. The violence in Rwanda was another post-Cold War 
intranational ethnic conflict. While Rwanda’s genocide was not related to the end of the 
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Cold War, it still had the potential to establish a strong precedent for the US post-Cold 
War policies. As other presidents had during earlier parts of the twentieth century and as 
he had during the Haitian conflict, Clinton had to decide how he was going to respond to 
a non-Western conflict. He also had to decide how to support peacekeeping efforts in 
Rwanda following changes he made to the way the United States participated in and 
supported international peacekeeping efforts.   
Changes to US Peacekeeping Policies 
During the post-Cold War period, the international community faced repeated 
problems establishing, deploying, and sustaining peacekeeping missions. The difficulties 
surrounding international peacekeeping missions led the American public and American 
Congress to publicly debate US participation in future peacekeeping operations, and the 
continued viability of peacekeeping missions as a method to restore stability and security 
around the world. In response to these debates, the Clinton administration re-evaluated 
US policies for peacekeeping missions. However, as the world’s superpower, changing 
America’s role in the UN and UNSC would change dynamics within the UN and the way 
the UN responded to international crises. The American public and Congressional 
reluctance to continue to support and participate in UN peacekeeping missions led 
Clinton to alter US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions.  
In Presidential Review Directive-13, Clinton noted that the post-Cold War period 
had more intranational conflicts that international ones. Additionally, the increased 
breakout of intranational conflicts created more international demand for UN 
peacekeeping missions to resolve those intra-state conflicts. However, the UN had not 
updated its policies and peacekeeping structures to respond to the increased frequency of 
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intranational conflicts and increased demand for peacekeeping missions. In PRD-13, 
Clinton established that the United States needed to re-evaluate the role of UN 
peacekeeping operations in US foreign policies. This policy re-evaluation had to include 
an understanding of the post-Cold War period’s increased demand for UN peacekeeping, 
and re-evaluations of US roles and participation in the UN.286  
Clinton defended the policy re-evaluations as a necessary step to improve 
America’s response to the higher costs and requests for peacekeeping operations after the 
Cold War. PRD-13 focused on re-evaluation US policies towards financial support for 
peacekeeping operations, the probability of the mission’s success, and how easily UN 
members would support any peacekeeping mission. Clinton’s call for his advisors and 
staff to re-evaluate US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions included 
understanding the role UN peacekeeping missions played in US foreign policies. In 
particular, the ways that peacekeeping missions served US interests. and whether 
peacekeeping mission undermined America’s ability to act unilaterally.287  
The PRD also encouraged Clinton’s advisors to analyze America’s reliance on 
international organizations and operations as a means to downsize US military forces, as 
well as respond to changes in public and Congressional attitudes towards peacekeeping 
operations. Clinton also had his administration analyzed international repercussions of 
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the international community’s increased reliance on UN peacekeeping missions to secure 
regional stability. In particular Clinton wanted to understand which countries or regions 
were more dependent on UN peacekeeping missions to resolve internal crises.288  
PRD-13 introduced a post-Cold War re-evaluation towards UN peacekeeping 
missions. This included understanding their successes and failures. It also required the 
Clinton administration to reconsider how the United States determined how it would 
support and when it would participate in UN peacekeeping missions. These 
reconsiderations would lead to significant changes in the way the United States 
responded to calls for peacekeeping missions around the world. Additionally, it would 
change the way the United States influenced the world to support these types of 
operations. Traditionally the United States has provided much of the military and 
financial support for UN peacekeeping operations. However, the analysis requested by 
Clinton would introduce changes that revealed America’s growing reluctance to 
peacekeeping missions, and increased pressure for peacekeeping missions to demonstrate 
the possibility of success before the United States participated.  
In the fall of 1993, Clinton’s advisors responded to PRD-13 with Presidential 
Decision Directive-25 “US Policy to Reform Multilateral Peace Operations.” In PDD-25 
the Clinton administration outlined changes the United States would make to its roles in 
UN peacekeeping missions. The administration began by reducing America’s overall 
financial commitment to the UN. This included reducing America’s financial 
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responsibility for peacekeeping missions to 25 percent from 31.739 percent. 289 In the 
UN, the United States was the largest financial contributor to UN operations. At the same 
time the United States also owed a significant debt to the UN for previous peacekeeping 
missions.290 By reducing America’ financial responsibilities by 6.739 percent the United 
States would either force other UN members to make up the difference or force the UN to 
cut the costs of its operations, especially peacekeeping operations.  
In addition to reducing America’s financial responsibilities to the UN, PDD-25 
established new benchmarks for peacekeeping proposals to meet before the United States 
would participate in a peacekeeping operation. These benchmarks were established to 
ensure that the United States was participating in peacekeeping operations that would 
succeed and not drag the United States into a quagmire. The criteria were also designed 
to focus American resources to those missions that were the United States could 
effectively support peace.291 At the same time, the Clinton administration recognized that 
UN peacekeeping missions provided the United States with a method to respond to 
security threats in the post-Cold War period multilaterally. They argued that 
peacekeeping missions acted as force multipliers for US efforts to promote peace and 
stability around the word. However, to ensure that the United States could get the 
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maximum return from peacekeeping missions without placing too high a burden on the 
United States, peacekeeping missions had to meet certain criteria first. 292 
In PDD-25 the Clinton administration outlined eight requirements peacekeeping 
proposals had to meet before the United States would agree to participate. First, the 
proposed peacekeeping mission advanced American interests in the country or region. 
Second, peacekeeping operation was in response to a threat or breach of international 
peace due to international aggression, a humanitarian disaster, an illegal government 
change, or gross violation of human rights. Third, the proposals established clear 
objectives for the mission, and the mission was to either a peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operations293. Fourth, a ceasefire already existed for peace keeping missions 
that did not fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter294. Fifth, due to significant threats 
to international or regional peace the peace operations were authorized under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. Sixth, the United States could financially afford to support and 
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participate in the operation. Seventh, the political, economic and humanitarian costs of 
UN inaction outweighed UN action. Eighth, the peace operation’s duration was set and 
connected to clear objectives and a realistic criterion for ending the operation.295  
The guidelines established by PDD-25 introduced restrictions on US involvement 
in UN peacekeeping missions to protect the United States from endangering its interests 
and over-extending its resources. However, these new guidelines would have unintended 
consequences on US relations with the UN and international community that would 
emerge as the UN attempted to respond to the genocide in Rwanda. These unintended 
consequences included limiting US leadership in the UN and discouraging other UN 
members from participating in peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. It would also lead the 
international community to question America’s interests in the global community, and 
Clinton’s strategy to keep the United States engaged with the world.  
Initial Response to Rwandan Genocide 
Following the outbreak of violence in Rwanda, American and other foreign 
governments prioritized evacuating their own citizens from Rwanda, before they worked 
on establishing a new peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. By 9 April, the United States 
had successfully evacuated all Americans from Rwanda by ground or French flights. 
Following the evacuation of US personnel, the Clinton administration supported 
Belgium’s efforts to evacuate their citizens as violence escalated in Rwanda. Part of this 
support included cooperating with the French to secure the Kigali airport and airspace for 
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Belgium to deploy its troops to defend Belgium citizens in Rwanda.296 During the 
violence, the Hutu military killed UN personnel. The deaths of UN personnel by the Hutu 
military encouraged the Clinton administration to push the UNSC to end the UN 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), “we make a lot of noise about terminating 
UN forces that aren’t working. Well few could be as clearly not working. We should 
work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN Mission.”297  
The failure of the UN peacekeeping forces to prevent the violence from renewing 
in Rwanda led the administration to conclude that attempting to maintain a peacekeeping 
mission in Rwanda would put more people in danger, and was not worth the risk. The 
United States was not alone in prioritizing the safety of its citizens, and helping other 
governments protect and evacuate personnel. However, the United States viewed the 
renewed violence in Rwanda as evidence that a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was not 
a good investment of international resources. Richard Clarke’s email arguing for the 
United States to support efforts in the UN to end UNAMIR demonstrated America’s 
increased reticence to peacekeeping missions when the parties were unwilling to abide by 
their own agreements. Many viewed the failure rates for UN peacekeeping missions 
towards intranational conflicts, like the failure of UNAMIR, demonstrated the UN 
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needed to re-evaluate how it designed and implemented peacekeeping operations in the 
post-Cold War period. 
As the violence overtook Rwanda, the CIA reported that the outbreak of violence 
had ended all efforts by the Hutu government and RPF to abide by the Arusha accords. 
The CIA also reported that renewed violence had undermined the UNAMIR mandate, 
fueled massive refugee flows, threatened to rekindle ethnic violence in Burundi, and 
threatened to destabilize the region. They continued as the RPF attempted to gain control 
of the Rwandan government the fighting between the Hutu and RPF would be worse than 
the civil war because the RPF would attempt to gain control of the Rwandan 
government.298 The CIA’s analysis revealed that the intranational ethnic violence in 
Rwanda, similar to the Bosnian War, would create refugee flows that would create 
humanitarian crises on Rwanda’s borders that would destabilize other countries and 
possibly the region. At the same time the analysis gave the Clinton administration the 
evidence it needed to argue against continuing UNAMIR. The administration also 
understood that unless both sides were ready to stop fighting it was unlikely that a new 
mission would succeed. 
On 11 April, Richard Clarke repeated his call for the United States to support 
calls to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. He also asked NSA Tony Lake for 
guidance on a response to a UN request for US assistance to remove its forces from 
Rwanda. Clark noted that the UN was likely to request a US airlift to facilitate the quick 
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withdrawal of UN forces from Rwanda. He continued that the French would attempt to 
withdraw their troops along with UN forces while Belgium deployed it’s to defend and 
support the evacuation of its citizens.299 Lake responded that the United States “was 
inclined to help. But decision should go to Principals.”300 At the beginning of the fighting 
the Clinton administration was willing to support international efforts to withdraw 
foreigners and UN forces from Rwanda. At the same time, the administration was slow 
establishing a policy response to Rwanda beyond evacuating American citizens from 
Rwanda, and ending UNAMIR. Part of this was because the United States has 
traditionally given foreign policies towards Africa a low priority. Another reason was 
because the United States was also dealing with the coup in Haiti and the Bosnian War as 
well as the Rwandan genocide, similar to the way the collapse of Yugoslavia got lost 
behind German reunification and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  
Historically, the African continent has been a low priority in American foreign 
policy, as US foreign policy traditional focused on US relations with Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere. Yet Clinton wanted to support the development of democracy, 
economic development, and conflict resolution there. In particular, Clinton wanted to 
address the roots of African conflicts, and encourage resolution efforts to internal 
disputes and continue US support for humanitarian missions. However, Clinton did not 
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want to commit the United States to supporting long-term humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations.301 While Clinton argued that Africa was “one of our greatest 
challenges for a strategy of engagement and enlargement,” this did not make Africa a 
high national security interest.302 Clinton’s interest in post-Cold War Africa was related 
to implementing international and internal policies that would support the growth of 
democracy and economic development, while continuing to support limited humanitarian 
and peacekeeping operations. However, the policy re-evaluation of international 
peacekeeping operations would further limit Clinton’s ability to engage in post-Cold War 
Africa, and to support peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda. The power of this policy re-
evaluation also limited the influence of race, even as debates about race relations in the 
United States caused by the Rodney King beating, the LA Riots, and OJ Simpson murder 
trial increased the influence of multiculturalism in the United States and US foreign 
policy.  
As the violence overtook the area, the UN started deliberating the future of 
UNAMIR. Many members including the United States supported ending UNAMIR rather 
than expanding UNAMIR’s mission. The CIA noted that African countries were 
conditionally willing to participate if adequate logistical support and equipment were 
provided. However, many western governments were reluctant to provide some of the 
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required troops to field a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda.303 The CIA also noted that 
any expansion of UNAMIR faced contradictory desires from the Hutus and the RPF. The 
Hutu military wanted the UN to deploy a force large enough to enforce a cease fire and 
backup a political settlement while the RPF wanted a peacekeeping mission to augment 
the 2,500 UN force already in Rwanda.304 Along with the contradictory desires of the 
opposing parties, Belgium and France had withdrawn their forces they had deployed as 
part of UNAMIR to avoid being drawn into the Rwandan Civil War. Other UN members 
supported withdrawing their forces from UNAMIR in after the Hutu military had killed 
sixteen UNAMIR members.305  
As the Clinton administration considered its next steps in Rwanda, it joined the 
majority of UN members in withdrawing its forces from UNAMIR and Rwanda. 
Clinton’s decision to withdraw US forces from UNAMIR and to support international 
efforts to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was the start of a cycle of 
hesitancy in international efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide. Following the 
withdrawal of US citizens from Rwanda and supporting efforts to end UNAMIR, the 
Clinton administration adopted the policy guidelines established by PDD-25 for US 
participation in international peacekeeping efforts.  
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Following the successful evacuation of Americans and other foreigners, the 
Clinton administration started drafting policies and strategies for the US response to 
Rwanda. During a NSC meeting on Rwanda, the Clinton administration decided that 
America’s main strategy was to carry out humanitarian relief by resettling Rwandan 
refugees and those displaced inside Rwanda. However, any US force deployed to 
Rwanda would be focused on providing security for International Committee of the Red 
Cross humanitarian aid deliveries and rather than deliver humanitarian aid. It also 
decided the United States would support international efforts to establish a new cease-fire 
between the Hutu and the RPF. During this first policy meeting, there was no discussion 
about America’s position in the UN on UNAMIR, its mission, or deploying US troops as 
part of a peace enforcement mission to Rwanda.306 From this initial meeting the Clinton 
administration decided that the situation in Rwanda was a humanitarian crisis, and that 
the United States would provide security for humanitarian aid deliveries for those 
Rwandans displaced by the conflict. This fit within Clinton’s national security strategy 
and the increased selectivity the administration planned for post-Cold War peacekeeping 
operations. However, PDD-25 also made policies towards Rwanda contradictory to 
Clinton’s desires to keep the United States engaged in the world. By establishing onerous 
prerequisites for American participation, PDD-25 effectively kept the United States out 
of proposed peacekeeping missions to Rwanda.  
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Thirteen days after the violence began in Rwanda, the administration received an 
appeal from Human Watch, a NGO that monitored human rights violations, to oppose the 
quick withdraw of UNAMIR because the mission was supposed to be protecting 25,000 
Rwandans from the genocide.307 Up to this point the Clinton administration had treated 
the violence in Rwanda as a resumption of the civil war that was stopped by the Arusha 
Accords in 1993. With the appeal form Human Watch, the administration received one of 
the first calls for aid to end the Hutu-led genocide against the Tutsi and their Hutu 
supporters.  
In response to the letter from Human Watch, Eric Schwartz asked Susan Rice and 
Donald Steinberg, “if true shouldn’t it be a major factor informing high-level decision 
making on this issue? has it been?”308 The Clinton administration responded by 
investigating Human Watch’s claims, but did not change the administration’s policies. 
Additionally, there was no further discussion of genocide in Rwanda until the end of 
April in preparation for UN discussions about peacekeeping in Rwanda. The Clinton 
administration’s reluctance to describe the violence in Rwanda as a genocide, and its 
determination to withdraw UNAMIR forces from Rwanda contradicted Clinton’s 
statements in his 1994 national security strategy to improve US relations with the African 
continent and encourage resolution efforts for internal conflicts. It also contradicted 
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PDD-25 guideline that allowed the United States to participate in peacekeeping missions 
where substantial human rights violations were occurring.  
 On 20 April, the administration resumed discussions on the refugee issue in 
Rwanda, and the status of the UNAMIR forces protecting Rwandans in a Kigali soccer 
stadium. They noted that rather than the 25,000 Human Watch had claimed, the 
remaining 2,100 UNAMIR forces were protecting between 6,000-12,000 Rwandans in 
the Kigali soccer stadium. The meeting participants discussed UNAMIR assets, and 
noted UNAMIR personnel lacked the necessary equipment to fully equip their forces let 
alone defend the Rwandans seeking refuge in the stadium.309 This information did not 
encourage the administration to alter its policies, and it continued to focus on 
humanitarian aid. Additionally, the administration resumed plans to push the UN to recall 
UNAMIR forces after its mandate ended. The NSC/DC began discussion on where to 
relocate the Rwandan refugees that were relying on UNAMIR protection in preparation 
for UNAMIR’s withdrawal. 
After discussing the status of the UNAMIR, the NSC/DC presented four options 
to withdraw UNAMIR forces the Rwandans under UNAMIR’s protection from Kigali. 
The first option relocated UNAMIR into RPF controlled area. The committee noted that 
while this option was the easiest to carry out it was also the most dangerous. The second 
option was to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwanda refugees to Tanzania. Unfortunately, 
twenty thousand Rwandan’s had already fled there to escape the violence. Additionally, 
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there were numerous logistical difficulties including safely travelling hostile Hutu 
controlled territory, and in order to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwandans the United 
States would need permission from the Tanzanian government. The penultimate option 
was to relocate everyone north of the violence, but it required the UNAMIR and the 
Rwandan refugees to travel a long distance, it was logistically difficult, and there were 
less resources available in the north. The final option was to withdraw UNAMIR and the 
12,000 refugees to Uganda, leave the Rwandans in refugee camps, and establish a 
UNHCR operation. The committee was concerned that if the 12,000 Rwandans were 
relocated to Uganda it would encourage more refugees to flee there, increasing the 
refugee population from 12,000 to 250,000.310  
The committee also discussed the repercussions of UNAMIR’s continued 
presence in Rwanda. They noted that while UNAMIR provided a safe location for 
Rwandans fleeing the violence, it placed UN personnel in danger and pressured other 
countries to deploy their troops into a highly unstable situation to participate in a peace 
operation. 311 At this point neither Clinton nor his administration were not ready to deploy 
US forces to a peace operation in Rwanda. Instead they remained focused on 
withdrawing UNAMIR and the refugees they were protecting to reduce pressure for the 
international community and the United States to deploy additional forces to protect the 
Rwandans from the violence.  
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The Clinton administration’s focus at the start of the Rwandan genocide was to 
protect American and foreign citizens and UN personnel from the violence in Rwanda. 
This priority limited the administration’s ability to draft responses to stop the violence in 
Rwanda before all foreign personnel were safely evacuated from Rwanda. At the same 
time, the Clinton administration’s attentions were divided between responding to the 
crises in Bosnia and Haiti. As Bush had responded to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the 
Bosnian War, Clinton was unwilling to deploy US forces to enforce peace in Rwanda and 
to end the ethnic violence occurring there. Both Clinton and Bush were reluctant to 
intervene in ethnic conflicts where one ethnic population was attempting to eliminate the 
other. While Clinton would gradually move to pressure the Bosnian parties to reach a 
settlement, Clinton did not implement similar strategies towards Rwanda. Instead, 
Clinton remained fixed on humanitarian relief and supporting African-led negotiations 
between the Hutus and the RPF.  
Reports of Genocide 
On 28 April, the NSC/DC issued a discussion paper that described the situation in 
Rwanda. The report noted that by 28 April 100,000 Rwandans had been killed, the 
government and RPF continued to fight, and paramilitary forces were massacring Tutsi 
and moderate Hutus while radio stations called for additional killings. At the same time, 
the remaining 270 UNAMIR forces were trying to protect 12,000 Rwandans at Kigali 
stadium, and 500,000 Rwandans had fled to the borders of Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire 
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where the refugees were denied permission to cross the borders and needed humanitarian 
assistance.312  
The NSC/DC outlined six short-term policy objectives that the Interagency 
Working Group had identified. First, the United States needed to pressure the RPF and 
Rwandan army to stop killing Rwandan civilians. Second, the United States should 
support UN and non-government organization efforts to re-establish a ceasefire in 
Rwanda. Third, the United States should encourage and help Tanzania and other African 
countries’ efforts to pressure the RPF and Hutu military leaders to restart peace 
negotiations. Fourth the administration had to prevent the violence from spreading to 
neighboring countries. Fifth the US government needed to push the UN to expand 
humanitarian efforts in Rwanda. Finally, the administration needed to prevent similar 
violence from erupting in Burundi.313 These short-term policy objectives focused on 
diplomatic methods that could end the violence in Rwanda, establish humanitarian relief, 
and contain and prevent further violence and destabilization in the region. None of these 
objectives included a long-term objective for US policies towards Rwanda. Instead the 
administration focused policies were embedded with traditional themes of promoting 
security and stability and international cooperation to thwart aggression to achieve short-
term goals it believed were most likely to succeed.  
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The State Department carried out an action plan based on the NSC/DC’s policy 
discussions. The State Department’s action plan that included a vigorous foreign policy 
program and talking points for meetings with the Secretary General, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) leaders, concerned European states, and regional leaders. The paper 
also included suggestions for the OAU to deploy a peacekeeping force to Rwanda, begin 
preventative diplomacy, deter aggression in Burundi, establish an arms embargo against 
Rwanda, initiate a human rights or genocide investigation, and prepare implement a UN 
operation to protect the Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC planned to review the paper the 
first week of May. It also planned to express American support for UNSC resolutions that 
established an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and refugee assistance in 
Rwanda.314 The discussion paper was a continuation of the Clinton administration’s 
humanitarian policy for Rwanda, but expanded to produce more diplomatic pressure to 
encourage the Rwandan’s to stop fighting and killing. It also avoided deploying US 
forces to Rwanda unless the conditions in PDD-25 were met. At the same time, the 
Clinton administration continued to encourage regional multinational institutions to lead 
and initiate cooperative peace efforts to end the conflict. 
The Rwandan Peacekeeping Mission and PDD-25 
As May began and the violence continued, the Clinton administration decided to 
materially support any OAU and other regional efforts to protect Rwandan refugees and 
end acts the genocide in Rwanda. The administration also continued to avoid deploying 
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US forces to help end the violence in Rwanda. The United States also started 
broadcasting Clinton’s 30 April appeal to the Rwandans to stop fighting and re-enter 
peace negotiations through international radio broadcasts. The administration recognized 
that though the parties heard Clinton’s appeal the leaders were ignoring it. By this time, 
the United States was sending delegates to work with regional African leaders to create a 
peace plan to end the fighting and develop methods to protect and provide for Rwandan 
refugees. US officials were also contacting RPF and Rwandan government leaders daily 
in an effort to maintain pressure to convince both sides to agree to a new ceasefire and 
new negotiations. Lastly the State Department had assembled $15,000,000 in emergency 
humanitarian relief assistance for the refugees along Rwanda’s borders.315  
Since Clinton and his advisors were determined to avoid deploying American 
forces to Rwanda and risking American lives to end the conflict, the United States had 
focused its policies on providing humanitarian relief to Rwanda and supporting UN and 
OAU efforts to end the conflict in Rwanda. The Clinton administration’s reasons for this 
policy were based on the guidelines established in PDD-25 that set criteria for US 
participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. It was also based on America’s 
participation in peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia which was dividing 
the administration’s attention and US resources. In this situation, the international 
community was attempting to resolve multiple intranational conflicts occurring 
concurrently, which prevented it from engaging in each crisis equally. This meant that the 
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Rwandan genocide was competing for attention against crises that had been ongoing 
when the fighting resumed in Rwandan. It also increased US reluctance to participate in 
another peacekeeping mission in a country where the peacekeeping forces might be 
deployed for a long period.  
The UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda was the first test of PDD-25 on US 
policies towards multinational peace operations. On 3 May, Samuel Berger met with Kofi 
Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping. During the meeting Berger 
provided Annan with a copy of PDD-25, and informed Annan that that the Clinton 
administration had concerns about the proposed peace operation to Rwanda, and that the 
United States was not committing troops for UN peacekeeping operations. Berger 
informed Annan that the Clinton administration hoped the UN received enough troop 
commitments from the other countries to carry out the peacekeeping operation. Berger 
also stated that the United States would attempt to provide financial and logistical support 
for a UN mission to Rwanda, including fifteen million dollars for emergency relief 
efforts.316  
From the first attempts to deploy peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, the Clinton 
administration’s implementation of PDD-25 limited US participation in military efforts to 
end the violence. It also pushed the United States towards a more selective involvement 
in peacekeeping efforts. During the crises in Bosnia and Haiti, the United States 
increased its participation and leadership roles. However, using PDD-25 to guide US 
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policies towards peacekeeping missions prevented the administration from adopting a 
similar strategy to resolve the conflict in Rwanda. Since the United States had increased 
is requirements for participating in peacekeeping missions, it forced the rest of the 
international community to provide the support the United States would not. However, 
even with US financial and political support the OAU and UN were unable to overcome 
the hindrance that US reluctance to participate created in other countries.  
The effects of PDD-25 and the Clinton administration’s position on post-Cold 
War peacekeeping operations was most evident during Vice President Al Gore’s meeting 
with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on Rwanda. Before the meeting, the 
NSC Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office gave Gore talking points that 
explained US concerns about policy towards Rwanda. The talking points noted that the 
United States believed the international community needed to provide more support to 
create a lasting solution in Rwanda, and that the United States wanted to explore UN 
proposals further. The talking points also encouraged Gore to stress America’s continued 
commitment to providing humanitarian relief, implementing the embargo, and supporting 
UNHRC investigations in Rwanda. Gore was also instructed to inform Boutros-Ghali the 
United States was interested in creating a protective zone on the Rwandan border to 
provide international support for the refugees.317  
Gore was also given points for expressing America’s main reservations against 
General Dallaire’s peace enforcement proposal. The talking points focused on Dallaire’s 
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proposal for a large deployment of peace enforcement forces mandated to end the 
fighting, restore law and order, and pacify the population. The United States was not 
concerned that Dallaire’s proposal would lead to mission that was more complex than the 
mission to Somalia. There were also concerns that the Rwandans would attack UN troops 
as they carried out operations, the lack of member commitments for troops, and the high 
improbability that the UN would successfully raise enough troops for such a large-scale 
operation. Other US concerns included the logistical difficulties staging the mission out 
of the Kigali airport because it was at the center of the civil war, the mission mandate and 
timeline were unclear, and there were few chances of success. Despite American 
reservations, Gore was to express that the United States had not ruled out or in any 
response. The talking points suggested that Gore conclude the meeting by explaining to 
Boutros-Ghali that the United States was willing to support a viable and clear 
peacekeeping proposal UN mission if American troops financial resources, air power, 
and equipment were available.318  
The reservations listed at the end of Gore’s talking points were closely tied to CIA 
and State Department memos on possible dangers a UN force faced in Rwanda. The 
memos pointed to the difficulties experienced in Somalia as a warning to the difficulties 
the UN mission would face in Rwanda. In particular conducting a peacekeeping 
operation in a country were the parties had not agreed to a cease-fire would require the 
UN to deploy a large force to enforce peace. The mission risked becoming part of the 
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political entanglements between the two sides, which increased the troops exposure to 
attacks from either side. Talking points reconnected these concerns to PDD-25 guidelines 
for US participation in multinational peacekeeping operations.319  
As the talking points reveal the United States had significant reservations towards 
Dallaire’s proposed peacekeeping missing to Rwanda based on previous experiences in 
Somalia and the situation in Rwanda. While the Clinton administration was wary of 
deploying US troops to participate, the administration did not rule out the possibility of 
providing financial and logistical support once the UN decided to deploy a mission to 
Rwanda.  
As the genocide continued into May, the Clinton administration remained 
committed to a humanitarian policy strategy to support Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC 
meetings continued to discuss General Dallaire’s proposal for an expanding UNAMIR’s 
mandate, and UN plans to forcefully stop the killing by deploying a UN force. They also 
explored diplomatic efforts to protect Rwandan refugees along the Tanzanian, Ugandan, 
and Zairian borders. This included discussing the creation of safe zones, and scheduling 
humanitarian airlifts for supplies as diseases were spreading through the refugee camps. 
They analyzed the positions of the RPF and Rwandan government in relation to future 
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peace efforts. They also discussed French plans to deploy the Foreign Legionnaires to 
limit the fighting and deliver humanitarian aid.320  
Conclusions 
Throughout the Rwandan crisis, the Clinton administration adhered to PDD-25 
and focused on policies directed toward humanitarian aid rather than deploying US forces 
as part of a peacekeeping mission. In the post-Cold War period, the Rwandan episode 
showed that the United States continued to selectively engage in world crisis. However, 
selective engagement made it difficult for the United States to encourage cooperative 
actions to deter aggression and to participate in multinational peace operations. The 
creation of Presidential Decision Directive-25 towards US policies in multinational 
peacekeeping missions added to the difficulties the Clinton administration faced 
encouraging international cooperation while limiting US participation to financial and 
logistical support. In addition, the PDD-25 hindered others who pushed for UN 
peacekeeping missions to end the violence in Rwanda. 
While Clinton had desired to introduce more American interest in the African 
continent, his policy strategies towards the genocide in Rwanda contradicted that national 
security strategy. At the same time, Clinton and his advisors’ attention was divided 
between the crises in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. In Somalia, the United States was 
participating in a UN peacekeeping mission, while in Haiti Clinton was preparing the 
United States to start a multinational peacekeeping operation. These crises pushed 
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Rwanda into a lower priority for US national security and foreign policy decisions. Even 
so, the Clinton administration attempted to encourage the OAU to led international 
efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide by pressuring the Hutu and RPF to accept a 
cease-fire and negotiations for a new government.  
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CHAPTER VIII POST-COLD WAR CRISES FRAMING AND AGENDA SETTING 
AND PUBLIC OPINION 
Scholars have shown that the 1960s was a crucial period in the evolution of mass 
media and communications, and the public’s ability to influence the media and foreign 
policy. The civil rights movements of the mid-twentieth century and the anti-Vietnam 
War movement enabled and encouraged America’s media outlets to challenge the frames 
and public agenda settings established by American presidents. This period was pivotal to 
establishing the media’s ability to challenge public debates and to sway public opinion 
away from the cold war consensus, as the media rose as a national power capable of 
challenging the American government’s authority. At the same time, the increased 
competition between cable television and the three broadcast networks decreased the 
president’s ability to rely on dedicated television coverage to express his policies and set 
the frames and agendas for American policies. After the end of the Cold War, 
telecommunication technology advances gave the media greater abilities to challenge the 
president’s frames and agendas, to influence public opinion to redirect American foreign 
policy debates, and to force foreign policy changes.  
In this chapter I argue that between 1989 and 1995 Bush, Clinton, and the US 
mass media competed to define and contextualize foreign crises for the American public 
to produce support or opposition for foreign policy decisions. I contend that in the post-
Cold War period, the introduction of new telecommunications technologies changed the 
way the media and presidents influenced public opinion. These new technologies also 
altered the public’s relationship with American presidents and the way the American 
public and public opinion influenced presidential foreign policy decisions. The expansion 
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of satellite communications enabled the start of twenty-four-hour cable news networks, 
like CNN, that kept Americans informed of domestic and foreign events. At the same 
time, the introduction of the home computer, public access to the internet, and electronic 
mail (email) provided the American public with easier methods to express opinions to 
policymakers and the media. The increased presence of the public’s opinion and the 
media after the Cold War, forced Bush and Clinton to debate their foreign affairs framing 
and agendas with political opponents, the media, and the public to get public support for 
their decisions. Bush and Clinton’s success depended on their ability to establish a frame 
and agenda the public easily accepted and the media supported. However, if the media or 
political opponents presented convincing counter-frames and agendas then Bush and 
Clinton were less successful gaining public opinion.  
Theories on the Relationships between Mass Media, the President, and American Public 
Opinion 
In response to the growing anti-Vietnam War movement American president 
Richard Nixon said, “In each nights TV news and each morning paper the war was 
reported battle by battle but little or no sense of the underlying purpose of the fighting 
was conveyed.”321 Nixon continued that the lack of context made it appear that the 
United States was fighting a war without a purpose or objective, and the media’s 
“relentless and literal reporting” on human suffering and the sacrifices of American 
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soldiers demoralized the American public.322 As Nixon’s statement reveals the media’s 
ability to move public opinion behind or against for the president’s foreign policy 
decisions by establishing counter frames and agendas to the president’s. It also reveals 
that the media’s focus on presenting entertaining and dramatic stories without context 
prevented the American public from fulling understanding foreign affairs and encouraged 
public opinion to oppose foreign policy decisions that failed to end human suffering. 
Robert Entman explains that the relationship between policy elites, the media, and 
public is an important factor in foreign policy decision making. He explains that the 
power dynamic in this relationship is best explained as a cascade of frames and agendas 
started by the president that flow downward to the media and public. Entman’s cascading 
activation theory shows that after the president and other policy elites express their 
opinions on foreign policy that the media choses to support or oppose those opinions. 
This president and other policy elites respond to the media’s coverage of the policy 
debate. At the same time, the public absorbs the messages from the president, policy 
elites, and the media, and makes its own opinion to approve or disapprove of the media 
and policymakers, which is then fed back up to the media and policymakers. The public’s 
opinion is reflected in future news coverage and policy elites adjusted messages or policy 
decisions.323 Entman’s theory established that foreign policymaking is not isolated to 
policy elites. Instead, foreign policymaking is a complicated process where the media, 
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policymakers, and the American public interact with each other at different power levels 
influencing changes as policies and events are publicly debated. 
 During the post-Cold War period, ABC’s World News Tonight had an average 
viewership of 11.1 million Americans, CBS’s Evening News had 9.9 million, and NBC’s 
Nightly News had 9.4 million views for a combined total of 30.4 million American adults 
watching the evening news on broadcast television.324  It meant that at any time 
approximately thirty million members of the American public had some access to news 
about foreign events. The media’s news coverage of the changing international 
environment after the Cold War included depictions of the continued violence and 
instability around the world following the fall of communism.  
These depictions encouraged the American public to view the post-Cold War 
period as chaotic. Additionally, the media’s use of images of starving refugees, mutilated 
bodies, and suffering women and children appealed to the public’s morality. These 
images could move the public to pressure the government to intervene in a crisis or 
conflict. At the same time, images of people American soldiers who were deployed to a 
country to provide humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping could turn public opinion 
against the intervention. The media’s influence on public opinion is not new. However, 
the increased pressure the media can bring on governments due to technological changes 
during the later decades of the twentieth-century has led to the CNN effect. In response to 
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the CNN effect presidents now had to engage in media diplomacy as well as hard and soft 
diplomacy to achieve policy successes.325  
As the Cold War ended many Americans hoped for a peaceful and stable period. 
However, conflicts, crises, and instability plagued the post-Cold War period from the 
start. Few Americans considered these crises direct threats to the United States compared 
to the threat the Soviet Union posed for the previous forty years. Additionally, few 
Americans supported the United States acting as the world’s policeman though many 
recognized that the United States was the world’s only superpower. Americans were also 
less supportive of deploying American forces abroad to respond to conflicts that were not 
international acts of aggression, and placing American troops under UN command. 
Instead, much of the American public turned its attention to domestic issues, most 
Americans ignored or divested in foreign affairs that did not directly affect their lives.326  
Scholars have also shown that unlike the president, the American public does not 
have a sophisticated understanding of foreign affairs to influence US foreign policy. This 
is important as surveys have revealed that only one third of the American public is 
interested in foreign affairs and US foreign policy. Part of this is due to the public’s 
tendency to ignore or avoid foreign policy news it considers too distant or confusing. 
However, this lack of knowledge does not prevent the American public from having an 
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opinion about foreign policy or world problems.327 Instead, Americans continue to 
express their opinions about foreign affairs and US foreign policies even when those 
opinions are based on limited information and challenges the presidents understanding of 
foreign events.  
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had to navigate this changing power 
dynamic between themselves and the media to defend and promote their foreign policy 
decisions to the American public. This included establishing their frames and agendas for 
the foreign affairs the United States was involved to gain public. Clinton’s and Bush’s 
ability to successfully establish their frames and agendas determined their ability to gain 
public support, and prevent the media from establishing counter frames and agendas Each 
president had to confidently and concisely justifying why the conflict or crisis warranted 
his policy decision. However, if the president failed to convincingly accomplish this, then 
the mass media was open to set its own frame and agenda, and gain the ability to sway 
public opinion against the president.328 Additionally, if the president’s ratings are below 
50 percent the president has less influence on public opinion than when his ratings are 
about 50 percent. 329In this situation, the president’s ability to use media outlets to 
disseminate his views determined how successfully he could lead foreign policy debates, 
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and thereby implement the foreign policy agenda he desired. However, the president does 
not have unquestioned influence.  
Along with the rise of media diplomacy America’s presidents also had to respond 
to the negative effects cable television had on ratings and popularity of televised 
presidential statements. In the age of cable television, the American public could choose 
to ignore presidential statements by changing the channel. The increased popularity of 
cable television and the American public’s ability to watch something other than 
presidential addresses has decreased media coverage of these addresses, and encouraged 
presidents to reduce the number of addresses they give.330 However, presidential rhetoric 
and statements about foreign affairs remains a strong influence on public opinion despite 
of the cable television’s popularity.331  
As early as the late 1970s, scholars have shown that public opinion can shape and 
change foreign policy especially “when opinion changes are large and sustained.”332 
However, public opinion is not developed in a vacuum. The news the public watches and 
reads has its own frames, agenda setting, attributes of responsibility, and policy 
preferences that may or may not diverge from those established by the president. Like the 
president, television news has a substantial effect on collective public opinion, while each 
source television news uses has a different level of influence to newspapers. Televised 
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news broadcasts use of commentators including anchors, field reporters, experts, research 
studies, and special commentators have a greater influence on public opinion than special 
interest groups, demonstrations, and foreign news sources.333 The ability of the media to 
use these sources effectively to influence public opinion does not enable the media to tell 
the public what to think. Instead the media and president are competing to tell the 
American public what to think about and to determine what events are important.  
The media’s ability to influence public opinion relies on journalists’ abilities to 
“focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues 
of the day.”334 From the location of a story in the broadcast or newspaper, the size of the 
headline, the length of the newspaper article, and reporting on a story day-after-day the 
media can direct public attention to issues and events it deems important for the public 
agenda. In this way, the media sets the public agenda and influences what the American 
public thinks about. This also provides the media with the ability to encourage specific 
policies for the government to implement.335  
The media’s ability to influence public opinion and set the public agenda is as 
important as the way it frames those issues. The way the mass media frames or chooses 
to describe an issue or event, can affect the way the public understands what is occurring. 
It can also affect public opinion in strongly enough that the change in public opinion 
forces the president to change his foreign policy. Philip Hammond argues that the 
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European media’s descriptions of the collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnian War as an 
“ethnic conflict” was “really a refusal of explanation: the tendency to down-play or 
ignore historical and political factors…and to suggest instead that conflict is somehow 
inevitable and incomprehensible.”336 Additionally, the use of a civil war frame implies 
that all sides are equally to blame whereas an ethnic cleansing and genocide frame 
established that one side has more responsibility for the conflict.337 As Hammond 
demonstrates with his study on reporting on Yugoslavia and Bosna, the frames the media 
uses influences the ways that people understand an issue, positively or negatively, and 
intervenable or not.  
Since the 1960s mass media scholars have debated media’s power to influence 
public opinion and change foreign policy. Following the introduction of real-time 
communications via satellite communications and the twenty-four-hour cable news 
network, CNN, media scholars termed this theory “the CNN factor.” The CNN factor 
refers to the process by which the media influences foreign policy by evoking responses 
in the audience through concentrated and emotionally biased news coverage, which in 
turn applies pressure to governments to adopt policy responses to the covered conflict or 
crisis. 338  
The CNN factor Originally referred to the effect CNN broadcasting had on the 
Persian Gulf. Since then the theory has been applied broadly to refer to all real-time 
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communications technology via the news media.339 Virgil Hawkins shows that there is a 
downside to the CNN factor. Hawkins argues that it is impossible for the media to give 
every conflict high priority coverage. This creates imbalanced coverage which means that 
a conflict that is potentially more relevant to US national security or humanitarian 
interests is overlooked. This lack of coverage prevents public pressure from building to a 
point that it pressures the government to create a policy response to the conflict. Hawkins 
contends that the media’s inability to cover every conflict leads to an absence of policy 
towards those conflicts not covered by the media because the government has little 
incentive to become involved.340 During the post-Cold War period when multiple 
conflicts occurred concurrently this lack of media coverage had significant effects on US 
foreign policy. 
The “other side of the CNN factor” shows that without public opinion and interest 
in an issue there is no motivation for the media to include an issue in the public agenda or 
for the government to develop policies. This relationship is why public opinion, and mass 
media’s influence on public opinion are important to policymakers and their ability to 
direct mass media frames and agenda.341 This relationship is also why presidents attempt 
to frame foreign affairs according to their preferred foreign policy strategy so that the 
public will support that policy and the president’s decisions. When the media and public 
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opinion diverge from the president’s frame and agenda they can force the president to 
change his foreign policies in ways that undermine his policy goals or US interests. As 
the United States responded to the post-Cold War period under Bush and then Clinton’s 
leadership, their foreign policies elicited different responses from the media and public 
opinion that affected how both presidents implemented their national security strategy 
and foreign policies.  
Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and German Reunification 
As democratic revolutions swept Eastern Europe and Germany, many Americans 
viewed them as initiating a period of peace and stability, even as those changes brought 
instability and fears. At that time, Americans were focused on a peaceful future, even as 
policymakers feared the instability in Eastern Europe posed significant threats to the 
United States. As Warsaw Pact members broke away as the Soviet Union refused to 
intervene, these events were viewed as evidence that America’s cold war strategy of 
containment was successful as against the Soviet Union and communist expansion. In the 
months after the opening of the Berlin Wall as Europe supported and opposed German 
unification, most Americans supported it. Also, most Americans did not believe a 
reunited Germany would attempt to dominate the world again. The broad base of support 
for German reunification crossed generational lines, including most of those that had 
lived through WWII.342 
                                                 
342 Robin Toner, “Clamor in the East; Survey Finds Americans Favor a Reunited Germany,” NYT 
December 1, 1989, 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427493259?accountid=13946.  
 218 
Additionally, a solid majority of Americans believed that reuniting Germany was 
a good thing for Western security and international security arrangements. Part of this 
was because few Americans feared the changes occurring in Europe, or believed the 
changes in Europe would weaken the US-European military alliances. Most Americans 
also believed that the benefits of reduced US-Soviet tensions outweighed the drawbacks 
caused by any instability in Eastern Europe.343  
These opinions improved Bush’s ability to successfully carry out his policy to 
reunify Germany even as Europe remained reluctant to endorse German reunification. 
While Bush enjoyed a high level of public support for German reunification, he still 
faced criticisms and opposition to his policies. To offset the influence of the opposition 
and maintain public support, Bush made public statements that explained the situation in 
Germany in ways that justified his policies, and established that German reunification 
was a boon for US interests and security. The high levels of public support also limited 
the media’s ability to diverge greatly from Bush’s framing and agenda for Germany’s 
reunification.  
Bush had to continue to convince the American public that German reunification 
was a boon for US interests and European. However, this was not an uphill climb as most 
Americans viewed German reunification positively. To maintain public support for his 
efforts to reunify Germany Bush had to frame the events in Germany as improving 
European security and economy, and describing Germany’s reunification as the German 
citizens right to determine the future of their country. Bush did this by issuing statements 
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that embraced the German people’s desire for unification, justified the merits of 
reunification in terms of American, European, and world interests, and defended the 
Germans’ right to self-determination. By doing this and doing it repeatedly, Bush 
established a frame and agenda for German unification in the United States that many 
Americans accepted, even as strong opposition in Europe and American critics 
challenged Bush’s perspective. 
Bush’s frame included expressions of confidence in the German people’s ability 
to unite under democracy and avoid the militarism and totalitarianism that had led the 
country to follow a leader into a second world war and the most infamous case of 
genocide. He did this with repeated statements urging the American public and 
Europeans not to fear, “and there are some that worry about it…But what I say is as I 
tried to the other day: This is 1989. And we can learn from history, but we also can look 
to the future. And my view is: Let this matter be determined by the people in Germany.344 
He also established that the opening of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany 
were positive changes for Europe, the world, and the Cold War environment. 345 He also 
connected German reunification with a warming of the Cold War and greater 
international peace and security. The day the border opened Bush said, “Clearly this is a 
long way from the harshest Iron Curtain days, a long way from that,” and that the world 
was closer to a “Europe whole and free,” as Eastern Europe reconnected with Western 
Europe, democracy spread among the eastern governments, and enjoyed the benefits of 
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the Helsinki Final Act346.347 Bush also succeeded because the media embraced the 
celebratory attitudes from Germany during the opening of the border, and presented it to 
the American public. 
As the Europeans gathered to prepared to reunify Germany, the 57 percent of 
Americans that reported that they had followed media discussions about German 
reunification. During the same poll 82 percent of Americans believed the American press 
had done a good or excellent job covering the events and discussions about Germany’s 
reunification. 348 Both percentages remained constant between January and March 1990 
as the American public consistently agreed that the media had done either a good or 
excellent job covering Eastern Europe and German reunification efforts, and about half 
report maintaining current about the situation.349 The high level of public interest in 
events in Eastern Europe and Germany encouraged the media to cover events there, and 
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report on the process to reunify Germany. However, the media did not completely follow 
the frame that Bush set as foreign affairs commentators and experts questioned Bush’s 
policy decisions.  
As Bush issued statements validating the reunification of Germany, the American 
media kept the American public informed about events in Germany, and the various 
expert opinions about the developments towards German reunification. The media 
focused much of its attention on the opening of the Berlin Wall itself, and then reported 
on the reunification process as it unfolded in Europe.350 From 9 to 15 November, the 
American public received daily news reports about the border opening and the movement 
of East Germans to West Germany. 351 The media’s frame of the opening of the Berlin 
Wall and German reunification resembled Bush’s frame that the changes in Germany 
demonstrated the success of America’s strategy of containment and that German 
reunification was a positive event. Along with news reports about the daily situation, 
cable news channels like C-Span and CNN provided editorial style expert analysis of 
events. The reports by C-Span and CNN added to the American public’s understanding of 
events in Germany. While some experts focused on explaining the events to the 
American public others criticized or opposed Bush’s foreign policy decisions towards 
German reunification. However, Bush’s critics were unable to overturn Bush’s framing 
and agenda. 
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In an episode of C-Span’s Current Issues the commentators, Hans-Henning 
Horstmann, Counselor of West Germany, Robert Gerald Livingston, and Ulrich Schiller, 
bureau chief of Die Zeit, discussed the history of the Berlin Wall and discussed the 
ramifications of the wall’s opening. The commentators discussed the history of the Berlin 
Wall so that the current generation of the American public could understand the walls’ 
significance, and better comprehend why its opening in 1989 was so significant. The 
commentators spent most of the discussion explaining the ramifications of a future 
democratic revolution in East Germany, and connected the opening of the German border 
to the larger democratic revolution occurring in Eastern Europe.352 These editorials 
combined with the daily reports on the situation in Germany and helped move the 
American public support Germany’s future reunification. It did this by having experts 
explain the events in Germany as a winding down of the Cold War and introducing a 
peaceful transition to democracy in Europe.  
However, the media also produced reports and editorials from experts, especially 
in major newspapers, that questioned the ramifications of German reunification for US 
interests, global security, and Bush’s ability to lead the nation through the changes. Many 
of the newspaper criticisms immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall 
focused on Bush’s ability to respond to the changes occurring in Europe. Many experts 
and commentators worried that Bush’s reserved and calculated mannerisms threatened 
America’s role in Europe moving forward. They were also wary that his policies were ill-
suited for the growing revolutionary environment. Some commentators, like Walter 
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Mossberg and Robert Greenberger feared that Bush’s inactivity would allow the Soviet 
Union to dominate future security debates in Europe. They were particularly concerned 
the Soviet Union would lead a move to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a new 
system that did not include the United States or one did not give the United States a 
strong presence in Europe.353  
These comments reveal that underneath the positive feeling about the changes in 
Eastern Europe, there were many experts and policymakers that continued to hold onto 
Cold War fears of the Soviet Union and believed that Gorbachev or the Soviet Union 
could retaliate or attempt to suppress democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. There 
were also commentators that continued to believe the United States needed to have a 
strong presence in Europe to deter any Soviet aggression or expansion. These editorials 
feared that Bush did not recognize the gravity of the situation and feared that his policies 
were threatening US interests and security. Despite the concerns that foreign policy 
analysts and commentators expressed they were unable to challenge the positive attitudes 
and framing of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe.  
Like the editorials that criticized Bush’s policy decisions, editorials also opposed 
German reunification. Those that opposed Germany reunification argued that the 
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situation in Germany threatened US and European security. 354 These discussions 
attempted to sober the exuberance created by television broadcasts of Germans dancing 
on the Berlin Wall or the flood of East Germans to the West. These editorials placed 
German reunification in context of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, and 
reminded the audience that the Cold War continued. However, these editorials did little to 
diminish public opinion towards the reunification of Germany. Instead, Bush’s positive 
frame and agenda for Germany’s reunification remained steady even as the media 
produced reports and specials that did not always follow Bush. 
Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait 
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was the last conflict of the Cold War. Bush’s and his 
administration’s diplomatic skills ensured that international cooperation ended Iraq’s 
aggression and illegal territorial acquisition. While many Americans opposed the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait, the American public was divided on the appropriate response and 
why the United States was involved in resolution efforts. Most Americans believed that 
oil was the main reason that the United States was involved, and much of the public did 
not support a military intervention in Kuwait. Additionally, the American public still 
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suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome and feared the United States would get involved in 
a conflict it could not escape.355  
As the Iraqi invasion continued into November, Americans increasingly become 
wary of the prospects of a US military operation against Iraq. Most Americans continued 
to oppose a military intervention to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, Bush 
gained much of the population’s support for his policies, though that support had 
diminished to 65 percent, from an 80 percent high depending on Bush’s decisions to 
deploy US forces to Saudi Arabia. Bush also managed to convince most Americans that 
the United States was not involved in the Iraqi situation because of oil by November, 
though 38 percent continued to believe the US motivated by oil interests and only 23 
percent believed it was to stop Iraqi aggression 356  
The changes that occurred in public opinion towards between November and 
December followed the UNSC’s decision to use all means necessary to remove Iraq 
forces from Kuwait. While most Americans supported the decision to use force, the 
public remained divided if Kuwait was worth going to war over. Additionally, 56 percent 
believed that “Bush should tailor policy to what polls say.”357 The polls reveal that even 
as Bush successfully garnered and kept public support, the public did not completely 
accept Bush frames or agenda. Instead the public while supportive continued to hold 
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opinions to that diverged from those Bush tried to spread throughout the public. Public 
opinion also ensured that the media kept the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the public 
agenda, and that the media presented competing frames of the situation.  
Along with public opinion polls, Bush also received 198,680358 pages of 
correspondence from the American public expressing their support, opposition, fears, 
suggestions, and information request about the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the future 
Gulf War. This level of correspondence before email was readily available to much of the 
public demonstrates the American public’s determination to contact elected officials to 
express their opinions. Most of the authors expressed support for Bush’s policy decisions, 
a significant portion also made policy suggestions, or asked Bush to clarify policy 
decisions. As much of the nation was concerned that the United States was repeating the 
mistakes of the Vietnam War, many Vietnam War veterans wrote to express their 
support. They also encouraged Bush to provide American forces all the resources they 
needed to do their jobs, win any future war, and return home. Many veterans 
recommended limiting political and civilian influences on the generals’ abilities to make 
military decisions and successfully wage any war. 359 
As Bush also received many letters from the family members of military 
personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf. These were letters written by children, and 
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parents they expressed their support and their fears for their loved one deployed abroad. 
One mother wrote:  
Dear Mr. President, I want you to know that my family and I stand behind your 
decision to send troops to the Middle East. I do not say this lightly since four of 
my five children are in military service. My twins are already over there and the 
other two could be soon. I fully understand what this conflict could cost my 
family and our nation in the lives of our bravest and best young people. But I also 
realize that aggression against a peaceful neighbor cannot be tolerated and the 
interests of our nation and the civilized world must be protected.360  
The letters Bush received followed trends in public opinion polls about the 
public’s understanding of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and their support for Bush’s policy 
decisions. These letters also provided Bush and his administration with an abundance of 
knowledge about American concerns, and what steps Bush needed to take to reduce those 
concerns and gain more public support.  
During the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Bush’s framed the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as 
an act of aggression, and that the United States was involved to end Iraqi aggression in 
the Persian Gulf and to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. With 
statements like, “We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one 
becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading 
into the past, we cannot fail. At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. 
At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit.”361 He presented the US mission as 
defensive, and argued that he would deploy enough US personnel and equipment to the 
region to deter further Iraq aggression.  
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As it became increasingly apparent that a military intervention was the only way 
to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. Bush promised that US military forces would have the 
resources and equipment to defeat Iraq. Bush also countered any arguments that the 
United States was involved because of oil. Bush also used the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to 
explain his national security strategy that promoted international cooperation to promote 
stability, security, and peace around the world. From the beginning of his response to 
Iraqi aggression, Bush established that his policies would rely on diplomatic measures 
and international pressure to get Iraq to leave Kuwait.362  
He also attempted to override any fears the United States would end up bogged 
down in the Persian Gulf like it had in Vietnam, by reminding the public that the United 
States was working with the international community not unilaterally, “As the 
deployment of the forces of many nations shows and as the voted in the United Nations 
show, this is not a matter between  Iraq and the United States; it is between Iraq and the 
entire world community…All the nations of the world are lined up to oppose 
aggression.363. He also had to defeat the Vietnam Syndrome364 which was the strongest 
barrier against public approval for a US intervention in Kuwait. Bush began by stating 
that he did not want to involve the United States in a war in the Persian Gulf, “I want 
peace. I want peace not war…No one wants to see a peaceful solution to the crisis more 
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than I do. And at the same time no one is more determined that I am to see Saddam’s 
aggression reversed.”365 As the deadline to intervene in Kuwait approached Bush 
adjusted his, “if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied 
behind their backs.”366 In both types of statements Bush reaffirmed the intervention was 
defensive in nature and a last resort to Iraq’s aggression.  
He framed America’s response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as a way to 
establish America’s roles and responsibilities for the future to “forge for ourselves and 
for future generations a new world order.”367 Bush’s framing was successful as most of 
the media and the public accepted that the US involvement in the Persian Gulf was to 
deter further Iraqi aggression. They also supported Bush’s agenda that with the 
international cooperation against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait the world could move closer 
to deterring aggression and security stability and peace. For the most part, the media 
abided by Bush’s frame and agenda for the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. However, this did 
not mean that the media did not report on opposition and criticism to Bush’s policies. 
Instead, Bush’s frame and agenda were more easily accepted by the public than 
opposition. As a result, the media followed Bush’s frames and agendas.  
The media played a role developing public opinion towards the Iraq Invasion of 
Kuwait. From 1 August 1990 to 16 January 1991, the three broadcast networks aired 
1,112 segments on either the Iraq invasion of Kuwait or the Persian Gulf Crisis. In 
August the ABC, CBS, and NBC aired 372 news reports on the situation in the Persian 
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Gulf. Most of the news reports lasted between one and eight minutes with the longest 
lasting thirteen minutes. These news broadcasts provided updates on events related to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, including diplomatic efforts, the invasions effect on oil prices, 
and interviews and press statements by Bush and other foreign leaders.368 Public opinion 
polls reveal that most Americans paid attention to the news about Iraq’s occupation of 
Kuwait, and a majority agreed that the press was covering the situation well.369 At the 
same time most of the public believed the media had kept the public well informed about 
the conflict in Kuwait.370  
Most of the news reports on the invasion of Kuwait adopted Bush’s frame and 
agenda for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Also, some television and newspaper commentary 
criticized and opposed of Bush policies. However, these were in the minority, though US 
newspapers had more present articles that did not fit or challenged Bush’s frame an 
agenda. 
National, regional, and local newspapers used titles like “Iraq’s Naked 
Aggression,” “Hussein Must Be Stopped,” “Isolate Iraq,” and “The US Stands Up Who 
Else,” which ensured that the public understood that Iraq was the antagonist and that the 
United States and the world had united to stop Hussein’s aggression in the Persian Gulf. 
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These titles also supported Bush’s frame and agenda: that Iraq had illegally invaded 
Kuwait, that the United States would respond defensively to protect the rest of the 
Persian Gulf from additional Iraqi aggression, that the United States and the world 
condemned and opposed Iraq’s actions, and the international community was cooperating 
to end the invasion of Kuwait.  
At the same time editorials continued arguments that America’s involvement was 
connected to oil and easy access to Persian Gulf oil. Gary Sick, former National Security 
Council member during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, argued that 
Hussein invaded Kuwait to gain control of Persian Gulf Oil and OPEC. He argued that 
the United States had to act to stop Hussein because neither the United States nor its 
allies could afford the long-term threat Saddam posed to regional and international 
stability.371 While Sick continued the arguments that oil was a strong reason for US 
participation he framed it as a defensive measure to defend US national interests from 
Hussein’s aggression. In this way Sick’s editorial presented mild deviations from Bush’s 
desired frame, while continuing to push’s frames of international cooperation and 
defensive actions. Other editorials undermined Bush’s efforts to reduce the Vietnam 
Syndrome. They argued that Bush had limited his options by deploying American forces 
to Saudi Arabia and dedicated American forces and reputation to ensuring that Hussein 
was defeated and no longer capable of threatening the Persian Gulf.372 By challenging 
Bush’s frames through critiques of policy decisions the media prevented Bush from 
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creating a consensus on his policies even as he gained approval from most of the public. 
This lack of consensus forced Bush to constantly argue for his policies in the public 
debate, and kept public concerns in the agenda. However, even without a consensus 
Bush’s frame and agenda became dominate and allowed him to gain the public support he 
needed to carry out his policies.  
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Collapse of Yugoslavia 
The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred as Germany was reunified and Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. In 1989, public opinion polls revealed that only 28 percent of Americans were 
paying close attention to news coming out of Europe.373 In 1990, much of the American 
public was focused on events and news on the Persian Gulf Crisis.374 It was not until the 
conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 that Bush and the American public turned their 
attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. However, some members of the American public 
with an interest in Yugoslavia contacted Bush to make the situation in Yugoslavia a 
higher US priority. Many of these individuals worked for human rights organizations that 
had connections in Yugoslavia of these the members of Human Rights Watch were the 
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most determined to convince Bush to act in Yugoslavia. 375  These observers described 
political purges, and assassinations, attempted to assassinations, and press censorship by 
the Serb ultranationalists and hardline leaders in the Yugoslav government. 376 The letters 
continued as Bush worked on German reunification and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. 
They described the worsening situation and Serb atrocities against the Albanians in 
Kosovo, Croatians, and Muslims.377 Human Rights Watch was also the first to connect 
Serb atrocities and human rights violations with a desire to create Greater Serbia out of 
Kosovo and Bosnia.378 Along with Human Rights Watch proponents Bush received 
letters from Americans of Croat, Muslims, Serb, and Albanian heritage urging Bush to 
defend human rights and self-determination for those states that democratically voted to 
secede from Yugoslavia.  
Despite these pleas Bush did not establish a frame to defend human rights 
violations in Yugoslavia or promoting the democratic movement and self-determination 
for the Yugoslav states. Instead Bush promoted Yugoslavia’s unity and using diplomatic 
measures to resolve the differences between the states. Bush also refused to acknowledge 
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that the Serbs perpetrated more human rights violations than the other groups. In a 
response to one of the Human Rights Watch letters the administration noted:  
“The United States government does not favor the position of any particular 
nationality within Yugoslavia. We believe it would be wrong to take sides in a 
situation in which rights and wrongs are passionately debated and difficult for 
outsiders to discern accurately. Our hope is that the Yugoslav people will solve 
their current problems in a way which will protect the rights of all Yugoslav 
citizens.”379 
On 7 May 1991 Bush issued his first statement on Yugoslavia through his press 
secretary Max Fitzwater. This statement and those that followed demonstrated Bush’s 
frame and agenda for Yugoslavia. The United States joined the international community 
expressing American concerns about the situation in Yugoslavia and condemning the 
violence there. Bush also espoused US support for Yugoslavia’s unity, and urged the 
parties in Yugoslavia to respect human rights and democracy.380  
In another statement released through Fitzwater, Bush announced he had sent a 
letter to Yugoslav President Mesic expressing his concerns about the situation in 
Yugoslavia and urging Mesic to re-establish civilian control over the military and restore 
peace to the country, and to continue cooperating with the United States, EC and others 
for a peaceful resolution. In the statement via Fitzwater, Bush expressed hope that all 
Yugoslav parties would open a dialogue on Yugoslavia’s democratic future. Fitzwater 
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noted that Bush also reiterated American support for EC efforts to resolve the Yugoslav 
crisis.381  
Of the few times that Bush personally made a statement about the Yugoslav crisis 
occurred during a meeting with Italian leaders. In one statement, Bush discussed 
European efforts to help the Yugoslav’s resolve their problems peacefully, and that the 
United States along with Europe supported a collective resolution of the conflict.382 He 
also established that the collapse in Yugoslavia was a European matter.383 As the conflict 
in Yugoslavia continued and demonstrated that the federations collapse was inevitable 
Bush adjusted his frame to oppose the Yugoslav government’s use of force to keep the 
federation together. Throughout the crisis Bush made few references to the human rights 
violations Human Rights Watch described in their letters. Bush’s frame and agenda for 
the collapse of Yugoslavia connected it to the changes occurring in Eastern Europe as the 
Soviet Union lost power and influence opening opportunities for political reform.384 
The American media like Bush diminished the importance of the collapse of 
Yugoslavia to US interests and national security to the American public. The media did 
not add Yugoslavia to the public agenda until the spring of 1992. By that time, the 
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republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia had declared their independence 
from Yugoslavia through democratic elections. Between 1989 and 1992 satellite 
technology improved making it possible for news channels to produce near simultaneous 
reports from around the world. However, the media only reported on the crisis in 
Yugoslavia in 1989 eight times. These eight broadcasts focused on ethnic and general 
unrest and rioting in Yugoslavia, and the longest was two and a half minutes long, while 
most lasted twenty seconds.385  
Even though the crisis in Yugoslavia was also connected to changes occurring in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the media gave reports on Yugoslavia a low 
priority. This included the media’s coverage of the secession votes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. It was not until summer of 1991 that the broadcast 
networks reported on the situation in Yugoslavia frequently and repeatedly. It was not 
until reports emerged that the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that the 
situation in the Balkans was in the American media every day. However, by that point 
Yugoslavia no longer existed as a country, and the conflict had become a difference crisis 
between the former Yugoslav states.386 The media’s reporting of Yugoslavia framed the 
situation as a political conflict with occasional references to ethnic divisions and human 
rights violations. The media followed Bush’s framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia 
deviating by its focus on the ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia as the source of the conflict. 
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One of the ways the media framed the conflict was through special reports on 
Yugoslavia where experts discussed the situation that explained the conflict’s 
foundations. One C-Span special report “History and Politics of Yugoslavia,” included 
discussions between John Lampe, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, 
and Dusan Zupan, Washington Bureau Chief of Tanjug Yugoslavia’s News Agency. At 
the beginning Lampe challenged notions that the crisis was caused by an age-old 
animosity between the groups. Instead, Lampe argued that Yugoslavia’s conflict was 
caused a lack of contact between the parties, political changes that had led to the rise of 
secessionist movements, democratic movements, and ultranationalists’ and communist 
hardliners opposition to change. Zupan added to by pointing to the fall of communism as 
the spark that started the issues Lampe pointed to.387 Special reports like this one did not 
stray far from the media’s frame and agenda. They did not discuss human rights 
violations by the Yugoslav government, though some attempted to challenge the ancient 
hatreds frame. Instead the special reports tended to abide by the media’s frame and 
agenda for the collapse of Yugoslavia.  
American newspapers also framed the collapse of Yugoslavia as a conflict caused 
by ancient ethnic hatreds. They also presented the conflict as a European matter that the 
EC was failing to resolve, and were the earliest media source to discuss the humanitarian 
violations occurring during the conflict, and pointed to Slobodan Milošević as one of the 
main culprits encouraging the conflict. American newspapers also allowed for multisided 
discussions of the conflict. In the New York Times, one editorials “Bullying in the 
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Balkans,” denounced Milošević for encouraging ethnic hatred for political gain and 
endangering Yugoslavia’s stability and existence.388 Three editorials responded to each 
from a different perspective. Zivorad Kovacevic, Yugoslavia’s Ambassador to the United 
States, criticized the article for painting a misleading picture of developments in 
Yugoslavia. Kovacevic contended the situation in Yugoslavia was created by legal and 
democratic means, and blamed militant Albanian separatists for the violence in 
Kosovo.389 Joseph J. Dioguardi, the President of the Albanian-American Civic League, 
agreed with the author of “Bullying,”390 and Jerome Davidovich criticized the author for 
relying on the ancient hatreds frame.391 This did not stop other editorials from continuing 
to blame ancient hatreds for the violence in Yugoslavia.392 Other editorials debated the 
validity of keeping Yugoslavia together, and how to do it. Those that supported unity 
asserted that unity granted the member states greater autonomy that secession. They 
argued that seceding from Yugoslavia fueled resentments among ethnic minorities within 
the seceding states, and encouraged those minorities to make radical demands of the 
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states.393 Those that supported Yugoslavia’s dissolution, pointed to the fact that 
Yugoslavia existed because Tito had forced the nations into a federation and not because 
they had volunteered to form it. The supporters of dissolution also pointed to the political 
differences among the Slovenes and Croats that favored non-communist governments, 
and Serbs that wanted to remain communist.394  
The media’s framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia was similar to Bush’s and 
failed to bring the conflict into the American public’s awareness and onto the public 
agenda. Thus, the media did not bring any public pressure on Bush to change his policy. 
Like Bush, the media argued that ancient hatreds caused the collapse of Yugoslavia, even 
as some parts of the media unsuccessfully challenged that frame. Bush’s and the media’s 
frames for the collapse of Yugoslavia dismissed the political and economic factors in the 
crisis as irrelevant, this allowed the frames to oversimplify the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
Additionally, this frame applied universal guilt to the Yugoslavs for the federations 
collapse and the violence that followed. This trapped the media as well as Bush and 
Clinton when the Bosnian War erupted between the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.  
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Bosnian War 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia destabilized the Balkans, and gave the Serbs, led 
by Slobodan Milošević, an opportunity to carryout ethnic cleanse Bosnia of its Muslim 
and Croat populations to create Greater Serbia. While the collapse of Yugoslavia was not 
well covered in American media and it was discussed as a political crisis, the Bosnian 
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War with Serbs ethnically cleansing Bosnian Muslims and Croats to create Greater Serbia 
became a humanitarian crisis. The Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnian incensed American 
public opinion which led the media to give on the Bosnian War more attention. The 
increased media attention pressured Bush and Clinton to create a policy response to the 
war. 
In 1992, 37 percent of the American public reported following news reports on 
the Balkans,395 and in January 1993, 48 percent noted that they were following news 
reports about the war in Bosnia. However, most of these Americans opposed a US 
military intervention in Bosnia to end the conflict or defend Bosnia from Serb 
aggression.396 However, the 37 percent of Americans aware of the situation in Bosnia 
believed the United States had a “moral responsibility to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’,” and 34 
percent believed a military intervention was justified if it defended US national security 
interests or prevented the fighting from spreading to other parts of the region.397 
Additionally, 51 percent of Americans favored increasing America’s role in the 
peacekeeping talks.398 The polls also revealed that the American public understood the 
crisis in Bosnia as a humanitarian disaster or as a strategic concern. The polls show that 
while they supported American involvement ending the war, the public excluded the 
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involvement of US military forces. As they confronted the Bosnian War, Bush and 
Clinton responded. Bush adopted a humanitarian frame for the war caused by ancient 
ethnic hatreds, which Clinton adopted when he became president.  
Bush started establishing his frame in the summer of 1992 as reports emerged that 
the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing campaigns against Bosnian Muslims. Bush 
also set the Bosnian War as part of the European agenda, while the United States 
provided humanitarian assistance to Bosnia.399 Bush’s agenda that he did not believe that 
US troops show intervene in political problems around the world.400 Especially when the 
Bosnian War was caused by an “age-old animosities” or a “century’s-old feuds,” which 
Bush used to equally apply guilt to the Bosnians for the violence.401  
After winning the presidency in 1992, Clinton began setting his frames continued 
some of Bush’s frames that the Bosnian War as a humanitarian crisis, that the United 
States should not deploy its military. However, Clinton also gave more publicity to the 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnian and placed more blame on the Serbs for the violence in 
Bosnia. Clinton also increased America’s involvement in international efforts in Bosnian 
and made those efforts part of the agenda US agenda in Bosnia.402 
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During the Bosnian War, the media competed with Bush’s and Clinton’s frame 
and agenda for the Bosnian War. Unlike Bush and Clinton, the media focused on 
presenting the Serbs as the guilty party in the Bosnian War. The media did this by 
focusing its reporting of the Serbs human rights violations and policy of ethnic cleansing 
against non-Serbs in Bosnia. It did this by reporting on Muslim and Croat efforts to 
defend themselves from the Serbs and the suffering of women, children, and the elderly 
in Bosnia. It also attempted to link Serb actions to the Holocaust. However, this frame 
was mitigated by media frames that focused on ancient ethnic hatreds as the root causes 
of the conflict.403 Even as the media emphasized the humanitarian disaster side of the 
Bosnian War, it adopted Bush’s and Clinton’s framing of ethnic hatreds causing the 
violence in Bosnia.  
Television media’s framing of the Bosnian War did not change during Clinton's 
presidency. Between 20 January and 31 December 1995, the NBC, CBS, and ABC 
evening news reported on events in Bosnia one thousand times.404 The television news 
reports continued to describe the Bosnian War as a civil war between the Bosnians, 
Croats, and Serbs. The reports also discussed the situations in Bosnian cities under Serb 
attack, US policies, peace attempts, and ethnic cleansing. However, most the reporting 
was on the civil war, and much of these reports were less than a minute long.405  
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During a brief report on the history of Yugoslavia, NBC anchor and foreign 
correspondent, Garrick Utley, discussed the history of the Balkans and former 
Yugoslavia. In under two minutes, Utley connected the twentieth century ethnic conflict 
in the Balkans with the 1914 Serbian assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand that started WWI, and atrocities the parties committed during WWII. He also 
described Josip Broz Tito’s Cold War efforts to suppress ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia 
up to his death in 1980, when ethnic tensions returned and caused Yugoslavia’s collapse. 
At the end of his report, Utley stated the Europeans refer to the Balkans to as “the 
tinderbox” because of the regions repeated ethnic conflicts throughout the twentieth 
century. His finished the report saying, “The result is now familiar. History repeating 
itself,”406 During this report, Utley delivered few historical details, and provided little 
context for the conflict. He also parroted the administration’s views of the conflict the 
conflict.  
Another news report by NBC’s John Cochran reported on Bush’s and the 
international community’s efforts to deliver humanitarian relief to Bosnian. Cochran 
noted that most UNSC members and American allies opposed using airpower to protect 
convoys delivering aid because they did not believe air power would protect the convoys 
from snipers and guerrilla attacks.407 This report demonstrated that the United States was 
not alone in its refusal to use military force to resolve the conflict in Bosnia.  
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Television reports were not the only source of information the public received 
form the media. American newspapers’ editorial sections provided the American public 
with more nuanced coverage of events and policy debates. Newspaper editorials 
criticized Bush for not implementing a more aggressive policy against to Serb aggression. 
Several articles argued that Bush’s response to Bosnia was a failure to uphold his New 
World Order standards to deter aggression and encourage international cooperation. Like 
some television news reports, newspapers also drew comparisons between Serb actions in 
Bosnia to the Nazis and the Holocaust.408 However, these criticisms had little influence 
changing Bush’s policies towards Bosnian. Clinton would also receive this criticism as 
the media and a significant minority of the public pushed for more aggressive policies to 
curb Serb violence.  
When Clinton began drafting policy towards Bosnia, he also faced criticisms for 
not implementing more aggressive policies against Serbia. However, the media noted that 
while some critics desired more aggressive policies from Clinton, most of the public 
agreed with Clinton’s less forceful policies. Leslie Gelb wrote: 
“While most Americans seem generally content with Clinton’s handling of 
foreign affairs, most foreign policy experts, diplomats and pundits mercilessly 
accuse him of being clueless about U.S. interests and inept in wielding power. 
Where most Americans feel utter relief in the president's reluctance to act tough 
and threaten military intervention, professionals warn darkly of presidential 
naiveté and dangerous inaction. Where just plain folks applaud the president’s 
mainly minding the troubled store at home, the foreign policy elite – children of 
American empire, a generation reared in the excitement and primacy of foreign 
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policy – feel both disinherited by the Cold War’s end and genuinely alarmed 
about a world drifting toward perpetual violence.”409  
He continued that Bosnia represented problems with Clinton’s foreign policy decisions: 
no ethical ballast, no strategic center, no conviction, no steadiness, and a failure to take 
responsibility. Gelb also compared Clinton to Bush and noted that while Bush’s foreign 
policy was no better than Clinton’s, Bush delivered on the policy promises he made.410 
Samuel Berger responded to Gelb’s article in “What America Needs: Less Gelb.” 
Berger argued that US foreign policy was not supposed to satisfy foreign policy experts, 
and he also contested Gelb's claim that Clinton was ignoring the world. He pointed to 
Clinton’s foreign policy accomplishments that included over one hundred meetings with 
foreign leaders in 1993, a dozen foreign policy speeches, and eight country visits. He also 
pointed to Clinton’s success obtaining three of his strategic goals: putting the economic 
policy back in foreign policy, adapting the US military to the post-Cold War period, and 
enlarging the world’s community of free market democracies.”411 The American media 
had mixed success challenging Bush’s and Clinton’s frames for the Bosnian War. The 
media adopted Bush’s and Clinton’s frames that the war was a humanitarian disaster. 
However, the media put more emphasis on ethnic cleansing than either president but only 
succeed in pressuring Clinton to increase his efforts to address ethnic cleansing in his 
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decisions. The media also challenged Bush and Clinton’s foreign policy. However, Bush 
and Clinton enjoyed public support for their policies so the media was only able to exert 
limited pressure on the presidents to take more aggressive policies.  
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Haitian Coup 
The 1991 coup d’état of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide received most of its 
press coverage immediately following the coup and once the Haitians began fleeing to 
the United States. However, the public’s response to the Haitian were not measured until 
two years later when the public was split over their approval or disapproval of Clinton’s 
Haitian policies.412 Some Americans noted that the United States would not have gotten 
involved in Haiti if not for the Congressional Black Caucus.413 By May 1994, 44 slightly 
less than half of the American public was following news reports on Haiti.414 As Clinton 
approached the start of the military intervention in September, 60 percent of the public 
was following news stories about the intervention.415 However, most Americans opposed 
using US military force to restore democracy to Haiti.416  
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Following the Carter mission to Haiti that convinced the Cédras regime to resign, 
American opinions began to change. Between 19 and 25 September opinion polls 
revealed that more Americans supported sending troops to Haiti, and more Americans 
approved of the way that Clinton had handled the situation in Haiti. Additionally, of those 
surveyed, 51 percent believed the invasion would reduce or stop the flow of refugees, but 
only 37 percent thought the intervention would stop human rights abuses. Most 
Americans also believed that the United States would accomplish its goals and quickly 
withdraw from Haiti.417 The American public’s initial disinterest in Haiti and its 
continued opposition to military interventions in political intranational conflicts allowed 
Bush to focus little attention on Haiti. However, the Congressional Black Caucus 
increased its lobbying efforts to increase US involvement restoring Haiti’s democratic 
government. Eventually this pressure would push Clinton to change the frame and agenda 
for Haiti to support a military intervention.  
Shortly after the coup, Bush began establishing his frame. He denounced the 
coup, expressed concern for Haiti’s people, and announced the United States would 
support OAS diplomatic efforts to end the coup.418 Bush adopted a similar frame for Haiti 
as he had for Bosnia, the United States was concerned about the situation in the country, 
but Bush had confidence the regional institutions could resolve the crisis diplomatically 
and the United States supported the regional institutions diplomatic efforts. Bush did not 
mention the possibility of deploying US forces to restore Aristide or state that any US 
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interests were at stake in Haiti. This established that Haiti had little place on the public 
agenda and that it was a Latin American-Caribbean problem to resolve, not an American 
one.419 Bush’s frame remained in effect through the Haitian crisis though Clinton would 
unsuccessfully change the frame in 1994.  
Clinton’s initial frame for Haitian crisis differed little from Bush’s, it was not 
until CBC lobbying efforts pressured Clinton to change Haitian refugee policies and 
stronger diplomatic measures against the Cédras regime that Clinton began to change the 
frame and agenda for Haiti. In June 1994, Clinton started by trying to reframe the coup as 
a threat to democracy and that restoring Haitian democracy was in US interests, and that 
it would stop the flow of Haitian refugees.420 However, the public which continued to 
adhere to the frame Bush established in 1991. 
Once Clinton made the decision to authorize Operation Uphold Democracy, he 
and his administration continued to push and adopt their frame and agenda to gain public 
support for the intervention. Clinton added human rights concerns, ending the refugee 
flows, and defending democracy to his frame and agenda.421 During an address to the 
nation on 15 September Clinton once again attempted to justify his decision and frame 
the situation in Haiti to gain public support.422 However, by waiting until the eve of the 
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intervention, Clinton’s efforts faced significant hurdles to convince the American public 
that the intervention was the correct policy decision and to get their support. By waiting 
so close to the beginning of the intervention Clinton also lost the ability to establish the 
frame and agenda for Haiti. This put Clinton in an uphill battle to change an established 
and well-accepted frame, that only a minority adhered to.  
During Bush’s presidency, the broadcast networks produced 125 reports on events 
in Haiti. Of those reports sixteen included discussions on the coup, seventy-two discussed 
the refugees and refugee policies, four talked about the military, five mentioned Aristide, 
and ten discussed OAS efforts to end the coup. US news reports spent more time framing 
the crisis in Haiti as a refugee crisis with little time dedicated connecting the refugee flow 
to the illegal government change and the junta's rule. The news reports also framed the 
refugee flow as a response to economic sanctions against the Cédras regime and 
diminished the importance of the Cédras regimes violence as a pushing the Haitians to 
flee.423  
As the crisis in Haiti extended into Clinton’s presidency, the media’s depictions 
of the coup, Aristide, the plight of Haitian refugees, actions by the Cédras regime, 
remained the same. Television news media produced another 565 reports on events in 
Haiti. Five hundred and five of the reports covered general developments in Haiti, eleven 
reported on Clinton’s foreign policies, seventy-one reported on Haitian refugees and 
refugee policies, forty-one discussed Aristide, one report discussed the coup itself, and 
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five examined the Cédras regime's military leaders.424 However, the media’s frame 
deviated little from the frame established during Bush’s presidency.  
The media continued to focus on the refugees fleeing to the United States and US 
support for OAS efforts. While the television news did not include any overt signs of race 
in its frame, race played a covert part of the media’s framing of Haiti. One way this 
occurred was during C-Span’s debate on an intervention in Haiti between Representatives 
Carrie Meeks and Charles Canaday. Meeks was a Democratic congresswoman and CBC 
member and Canaday was a Republican Congressman. Canaday was an outspoken 
opponent of the intervention and repeatedly stated that it was not the best way to end the 
refugee flow from Haiti, while Meeks, supported a military intervention to return Aristide 
to power. Meeks also repeatedly and adamantly disagreed with Canady’s remarks arguing 
he ignored widespread violence under the Cédras regime as a source of the refugee flow 
and defended Aristide from Canady’s criticisms.425 The Canaday-Meeks debate revealed 
the sharp divisions along political and racial lines over Clinton’s Haitian policies 
especially his decision to deploy US forces as part of a military operation to restore 
Aristide to Haiti. As it had in the C-Span debate, the CBC emerged as one of the main 
proponents of Clinton’s Haitian policies and the military intervention to restore Aristide 
and democracy to Haiti. 
American newspapers also adopted Bush’s frame the same frame. At the same 
time newspaper editorials allowed Aristides proponents and opponents to present their 
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framing of the coup. Aristide’s detractors focused on charges that Aristide had violated 
the human rights of his political opponents in Haiti.426 While Aristide’s supporters 
denounced the coup and called for the restoration of Aristides democratically elected 
government.427 They denounced Aristide’s opponents for disseminating propaganda and 
criticized foreign leaders that listened to Cédras regime supporters.428  
Newspaper editorials also criticized US policy towards Haitian refugees. Many 
editorials argued the United States should not abide by the 1981 immigration agreement 
Reagan made with Duvalier to repatriate Haitian refugee, and that the United States 
should apply the same asylum laws to the Haitian refugees. Some editorials compared the 
repatriation of the Haitians to America’s refusal to accept the German Jews on the St. 
Louis fleeing Nazi Germany.429 Editorials also criticized Bush’s justification that he was 
repatriating Haitian refugees fleeing the economic devastation and not political 
repression. They called on Bush to end the economic sanctions against Haiti because the 
sanctions were not encouraging the Cédras regime or the army to stop violating their 
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political opponents’ human rights.430 Others urged the administration to tighten the 
embargo against the Cédras junta as long as it continued to obstruct Aristide’s return.431 
These editorials showed that the media’s framing of the Haitian refugee crisis was 
tenuously connected to the Cédras regime’s atrocities. It also revealed that the public 
debate on Haitian policy was focused on the effectiveness of diplomatic pressures against 
a military dictatorship.  
There was not discussion of US responsibility to defend democracy and restore 
Haiti’s democratic government, and there was no connection between Haitian democracy 
and US security and national interests. However, when Clinton introduced democracy 
into the Haitian frame editorials argued against Clinton’s arguments. Some editorials 
argued that it was an impossible mission because the Haitian military and police would 
reject international efforts to retrain them.432 Other American commentators argued 
against a United States invasion to rescue Haiti’s democracy.433  
As the military intervention approached foreign policy analysists like Anthony 
Lewis connected Clinton’s inability to gain public approval to the post-Cold War period 
and the public’s general opposition to US activism abroad. He noted that without an 
                                                 
430 “Backward Priorities on Haiti,” NYT, May 27, 1992, 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428532339?accountid=13946. Henry 
F. Carey, “The Americas: Lift the Embargo of Haiti Before There’s No Haiti Left,” WSJ, January 10, 1992, 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398243115?accountid=13946 
431 “Haiti: Tighten the Embargo,” NYT, January 30, 1992, 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428335661?accountid=13946 
432 “Haiti: Mission Impossible,” New York Times October 10, 1993, Late Edition (East Coast), 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429313874?accountid=13946.  
433 “On The Dock in Haiti,” Washington Post October 12, 1993, 
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307684236?accountid=13946.  
 253 
imminent threat like communism it was more difficult to get American support for policy 
decisions. He continued that post-Cold War political and humanitarian crisis were more 
difficult to convince the American public were threats to US interests.434  
After Clinton’s address on 15 September, most editorials mirrored public opinion 
and opposed Clinton’s decision to intervene in Haiti. They focused their criticisms on 
Clinton quick progression from diplomacy to military options in Haiti, while continuing 
diplomatic efforts to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.435 Other argued that 
Clinton had been swayed by a small group of people in Washington—without mentioning 
the CBC—who cared about Haiti and pressured Clinton to take more aggressive actions 
even though Haiti was not a significant problem to most Americans.436  
Bush’s frame for Haiti was similar to his frame for Bosnia. He focused on 
supporting regional efforts at a resolution and not using US forces to resolve a political 
conflict. Clinton started with Bush’s frame, and then attempted to change the agenda and 
frame for Haiti just before he deployed US military forces to Haiti. His efforts were 
unsuccessful, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted in his editorial, if Clinton intended to 
change US policies in Haiti he should have started framing and setting the agenda months 
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before the intervention was to occur to gain public support. 437 This allowed the media to 
continue Bush’s frame and increase public opposition to Clinton’s strategies.  
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
The genocide in Rwanda presented Clinton with several foreign policy and public 
relations opportunities. The genocide was the first crisis that Clinton could set his own 
frame and agenda for without having to continue, compete, or revise from Bush. It was a 
crisis that Clinton could bring into public awareness and quickly get public support for 
his policy decisions. A month into the genocide only 34 percent of Americans were 
aware that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda and were following news coverage.438  
Clinton missed the opportunity to establish a strong frame and agenda for the 
Rwandan genocide that garnered public support for his policy decisions. During the 
Rwandan genocide, Clinton issued six public statements specifically about Rwanda, but 
none of these statements acknowledged that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda. 
Instead, Clinton’s described the violence as a civil war. He established America’s agenda 
was evacuating Americans from Rwanda, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting 
OAU negotiation efforts to get the Hutus and RPF to accept a cease-fire.439 Most of these 
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statements were made in response to questions from reporters during exchanges on topics 
other than situation in Rwanda.440  
Clinton’s first statement to bring attention to the situation in Rwanda expressed 
his shock and sadness about the deaths of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
and Burundian President Cypriean Ntaryamira. Clinton established that their deaths were 
tragic blows to the Rwandan and Burundian people. He expressed his horror that the 
Rwandan security forces were using their president’s death to murder Rwandan 
politicians and others.441 Following this statement, Clinton’s statements discussed US 
efforts to evacuate Americans and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. However, 
Clinton did not discuss the ethnically motivated and genocidal quality of the killings the 
security forces were carrying out. 442 It was not until July that Clinton acknowledged that 
a genocide had occurred in Rwanda as he announced the closing the US embassy in 
Rwanda in protest of the new governments support for acts of genocide.443  
Throughout the conflict in Rwanda, Clinton’s frame focused on the political 
discord causing violence in Rwanda. He established that America’s agenda in Rwanda 
was to deliver humanitarian aid for those fleeing the violence and protecting American 
lives by evacuating from Rwanda and keeping US forces out. Compared to his remarks 
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about Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, Rwanda had a low priority in Clinton’s foreign policy 
agenda. While Clinton’s frame and agenda was late acknowledging the genocide in 
Rwanda, the American television and newspaper reports introduced genocide into the 
frame soon after the violence began and attempted to pushed Rwanda higher on the 
public agenda. Part of this was due to television reports from Rwanda and from human 
rights observer’s first-hand reports of the violence.  
The media’s reporting on the situation in Rwanda repeatedly challenged Clinton’s 
agenda for the conflict, but not his framing. The media focused on the killings in Rwanda 
and the need for an outside presence to restore peace. Additionally, television coverage of 
the fighting and genocide in Rwanda as extensive as some crisis like Persian Gulf Crisis, 
and Haiti, as ABC, CBS, and NBC produced 244 segments and specials on Rwanda over 
116 days. These segments ranged from ten-seconds to twenty-nine minutes in length, 
with most lasting between one and two minutes. Most of the segments described a civil or 
tribal war occurring in Rwanda, with only ten reports describing the killings as a 
genocide rather than massacres, ethnic slaughter, or tribal violence. While media 
coverage on Rwanda at the beginning focused on the plights of Americans there were 
mentions of the violence but the focus was on the fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis. 
During April, the media reported on events in Rwanda daily though it was not until 28 
April that the media first described the killing in Rwanda as a genocide.444 Still the media 
beat Clinton to introducing genocide into the frame three months before the president.  
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While television news reports added genocide to their frames, American 
newspaper editorials were discussing events in Rwanda and describing the violence as a 
genocide by mid-April. They also criticized the United States and UN for failing to act to 
end the violence. During an interview with Washington Post reporters, Monique 
Mujawamariya, a human rights observer in Rwanda who had managed to escape the 
genocide in Rwanda, discussed the acts of violence and intimidation carried out by 
extremist Hutu. She described Hutu human rights violations back to December 1993 
shortly after the last cease-fire was established. Mujawamariya argued that the 
international community had failed to prevent the violence from restarting by not 
adapting to the changing situation in Rwanda, not accounting for the long-term threat of 
violence between the Hutu and Tutsi, and failing to recognize the reality of the situation 
in Rwanda. She rejected claims that the violence in Rwanda was inter-tribal fighting or 
an ethnic conflict, and that the killings were separate from the civil war.445 
Mujawamariya’s interview was one of several articles and interviews that witnesses gave 
on the genocide in Rwanda.446  
She was also one of many that criticized the Clinton administration and media for 
describing the genocide in Rwanda as tribal violence or as an inter-tribal war. Her 
interview also contrasted with public statements from Clinton and his administration by 
focusing attention to the genocide occurring Rwanda hidden by focus on the resumed 
civil war. Mujawamariya and others that argued a genocide was occurring in Rwanda 
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challenged Clinton and the media’s framing. Others argued revealed that contrary to 
Clinton’s statements Africa remained a low priority for US foreign policy, and African 
crises generated little concern within the international community. Editorials that 
criticized Clinton’s slow response to Rwanda also pointed to the post-Cold War 
challenges related to crises where the president could not easily justify deploying US 
military forces to restore peace. 447 One editorial noted that the problem lay with 
policymakers’ failure to establish or articulate a clear standard to respond to intranational 
brutality and aggression that had low stakes to national interests.448 
Other commentators criticized Presidential Decision Directive-25 for enabling the 
United States to prevent the UN from acting aggressively or sending a peacekeeping 
mission to Rwanda. These editorials argued that despite administration arguments of 
supporting international actions to end the violence in Rwanda, Clinton’s policies had 
done the opposite by forcing the UN to focus on humanitarian efforts for refugees on the 
borders.449 Along with the criticism brought by the policy decisions, the Clinton 
administration was also criticized for refusing to describe the violence in Rwanda as a 
genocide, despite the numerous reports from human rights observers that it was 
occurring. Several commentators noted that the United States refused to describe the 
killings as genocide to avoid encouraging calls for a US military intervention as required 
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by the 1952 UN Convention on Genocide that called for the signers to prevent the crime 
and punish those that committed it.450 While Clinton tried to frame the conflict in 
Rwanda as a civil war, media reports and interviews with survivors repeatedly challenged 
this frame and Clinton’s agenda for the crisis. The media’s coverage of the situation in 
Rwanda demonstrated that the media was capable challenging the president’s frame and 
eventually forcing the president to change his frame. However, the media was not able to 
generate enough public opinion to pressure Clinton to change his policies towards 
Rwanda. 
Conclusions 
Framing and agenda setting for the American public is a multifaceted mechanism 
that includes the president, the media, and the public. The President attempts to establish 
the initial frame and agenda. The president’s efforts are challenged by political opponents 
and proponents in public debates. The media describes these debates and either adopts all 
or parts of the president’s frame and agenda or not. As these crises reveal the president’s 
frame is often supported by the media with little or moderate changes. At the same time 
the president and the media alter their frames and agenda based on public opinions of the 
presidents ‘policies and media coverage of events.  
As Bush and Clinton strove to support international stability and security through 
international cooperation, and protect the United States from as the international situation 
changed in the post-Cold War period they had to get public support for their policy 
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decisions. This required Bush and Clinton to describe and explain crises and their policy 
responses to the American public using language that fit within the American public’s 
world views and foreign policy preferences. The tone, rhetoric, and frequency of their 
presidential statements on foreign events reflected the level of importance a crisis had to 
the United States, and how much attention the American public and mass media should 
pay to those events as well. However, this did not mean that the public or the media 
would completely agree with the president’s position. In the post-Cold War period, the 
function of public opinion in a democracy to influence, limit, and guide leaders’ policy 
decisions ensured that presidents and other policymakers participated in policy debates, 
expressed their views on the situation, and justified their decisions in ways that informed 
the public.  
The media serves to keep the public informed, even if that requires the public to 
contradict the government. It is also dependent upon the media’s ability to cover an event 
in a way that forces that crisis higher up the public agenda. However, does not possess an 
omnipotent ability to equally cover every crisis around the world in a way that sways the 
public and policymakers. Additionally, when the media fails to substantially cover a 
crisis, or conflict it increases the possibility for the government to develop a policy 
vacuum.  
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CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION 
In 1993, Bill Clinton stated, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually 
coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”451 Not just the 
American people, but American policymakers understood that during the Cold War the 
United States was fighting to preserve democracy and free market capitalism from the 
Soviet Union and its desire to spread communism. The end of the Cold War threw those 
rules to the wind, and left post-Cold War policymakers searching for a new grand 
strategy for US national security and foreign policies. At the same time, American 
society was still coming to terms with changes that occurred during the 1960s with civil 
rights movements, the rightward turn of American politics, and leftward turn of American 
culture. American media was changing in response to telecommunications advances that 
enabled instantaneous transmissions of news reports around the world which led to the 
rise twenty-four-hour news channels and cable television, and the rise of the internet and 
growing popularity of email. These advances changed the way American received news 
and information and connected with each other and their elected officials. Internationally, 
the United States was re-evaluating its global military presences, responding to anti-
American attitudes around the world, and responding to increasing numbers of 
intranational conflicts that threatened regional and international stability and security. 
Following the temporary rise of a unipolar international system, the United States 
                                                 
451 Ann Devroy and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,” 
Washington Post, October 17, 1993, 
https://secure.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/307677847.html?FMT=FT. 
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emerged as a world super power in multipolar system as regional powers and institutions 
balanced America’s global military presence. 
Even as the international system encountered rapid change George Bush and Bill 
Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and national security strategies from 
the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment grand strategy after the Cold 
War. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign policies returned to 
cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional institutions to 
respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world security and 
stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War technological 
advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and electronic email 
increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence foreign policy 
decisions.  
For forty years, the strategy of containment guided the US presidents’ policy 
decisions, from the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, Vietnam War, using African 
American jazz musicians as ambassadors, to supporting totalitarian governments, the 
United States adopted policies designed to protect democracy and capitalism around the 
world. In many ways, the Cold War stymied the American diplomacy. It did this by 
forcing the government and American policymakers to comprehend international 
relations through one lens that simplified international relations to a black and white 
issue. While the singular focus made it easier to explain US policy decisions to the public 
and to gain public opinion, it also set the United States up for difficult a transition once 
the Cold War ended.  
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The end of the Cold War made the containment strategy and its singular vision for 
US strategies and policies obsolete. Without a similar universal strategy, US international 
relations returned to the pre-Cold War emphasis on cooperative security arrangements, 
and multinational responses to international crises. This system struggled to respond to 
post-Cold War conflicts in areas where the United States or the Soviet Union had 
provided governments with military and economic support to counter the plans of the 
other. Without the Cold War dichotomy suppressing internal discord, previously 
suppressed ethnic or political divisions re-emerged and sparked intranational political or 
humanitarian crises that Bush and Clinton found difficult to resolve. As the Cold War 
ended, Bush transitioned US foreign policy and national security away from the strategy 
of containment and towards cooperative security arrangements. Clinton continued this 
direction and added global economic prosperity as another means to defend US security 
and interests. Bush and Clinton also broke with America’s postwar tradition of 
decreasing US military force and maintained America’s super power military presence 
around the world, which they attempted to use to maintain global security and stability. 
However, neither president could create a strategy that used America’s military strength 
to deter and respond to intranational conflicts that frequently threatened global stability 
and security after 1991.  
Bush's attempt led to the creation of the New World Order, while Clinton’s 
attempt created a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Both presidents believed that 
creating a post-Cold War grand strategy provided the government with direction for 
foreign policies and the United States future role in the world. They also believed that 
like the policy of containment, their strategies could provide the American public with an 
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overarching understanding of America’s global mission and foreign policy agenda. 
However, neither president's grand strategy was entirely original. Their plans borrowed 
ideas and theories from the first half of the twentieth century, at times reenacting past 
international events. 
George Bush served as the transition president to the post-Cold War period. This 
positioned Bush to create a grand strategy that future post-Cold War presidents could use 
if his strategy was successful. However, Cold War ideologies were hard to overcome 
during the Bush presidency. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union when Bush 
was no longer felt he needed to the strategy of containment that he established new rules 
for US foreign policy. Bush’s post-Cold War strategy became the New World Order. It 
promoted collective security and international cooperation to maintain global and 
regional security and stability. It also encouraged working with international institutions 
like UN and NATO to deter aggression and if necessary to create coalitions to end 
conflicts. Bush’s New World Order harkened back to the notions of international 
cooperation advocated by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Bush’s response 
to the Persian Gulf Crisis was the best implementation of his New World Order strategy. 
He successfully created international opposition to Iraqi aggression, sustained and guided 
that cooperation through the to the end of a successful war that removed Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait. Bush also gained the support of the American public for his policy decisions. 
This included overcoming the Vietnam syndrome and significant opposition to a military 
intervention to liberate Kuwait up to the 16 January 1991. 
While Bush favored collective action to resolve crises, he did not support United 
States leadership in every attempt to deter aggression and resolve crises. Instead, Bush 
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engaged American leadership when a crisis posed significant threats to US national 
interests, as he did during the unification of Germany and the Persian Gulf Crisis. When 
global crisis did not threaten vital US national interests, such as the Haitian coup and 
Bosnian War, Bush encouraged regional powers and institutions to take the lead while the 
United States supported their leadership. The disadvantage of this strategy was that it 
limited Bush’s ability to influence policy decision and led to policy differences between 
the US and the regional institutions. This policy was supposed to encourage collective 
action between various states as Bush desired in the New World Order. However, many 
of the regional efforts failed to provide the same level of assertive leadership the United 
States had traditionally provided, due to internal divisions over policy decisions. 
While Bush borrowed foreign policy ideas from the early twentieth century, 
Clinton pulled from Wilsonian foreign policies and other mid-twentieth-century foreign 
policies.  His strategy of engagement and enlargement included the promotion and defend 
democracy and supporting global economic prosperity. While communism no longer 
threatened democracy, dictators, totalitarian governments prevented countries from 
embracing democracy, while and coups threatened new democratic governments. In his 
national security strategy, Clinton discussed participating in missions that were relevant 
to US national security interests and where the US could do the most good. 
Between 1993 and 1995, Clinton attempted to implement a foreign policy strategy 
that kept the United States engaged in world affairs, especially in ways that helped to end 
crises. Clinton's presidency was less focused on encouraging collective action, than with 
maintaining US participation in international developments and supporting the growth of 
democracy. Unlike Bush, Clinton was more willing to take aggressive actions when 
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international crises were not a threat to international events. Clinton also developed 
foreign and national security strategies that were more selective when deploying US 
military forces abroad.  
Both Bush and Clinton created national security and foreign policies based on the 
roles they believed the United States should fill in the post-Cold War period. Bush and 
Clinton developed and pursued policies per their strategies, whether that was directing 
international cooperation in a new era of peace and security or engaging with the world 
and promoting the spread of democratic governments. Their ability to enact that strategy 
through policy had varying degrees of success. While both presidents attempted to keep 
the United States involved in global events, the rise of intranational conflicts that violated 
human rights and created humanitarian crises challenged both strategies. Unfortunately, 
neither grand strategy provided a standard rule or set of rules to guide policymakers. 
Instead, Clinton and Bush enacted policies that frustrated international efforts by limiting 
US participation and with it that of other countries. As the sole super power the United 
States had much sway on the international community and when the United States proved 
unwilling to act assertively neither did the international community. 
While Bush and Clinton differed in their approaches, both presidents adopted 
similar responses to intranational crises. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda these men 
encouraged regional institutions and states to resolve the conflicts in their neighboring 
countries while the United States provided support. In both crises, the United States 
retreated from leading resolution efforts even as developments demonstrated that US 
leadership was likely the only way to generate a forceful response. Bush was called out 
for this strategy and how it undermined his New World Order after executing it so well in 
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response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. The public also criticized Clinton for this tactic, 
but because his foreign policy framework appeared less grandiose, his decisions came 
under less attack. Also, Clinton demonstrated that he was willing to adopt stronger 
policies against those that engaged in violence as he did against the Serbs in Bosnia and 
the Cédras regime in Haiti.  
The difference in US responses to international and intranational crises emerged 
during the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnian War, and the Rwandan genocide. Following 
Iraq's invasions of Kuwait, Bush successfully led a coalition to push Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait. However, neither Bush nor Clinton could unite the international community to 
stop the intranational conflicts in Bosnian War and the genocide in Rwanda, where 
conflicts were caused by one ethnicity attempting to eliminate the other. As the Persian 
Gulf Crisis revealed, it was easier to convince countries united to oppose the aggression 
of one state against another than it was to unify the international community against a 
state perpetrating violence against its own people.  
In a period when the American public was less inclined to pay attention to 
international events and less supportive of US involvement in foreign crises, presidents 
needed to explain foreign policy decisions in a way that kept the public focus but also 
supportive of policy decisions. American attitudes were especially relevant when mass 
media reports on global crises informed and influenced public opinion. Both presidents 
recognized that intranational conflicts were difficult for outside powers to influence, 
while American morality made it difficult to ignore the crises. Also, refusing to 
participate in resolution efforts undermined American principles and values. How could 
the United States argue it defended human rights and democracy while it stood by as a 
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state violated those ideals? In responding to intranational conflicts Bush and Clinton were 
questioned about US involvement in intranational crises especially when they did not 
threaten US national security interests. Thus, intranational conflicts proved to be the most 
significant challenges to both men's grand strategies. American foreign policy makers 
were not the only ones challenged by this situation; many Americans questioned 
America's role in a world without a global threat. 
During the 1990s, while American public supported US participation in 
international affairs, the public was less supportive of US involvement in peacekeeping 
missions. Many Americans had believed that the end of the Cold War ended would make 
the world safer and more peaceful. Instead, they continued to hear about violence and 
crises occurring throughout the world and appeals for international aid. During the Cold 
War the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism were the greatest threats to the 
United States, but in the post-Cold War period, that threat no longer existed. If no other 
country was powerful enough to threaten the United States then, what was America's 
purpose in the world, and who was the biggest threat to the United States? If there was 
not global power strong enough to threaten the United States, then the United States was 
not responsible for policing the world. These public attitudes led Bush and Clinton to 
frame and justify American interventions around the world in ways that answered these 
questions.  
After the Cold War, changes in telecommunication technology, the development 
of cable television, and twenty-four-hour news networks affected the mass media's role in 
American society. However, many Americans continued to get much of their evening, 
weekend, and serialized news broadcasts from CBS, NBC, and ABC. These news reports 
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provided the American public with basic information about world events. However, most 
regular news broadcasts discussed foreign news for less than two minutes, unless it was a 
special report which could last thirty minutes to an hour. Newspapers and editorial 
sections provided the in-depth analysis and context that television news reports lacked. 
The lack of attention was visible if a crisis did not threaten American interests or had 
little relevance to most American’s lives. However, crises that posed significant threats to 
US interest or were relevant to much of the American population received much news 
coverage.  
The Persian Gulf Crisis with over one thousand news broadcasts and special 
reports was the most televised event in the early post-Cold War period. The next highest 
reported crisis was Somalia and the US intervention there with over 800 reports. The US 
intervention in Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda received approximately 500 reports, and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany had less than 400. Many of the 
reports on the crises relied on stereotypes, traditional narratives, and understandings of 
regions and peoples. In Bosnia, the media described the crisis as an ancient feud, and 
often described the genocide in Rwanda as a tribal war or civil war. The ways mass 
media described these conflicts and the reasons for them influenced how American public 
understood and rated their importance in the same way presidential framing did.  
Americans’ expressed their opinions of US foreign policy by corresponding with 
the president and writing editorials to newspapers. It is difficult to completely gauge the 
influence public opinion had on Bush’s and Clinton’s foreign policy. However, both 
presidents took steps to recognize how the American public felt about various issues, and 
attempted to gain public support for foreign policy decisions. Sometimes they succeeded 
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other times they did, and depending on the crisis and the president’s determination of the 
crisis importance to US security he was willing to act without public support. As Clinton 
did when he decided to undertake the US intervention in Haiti even though the public’s 
opposed a military intervention to restore Haiti’s democratic government. Bush never 
faced this problem, though he often faced public opposition to his policy decisions.  
After the end of the Cold War, George Bush, Bill Clinton, the American public, 
and the American media attempted to understand the world’s changing situation. The rise 
of intra-state conflicts and the difficulties the United States faced determining when to 
intervene to re-establish stability and peace plagued Bush and Clinton’s foreign policy 
and national security strategies. The American public added to the challenges they faced 
as the public was reluctant to deploy American military force to police the world, even as 
the United States maintained its military preponderance of power. Intranational conflicts 
and technological changes combined to change the way the American media reported on 
foreign affairs. The increased ability of reporters to quickly describe crises around the 
world and the introduction of twenty-four-hour news channels introduced new ways to 
influence public opinion and presidential foreign policy decisions.   
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